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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Ronald Dworkin has proposed a new measure of human dignity,
one that he calls "inviolability"1 and that he correlates to the amount
© Copyright 1997 by Richard Stith.
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University. A.B., Harvard College; MA, University of
California, Berkeley; M. Phil., Yale University; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Yale University.
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1. RONALD DwoRKPN, LIFE's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EuTHANASIA,

AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 73 (1993) [hereinafter LIFE'S DOMINION].
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of creative effort invested in each human being.' His book Life's Dominion3 insists that the more productive investment in each being, the
more regrettable the killing of that being.4 His idea may well have a
legal impact.5 Inferences based in part upon inviolability are, according to Dworkin, valid not only for all "Western political culture," but
2. Id. at 71-101.
3. See supra note 1.
4. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 71-101. This and other broad, introductory comments concerning Life's Dominion are documented in detail in the subsequent text of this
Article.
Dworkin has not significantly modified, nor further developed, his position since the
publication of Life's Dominion. His only subsequent book, Freedom'sLaw: The Moral Reading
of the American Constitution, is almost exclusively an anthology of articles originally published prior to Lfe's Dominion. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM's LAw: THE MORAL READING OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION

(1996) [hereinafter

FREEDOM'S

LAW]. Only the "Introduc-

tion," id. at 1, the chapter summaries, and one short "Addendum," id. at 143, are new.
None of these deals with Dworkin's investment-based theory of inviolability. The main
point of the thirty-eight-page introduction is to bring "political morality into the heart of
constitutional law." Id. at 2. Dworkin adds that "political morality is inherently uncertain
and controversial, so any system of government that makes such principles part of its law
must decide whose interpretation and understanding will be authoritative. In the American system judges-ultimately the Justices of the Supreme Court-now have that authority
. .. " Id.
5. The views expressed in Life's Dominion have already begun to affect case law at the
highest levels. justice Stevens, in his concurring-dissenting opinion in PlannedParenthoodv.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913-14 n.2 (1992) (StevensJ, concurring), quoted Dworkin at length.
Id. Stevens cited an earlier article by Dworkin, UnenumeratedRights: Whether and How Roe
Should Be Overruled, that first developed core ideas later included in Life's Dominion. Id.
(quoting Ronald Dworkin, UnenumeratedRights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overrded,
59 U. CHI. L. REv. 381, 400-01 (1992)). The particular words quoted by Stevens were incorporated almost verbatim in Lfe's Dominion. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 113-14. NotingJustice Stevens's citation to his work, Dworkin avers that the Casey Court gave the right
to abortion "a new and better foundation, along the lines that Chapter 3 [which had been
previously published separately] . . . described." FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 4, at 42. It is
to be expected that someone of Dworkin's considerable lucidity and skill will have relatively great influence on the law, for "[wie certainly do want influence to be unequal in
politics ... : we want those with better views, or who can argue more cogently, to have
more influence." Id. at 27. See also justice Sopinka's opinion for the majority, citing
Dworkin, in Rodriguez v. British Columbia [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 585-a case dealing with the
"right to die." Reasoning quite similar to that of Dworkin is at work in recent right-to-die
cases in the United States as well. In the Addendum mentioned supra note 4, Dworkin
repeats some of his central arguments from Life's Dominion in support of Judge Barbara
Rothstein's ruling in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996), holding that a Washington law
forbidding physician-assisted suicide was unconstitutional. Id. at 1467.
Subsequent federal appellate court cases echo Dworkin's idea that some human lives
are worth less than others, namely, those lives in which the investment has been "as substantially fulfilled as is anyway likely." LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 88. Thus, the
Second Circuit argues "[s]urely, the state's interest [in preserving someone's life] lessens
as the potential for life diminishes." Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 36 (1996). Like Dworkin (as we shall see), the Ninth Circuit has made much of

1997]

CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY OF INVIOLABILITY

291

for "any nation dedicated to liberty."6 In the course of showing his
inegalitarian concept of inviolability to be both dangerous and mistaken, I hope not only to lessen its influence, but also to find better
answers to the new questions it raises.
Abortion made him do it. Dworkin's theory of inviolability is
needed, he thinks, in order to make sense of the ambivalence many of
us feel toward abortion.7 Here, too, Dworkin is wrong. Though not
its primary concern, this Article will examine another way to understand the important ambivalence about abortion uncovered by Dworkin, a way recently taken by German law. Shortly after the publication
of Dworkin's book, on May 28, 1993, the Constitutional Court of Germany issued an opinion holding that the inviolability of human dignity requires recognition of a constitutional right to life throughout
pregnancy, but does not mandate criminal punishment for abortion.8
the analogy between the unequal value of fetuses and the unequal value of ill or elderly

persons:
[W]e begin with the compelling similarities between right-to-die cases and abortion cases.... In right-to-die cases the outcome of the balancing test may differ at
different points along the life cycle as a person's physical or medical condition
deteriorates, just as in abortion cases the permissibility of restrictive state legislation may vary with the progression of the pregnancy. Equally important, both
types of cases raise issues of life and death ....
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 800-01.
Judge Beezer, in dissent, raises questions similar to some of those discussed in this
Article. He writes that we have been forced
to step back and reexamine the historic presumption that all human lives are
equally and intrinsically valuable. Viewed most charitably, this reexamination
may be interpreted as our struggle with the question whether we as a society are
willing to excuse the terminally ill for deciding that their lives are no longer worth
living. Viewed less charitably, the reexamination may be interpreted as a mere
rationalization for house-cleaning, cost-cutting and burden-shifting-a way to get
rid of those whose lives we deem worthless.
Id. at 856-57 (Beezer, J., dissenting). Further references to these two important appellate
cases will be made at appropriate points in this Article. Dworkin coauthored an amicus
brief in support of these two decisions before the United States Supreme Court. See Assisted
Suicide: The Philosophers'Brief N.Y. REv. BooKs, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41-42 (with an introduction by Ronald Dworkin) [hereinafter Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: The Philosopher'sBrie].
6. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 166, 171. Life's Dominion is already being published in various other European languages. See, e.g., EL DOMINIO DE LA VIDA. UNA DiscuSION ACERCA DEL ABORTO, LA EUTANASIA, Y LA LIBERTAD INDIVIDUAL (Editorial Ariel ed.,
1994). It has been published, or is forthcoming, in Italian, German, and French. Telephone Interview byJ. Thomas Veme with Professor Ronald Dworkin (Sept. 6, 1995).
7. IFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 10.
8. See Judgment of 28 May 1993, 88 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 203 (Second Senate), 1993 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRiF-r [EuGRZ]
229; see also Donald Kommers, The ConstitutionalLaw of Abortion in Germany: Should Americans Pay Attention?, 10J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 15-32 (1994) (reporting the German court's holding that "[i ] n the interest of preserving the value of unborn life, abortion
must remain illegal, but the State need not punish the illegal act if the abortion takes place
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As with the prior, similar holding that the court reaffirmed,9 this high
court decision can be expected to have an important impact not only
on Germany but also on the legal evolution of other nations, especially those with new or emerging constitutions.'
Not a review of Dworkin's book, 1' this Article focuses instead
upon his pivotal idea: the inviolability of human life is a function of
within the first three months of pregnancy and after the State has had an opportunity to
get the pregnant woman to change her mind"); Gerald L. Neumann, Casey in the Mirror
Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L.
273 (1995) (comparing the German court's decisions with United States decisions and
summarizing the major features of the German opinion).
9. SeeJudgment of 25 February 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1 (First Senate) (F.R.G.), translated
in Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v.
Wade, 9 J. MARSHALLJ. PRAC. & PROC. 551, 605-84 (1976). Despite important internal
differences regarding the statutes before them, both the 1975 and the 1993 panels of the
Constitutional Court agreed unanimously on two key points: the right to life protects the
unborn and this right does not necessarily entail the penalization of abortion. SeeJonas &
Gorby, supra,at 645. Thus, the more liberal (dissenting) opinion in the earlier case begins
with the following inclusion of the fetus under the protective umbrella of the constitution:
The life of each individual human being is self-evidently a central value of the
legal order. It is uncontested that the constitutional duty to protect this life also
includes its preliminary stages before birth. The debates in Parliament and
before the Federal Constitutional Court dealt not with the whetherbut rather only
the how of this protection.
Id. at 663.
The more conservative (majority) opinion in that same case acknowledges that the
means of protection need not in principle include criminal sanctions:
Punishment... can never be an end in itself.... The legislature is not prohibited.., from expressing the legal condemnation of abortion... in ways other
than the threat of punishment. The decisive factor is whether the totality of
measures .

.

. guarantees an actual protection ....

It is not a question of an

"absolute" duty to punish but rather one of a "relative" duty to use the penal
sanction, which grows out of ... insight into the inadequacy of all other means.
Id. at 646.
The essential difference between the 1975 and 1993 decisions is that the latter finds
certain such "other means" potentially adequate and, therefore, constitutional, but without
retreating from the affirmation of a fetal right to life. See Kommers, supra note 8, at 18.
The 1993 dissents object neither to the unborn's right to life nor to the depenalization of
abortion. For further discussion of the 1993 case, see infra note 328 and accompanying
text.
10. For a discussion of the 1975 case's influence on Spanish constitutional law, see
Richard Stith, New Constitutionaland Penal Theory in Spanish Abortion Law, 35 AM.J. COMP. L.
513, 514, 525 (1987) [hereinafter New Constitutionaland Penal Theory]. The permission for
depenalization found in the 1993 decision has apparently been a factor in a recent effort
to remove all punishment for early abortion in Spain. See Documentacidn-Espaa:
Anteproyecto de ley Sobre Regulacidn de la Interrupcion Voluntaria del Embarazo, 5 CuAD.NOS DE
BIOETICA 235, 235-37 (1994) (reproducing a preliminary draft of a bill proposing that abortion be decriminalized in cases of grave danger to the mother, pregnancies resulting from
sex crimes, severe fetal defects, or severe material personal problems-generally within the
first 12 to 22 weeks).
11. Life's Dominion has already been widely reviewed in the legal literature and elsewhere. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Life's Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 NomE DAME L. REV.
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the value of the creative efforts invested in it. 12 Arguing that this notion is both unfortunate and erroneous, I propose an alternative understanding of life's inviolability, one founded on respect for the
human image or form.1 3 The German court decision of 1993 can be
seen as using this idea of respect to reach a plausible political solution
to the abortion conflict.1 4
Dworkin begins by positioning himself in the middle of the road
in the abortion debate, aiming for a "settlement of the controversy...
that will not insult or demean [either side], one that everyone can
accept with full self-respect." 15 Indeed, his arguments do borrow from
329 (1993) (book review); Alexander Morgan Capron, Philosophy and Theory: Life's Sacred
Value-Common Ground or Battleground?, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1491 (1994) (book review); Stephen L. Carter, Strife's Dominion, NEw YORKER, Aug. 1993, at 86 (book review); Book Review, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1993, at 98; Robert P. George, Book Review, 88 AM. POL. SCI.
Rev. 444 (1994); Robert Grant, Abortion and the Idea of the Sacred, TIMES LIT. SuPP.
(London),June 18, 1993, at 11 (book review); Abner S. Green, Uncommon Ground, 62 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 646 (1994) (book review); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions: Investments, Memberships, the Tree of Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 TEX. L. REv. 559
(1994) (book review); Russell Hittinger, Getting It Wrong, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 1993, at 53
(book review); Frances M. Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life's Dominion, 95 COLUM. L. Rev. 160 (1995) (book review); Mary Kenny, Once upon a Time, HUM. LIFE

REv., Summer 1993, at 31 (book review); Chris Naticchia, Book Review, 10J.L. & POL. 339
(1994); MichaelJ. Perry, The Gospel According toDworkin, 11 CoNST. COMMENT. 163 (1994)
(book review); Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity of Human Life, 103 YALE L.J. 2049 (1994) (book
review); John A. Robertson, Autonomy's Dominion: Dworkin on Abortion and Euthanasia, 19 L.
& Soc. INQUIRY 457 (1994) (book review); T.M. Scanlon, Partisanfor Life, N.Y. REv. BOOKS,
July 15, 1993, at 45 (book review); Tom Stacy, Reconciling Reason and Religion: On Dworkin
and Religious Freedom, 63 GEo. WASH. L. Rev. 1 (1994) (book review); Leon E. Trakman &
Sean Gatien, Abortion Rights: Taking ResponsibilitiesMore Seriously Than Dworkin, 48 SMU L.
REv. 585 (1995) (book review); Laurence H. Tribe, On the Edges of Life and Death, N.Y.
TIMES BOOK REv., May 16, 1993, § 7, at 1 (book review); Book Note, Inside out, Within and
Beyond, or Backwards?, 107 HARv. L. REv. 943 (1994). Most have been fairly mild in their
criticisms. For example, even the Kenny piece in the anti-abortion Human Life Review declares the book "measured." Kenny, supra, at 36. Most of the reviews do not contain any
substantial criticism of Dworkin's central, investment-based notion of intrinsic value. But
see Kamm, supra, at 180; Rakowski, supra,at 2057-61. None has provided an adequate alternative solution to the paradox of intrinsic value so well delineated by Dworkin-the fact
that we often respect life once it exists without wishing more life to come into existence.
By contrast, this Article will show that Dworkin's investment theory deeply, erroneously,
and unnecessarily injures human dignity, in that there exists a far more plausible and felicitous explanation of this apparent paradox.
12. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 84.
13. Rakowski's critique is closest to mine in its concerns. See Rakowski, supranote 11, at
2053, 2071-79. His analysis is different, however, and he does not elucidate the key
counterconcepts of respect and image. See id.
14. See Kommers, supra note 8, at 20 ("Compulsory counseling, declared the Court,
must be oriented toward the constitutional goal of preserving unborn life. At the same
time, out of respectfor the well-being and dignity of the pregnantwoman, the counselors could not
legally dictate the outcome of such counseling." (emphasis added)).
15. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 10-11.
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the rhetoric of both sides. He agrees with the "pro-life" side that the
"fetus"-a term he uses to include the unborn at every stage of pregnancy, including the embryonic"6is human and alive. 1 7 According
to Dworkin, "abortion means the extinction of a human life that has
already begun,"1 8 and pre- and postnatal life share "sanctity" or "inviolability."19 Dworkin also adopts many of the stronger "pro-choice" assertions, including, for example, that laws against abortion impose "a
kind of slavery"2 ° on women.
Dworkin would have us grant the fetus an intermediate status, less
than a rights-bearing person but more than a thing of no moral
worth. 2 1 One might say that he provides a pro-choice answer to a
common ploy used by the pro-life side in debates: When supporters
of abortion rights express any ambivalence about the procedure, such
as a desire to make it "rare," their anti-abortion opponents are wont to
ask simply, "Why? If the baby weren't a fellow member of the human
community, why would you want to minimize abortion any more than
other kinds of surgery?" Dworkin would respond that abortion is indeed regrettable, but only because of the inviolability of human life,
not because the unborn child is an equal, rights-bearing member of
22
our community.
Dworkin claims to be articulating the deep or true position of
pro-lifers as well as of pro-choicers. That is, he argues that even those
opposed to abortion are ambivalent about fetal rights. 23 They think of
the fetus as more than property but less than an equal human being
with rights. 2a Interestingly, one of his proofs is based on German constitutionaljurisprudence. 25 Dworkin argues that in 1975 the German
high court struck down liberalized abortion laws solely because those
laws "did not sufficiently value human life," and thus were inconsistent
with the anti-Nazi tenor of the 1949 Basic Law, not because the fetus
16. Id.at 5.
17. Id. at 22.
18. Id. at 33.
19. Id. at 73. "I use [the terms 'sacred' and 'inviolable']-and also the terms 'sanctity'
and 'inviolability'-interchangeably," writes Dworkin. Id.
20. Id. at 103.
21. Id. at 73. That there are such intermediate entities or states of being can, of course,
be controverted. Dworkin seems to claim that intrinsically valuable objects do exist,
though he never appeals to natural law or otherwise explains how this can be possible. Id.
at 69-70. For criticism of the modem tendency to reduce all value to subjective satisfaction,
see Richard Stith, A Critique of Fairness, 16 VAL. U. L. REv. 459 (1982) [hereinafter Stith,
Critique of Fairness]. See also infra note 95.
22. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 70-101.
23. Id. at 32, 94-97.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 64.
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possesses a legal right to life.2 6 Although Dworkin has to ignore much
of the German court's language17 in order to reach this conclusion,
he is correct that the 1975 case seemed willing to minimize "rightstalk."2 8 It did so, however, with regard both to the fetus and to the
pregnant woman in the course of finding a viable middle ground in
the abortion conflict. 9
Any apparent concessions to the pro-life side are ultimately reversed by Dworkin. He holds that the pro-lifers' fundamental principle, the inviolability of life, itself requires an abortion-rights regime
more pro-choice than the United States Supreme Court's 1992
PlannedParenthoodv. CaseP0 decision-indeed, even more pro-choice
than the pre-Casey, post-Roe v. Wade3 1 jurisprudence of abortion-in
that Dworkin would forbid waiting periods, limits on abortion funding, and any other state regulations motivated by a desire to protect
the fetus from abortion.12 In other words, Dworkin's effort at political
26. Id.
27. For example, in interpreting the constitutional provision "Everyone has the right to
life," the Court in 1975 concluded: " ' Everyone' . .. is 'everyone living'; expressed another
way: every life possessing human individuality; 'everyone' also includes the yet unborn
human being." Jonas & Gorby, supra note 9, at 638.
28. Perhaps more frequently than rights-related terminology, one finds the value-related, catch-all term Rechtsgut (legal good) used in the 1975 decision. See id. at 624, 667.
This concept, of nineteenth-century origin, has been criticized by Spanish commentator
Rafael Domingo for ultimately doing away with the legal distinction between persons and
things. See Rafael Domingo, El Aborto y el Tribunal Constitucional Alemdn, 21 REWSTA
CHILENA DE DERECHO 273, 278-79 (1994). Although the 1975 German opinion explicitly
avoided the issue of whether the unborn child is a "bearer" of (is able to "possess") a right
to life,Jonas & Gorby, supra note 9, at 641-42, the 1993 decision repeatedly affirms that the
fetus has its "own" (eigenen) right to life. See 88 BVerfGE, supra note 8, at 242, 251, 258.
Thus, it may no longer be tenable to interpret German constitutional theory as relegating
fetuses and fetal rights to an impersonal level of goods or values, as I (like Dworkin) sought
to show in New Constitutionaland Penal Theory, supra note 10, at 526-27. See also MARY ANN
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw 38-39 (1987) (arguing that the Constitutional Court characterizes the "right to life" as a value of the community rather than
something that belongs to the fetus).
29. LFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 64.
30. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 173. Dworkin argues explicitly against the holding of the Casey decision, id., that a mandatory waiting period before an abortion is constitutional. Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.
Dworkin also advocates reconsideration of the cases decided between Roe and Casey,
LiFE's DOMINION, supra note 1,at 175, which held that federal and state refusals to fund
abortion were constitutional. See, e.g., Webster v.Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
511 (1989) (upholding a state act restricting "the use of public employees and facilities for
the performance or assistance of nontherapeutic abortions"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 326 (1980) (holding that "a state that participates in the Medicaid program is not
obligated under Title XIX [of the Social Security Act] to continue to fund those medically
necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde
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settlement ends with an overwhelming victory for the pro-choice
side.3" One cannot help but wonder whether his clear political goal of
more firmly securing abortion rights might not have skewed his
broader theory of inviolability.
My critique of Dworkin is divided into two parts. In the first, I
argue that the results of Dworkin's theory are unappealing. For example, despite his early promise, 4 Dworkin's argument does in fact "demean" individuals holding pro-life views. He accuses them virtually of
bad faith, or at best of self-deception, for he claims that they do not
really believe in fetal rights but only in fetal sanctity or inviolability.3 5
When he then goes on to argue that the sanctity of life itself may permit and even require abortion,3 6 Dworkin seems purposely to mock
pro-life views. Dworkin's idea of life's inviolability thus contains no
common meaning upon which civil peace could be founded. There is
a more important result of Dworkin's theory that may not appeal to
many. His weak idea of inviolability, together with his acknowledgement of the continuity of pre- and postnatal life, means that his justifications for abortion lessen legal and moral resistance to the killing of
human beings after birth as well-particularly with regard to infants,
the disabled, and the aged.
In the second part of my critique of Dworkin, I argue that both
sorts of pernicious results-the harm to political compromise and the
harm to certain classes of vulnerable postnatal human beings-are
founded on an erroneous concept of sanctity or inviolability. Dworkin
fails phenomenologically to understand both the object and the attitude involved in the inviolability of human life. He wrongly thinks
that when we mourn the death of a newborn, for example, we regret
Amendment"); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (holding that there is "no constitutional violation by the city of St. Louis in electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly
financed hospital services for childbirth without providing corresponding services for nontherapeutic abortions"); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (holding that it is constitutionally permissible for a state to provide Medicaid benefits for abortions only if the
abortions are medically necessary); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977) (holding that
"Pennsylvania's refusal to extend Medicaid coverage to nontherapeutic abortions is not
inconsistent with Title XIX" of the Social Security Act).
33. Many supposed efforts at abortion compromise appear, like Dworkin's, to be briefs
for one side. See, e.g., LAWRENCE TRIBE, ABORTION:

THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) (fully

supporting the Roe approach). One of the rare exceptions, a book that clearly listens with
sympathy to both sides, is The Politics of Virtue: Is Abortion Debatable?. ELIZABETH MENSCH &
ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLncs OF VIRTUE: Is ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993).
34. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 10-11.

35. Id. at 32, 94-97.
36. Id. at 99 (stating that exceptions to prohibition of abortion "are based on respect
for the intrinsic value of human life"). Dworkin also claims that euthanasia may further
the sanctity of life. Id. at 196, 215.
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primarily the waste of invested effort rather than the loss of the individual child herself.17 He incorrectly claims that our attitude toward
an infant who lives is largely one of valuing that investment rather
than of respecting her life."8 To the contrary, this Article will demonstrate that our attitudes toward human life cannot be captured by the
idea of "valuing" at all; it will demonstrate that the respect or reverence we have for life is an entirely separate stance, unrelated to value.
This stance provides a more coherent account for popular ambivalence toward abortion than does Dworkin's investment notion.
This Article will also briefly show that the German Constitutional
Court decisions of 1975 and 1993 are based on this more adequate
understanding of respect for life both before and after birth. This
understanding may lead us not only to avoid a devaluation of postnatal human life, but also towards peace with honor in the abortion conflict, by seeking to protect prenatal life, not by punishing, but by
empowering women. The German idea, at bottom, is that in a society
in which pregnant women were truly free to choose, the overwhelming majority of women would choose life."9 To require the law to aim
at such a social result is to be at the same time pro-choice and prolife.4 ° Thus, even on the narrow issue of abortion itself, the counterprinciples proposed in this Article are both more plausible in theory
and more acceptable in result4 1 than are Dworkin's suggestions.
37. Id. at 87-88.
38. Id.
39. See Kommers, supra note 8, at 32.
40. See Richard Stith, Protection Without Punishment: FindingCommon Ground on Abortion,
CREssEr, Nov. 1992, at 5. As Dworkin points out, Catherine MacKinnon goes further to say
that it is the inequality of women that dooms fetuses to a lesser right to life than they would
otherwise have. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 55 (citing Catherine A. MacKinnon,
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1316 (1991)). "In my opinion and
in the experience of many pregnant women, the fetus is a human form of life. It is alive.
But the existence of sex inequality in society requires that completed live birth mark the
personhood line." MacKinnon, supra,at 1316. Mark Tushnet has also argued that in a less
sexist world, a right to abortion might no longer make sense. See Mark Tushnet, An Essay
on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1365 (1984). If these people of the Left are correct, then
the use of empowering, nonpenal means to limit abortion might be necessary only up to
the point that women achieve real equality. In a truly egalitarian world, abortion might
once again become fairly punishable because pregnancy would no longer be used as a
weapon against women. For further discussion, see infra note 381 and accompanying text.
41. See Kommers, supra note 8, at 17. Donald Kommers notes that, after some initial
controversy, "more and more Germans began to realize that the [1993] decision was a
sensitive and nuanced attempt, undertaken with remarkable empathy and understanding,
to balance the State's interest in protecting life with the woman's interest in self-determination." Id. Even in America, we might be able to follow this path to a solution to the abortion conflict, for it can be argued that the minimum fetal protection required by the 1993
German decision, 88 BVerfGE 203 (1993)-nonpenal State encouragement and support
for birth over abortion-is also the maximum protection permitted by the 1992 American
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THE AMBIVALENCE OF ABORTION ACCORDING TO DWORKIN

Dworkin contends that the battle over abortion cannot end as
long as either side insists on speaking only the language of rights.42 A

fetal right to life is flatly incompatible with a female right to
abortion.4 3
According to Dworkin, once each side comes off its high horse,
both will agree that abortion is a wrong without being the violation of
a right.44 Most pro-choice people will admit that though a fetus does
not possess a right to life correlated to a government duty of protection, it still has significant intrinsic value. Abortion destroys a human
life. 45 As a result, "abortion is always a grave moral decision,"' and
"never permissible for a trivial or frivolous reason." 47 Dworkin thinks
that "sacred"4" and "sanctity"49 are good words to express the intrinsic
fetal value acknowledged even by the pro-choice camp, but he insists
that no theistic underpinning for these concepts need exist.5" Therefore, he prefers to use the words "inviolable"5 ' or "inviolability"5 2 in
connection with the fetus, for these have a more appropriately secular
3
sound than do "sacred" and "sanctity."
To consolidate the foundation of his new and supposedly universally acceptable view, Dworkin needs to make the same claim about
the pro-life camp-that it too considers the fetus to have only a sort of
intrinsic value or inviolability rather than a full-fledged equal right to
life. In addition, this value must be shown to be "detached" rather
than "derived" from rights.5 4 Dworkin makes strikingly strong assertions here. Although he claims only that "most"5 5 pro-choice liberals
agree that a fetus has inviolability, Dworkin argues that virtually no
one on the pro-life side truly believes that the fetus has an equal
decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
the German and American decisions).
42. LIVE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 9-10.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 32-33.
45. Id. at 21-22.
46. Id. at 32.
47. Id. at 33.
48. Id. at 25.
49. Id. at 73.

50. Id. at 25.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

73.
25.
11.
32.

See infra note 388 (comparing
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human right to life.5 6 It is unclear why he protests so much on this
point, for his argument here is both weak and largely unnecessary to
his final political position.
Dworkin is faced initially with much evidence that many people
believe the fetus to have a right to life equal to that of the rest of us.
For example, the 1975 German high court decision, analyzed by
Dworkin,5 7 asserts that with respect to the right to life, "no distinction
can be made . . .between various stages of the life developing itself

before birth, or between unborn and born life.""8 Nuanced polling
data also seem to show that at least a substantial plurality of Americans
believes in the equal dignity of the unborn. A 1991 Gallup poll cited
by Dworkin found that 36.8% agreed that "'Abortion is just as bad as
killing a person who has already been born, it is murder.'"5 9 If the
only other polling option had been something like "Abortion is
good," one might easily question whether the above respondents really meant what they said. 6' The poll at issue, however, contained two
other ways to express misgivings about abortion: "'Abortion is murder, but it is not as bad as killing someone who has already been
born,"' which got 11.5%, and "'Abortion is not murder, but it does
involve the taking of human life,'" which received 28.3%.61 To my
mind, these data show that 11.5% plus 28.3%-including many who
might style themselves pro-life-could well agree with Dworkin's inviolability-but-no-equal-rights view of the fetus, making his a politically
significant, though often overlooked, perspective. Dworkin is not satisfied with such a conclusion, however. He wants to claim that even
those in the 36.8% plurality do not really believe in equal rights for
the unborn.6 2
Though its content varies, the basic form of Dworkin's critique is
the following: Although pro-lifer X may say that she6 3 believes in an
equal right to life for the fetus, X also believes that the government
should leave some abortions, especially in early pregnancy, unpun56. Id. at 95.
57. Id. at 64.
58. Jonas & Gorby, supra note 9, at 638.
59. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1,at 13.
60. For example, one might raise this question with regard to a 1986 New York Times
poll with fewer available options that came up with 55% of respondents, including 61% of
women, who agreed that "'abortion is the same thing as murdering a child.'" Adam Clymer, One Issue That Seems to Defy a Yes or No, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1986, § 4, at 22.
61. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 13.
62. Id. at 94 (claiming that if very conservative people really believed in fetal rights,
they would not permit abortion even to save a mother's life).
63. In Life's Dominion, Dworkin uses traditionally inclusive masculine pronouns, except
when referring specifically to women.
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ished. Xs second belief is inconsistent with Xs first belief. Therefore,
X does not really hold the first belief, no matter what she says.64
Some problems with this argument are empirical. Dworkin's data
about anti-abortionists are often little more than surmises and may
well be inaccurate. For example, he frequently states that even prolifers consider early abortion to be not so bad as late abortion,6 5 and,
therefore, they clearly fail to recognize an equal right to life at all
stages of pregnancy.6 6 He offers no proof of that assertion, however.
To my knowledge, permissiveness with regard to early abortion is a
rarity among anti-abortionists.6 7 Certainly, it has never been the position of the National Right to Life Committee.6" Likewise, Dworkin
argues that the Roman Catholic Church only recently began using the
64. Id. at 14, 31, 32, 34, 64, 94.
65. Id. at 32-33, 88-89, 93-94.
66. Id.
67. For example, see the words of the anti-abortion 1975 German decision, quoted
supra at note 58, refusing to recognize any distinction between early and late abortion with
regard to the right to life. SeeJonas & Gorby, supra note 9, at 638. The 1993 opinion
reaffirms this same equality. SeeJudgment of 28 May 1993, 88 BVerfGE 203, 243-44, 247-48
(1993), 1993 EuGRZ 229, 240-41. In addition, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), does not
make much distinction between early and late abortion. Roe granted an almost unlimited
right to third-trimester abortion. Id. at 164-65. Even just before birth, destruction of the
fetus must be permitted if it promotes maternal "health." Id. at 165. By referring to its
companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973), Roe defines health broadly to
include all factors-even psychological and familial-relevant to well-being. Roe, 410 U.S.
at 151. It is clearly unconstitutional for a state to forbid intentionally killing a viable fetus,
if "the unborn child's survival" would have a "potential psychological or emotional impact
on the mother." Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 737
F.2d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 1984).
Since 1973, every politically significant attempt to limit Roe late in pregnancy has been
led by those who view such a prohibition as a first step toward forbidding early abortion.
See Ellen Goodman, Editorial, Partial-TruthAttacks to Dominate Rhetoric SurroundingAbortion,
AmIz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 1996, at 35 (arguing that criminalizing late-term procedures will
open the door to efforts to criminalize other procedures). But see Leavitt v.Jane L., 116 S.
Ct. 2068, 2073 (1996) (per curiam) (reversing, on procedural grounds, a Tenth Circuit
holding that Utah statute regulating abortions after 20 weeks of gestational age was
unconstitutional).
Dworkin may have missed all of this because he misread Roe v. Wade. He mistakenly
asserts that under Roe the government "may outlaw abortion altogether when the fetus has
become a viable being, that is, in the third trimester of pregnancy." LIFE'S DOMINION, supra
note 1, at 168; see also id. at 63, 114-15 ("Fetuses have no interests before approximately the

point in pregnancy after which they are viable, and Roe v. Wade permits states to forbid
abortion after that point, anyway."). Dworkin, without explanation, later contradicts himself and admits that even a third-trimester prohibition would be "subject to certain exceptions" (which is still a misleading understatement of Roe's and Doe's wide permission for
late abortion). Id. at 170.
68. Telephone Interview with Burke Balch, Director of Medical Ethics for the National
Right to Life Committee (Nov. 11, 1995).
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"right" of the fetus as a reason against abortion,6 9 without mentioning
that our modem rhetoric of rights came into existence only in the late
Middle Ages70 and into the Roman Catholic Church still later. 71 The
Church could hardly have been expected to speak of the rights of the
fetus before it spoke of the rights of anyone else.72
Likewise, Dworkin's charge of inconsistency is not obviously true.
Many scholars, both pro-life and pro-choice, have argued that even if
the fetus has a dignity equal to that of the rest of us, it does not necessarily follow that abortion should be punished in hardship cases (such
69. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 39.

70. The idea that legal duties must correspond to legal rights is both culture and timebound, perhaps arising in the West only in late medieval nominalism. Professor Michel
Villey has defended the thesis that William of Ockham was among the first fully to conceptualize rights over property. See MICHEL VILLEY, SEIZE ESSAS DE PHILOSOPHIE Du DROIT 140
(1969). Ockham did so, according to Villey, in order to permit the Franciscans to renounce such rights and thus more easily to fulfill their radical vows of poverty. See id. At
the same time as they renounced civil claims to property, they could continue to administer
and use it in a physical sense. See id. Among the best, albeit short, histories of the modern
idea of rights are those byJohn Finnis and Martin P. Golding. SeeJOHN FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 205-10 (1980); Martin P. Golding, The Concept of Rights: A Historical Sketch, in BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 44-50 (Elsie L. Bandman & Bertram Bandman
eds., 1978); see also Martin P. Golding, Justice and Rights: A Study in Relationship, injusrxCE
AND HEALTH CARE 23-35 (Earl E. Shelp ed., 1981) (for a more refined treatment). Ernest
Fortin summarizes the matter well with regard to nonpositive rights:
Nowhere in the older tradition does one run across anything like a theory of
natural fights .... The passage from natural law to... "human" rights represents
...
the paradigm shift in our understanding of justice and moral phenomena
generally. Prior to that time, the emphasis was on virtue and duty, that is to say,
on what human beings owe to other human beings or to society at large, rather
than on what they can claim for themselves.
Ernest L. Fortin, The Natural Wrong in Natural Rights, CIsIs, May 1994, at 20, 20.
71. George Weigel has written of the "rights revolution" in the Roman Catholic
Church. See George S. Weigel, Catholicism and Democracy: The Other Twentieth Century Revolution, 12 WASH. Q. 3 (1989); George S. Weigel,John Courtney Murray and the CatholicHuman
Rights Revolution, THIS WORLD, Fall 1986, at 14; George Weigel, A Sphere of Freedom Inside
Every Human Being, BALT. SUN, Sept. 29, 1995, at 15a, available in 1995 WL 2466277.
72. An unsupported factual claim less significant for his argument is Dworkin's assertion that Operation Rescue uses "violence to intimidate women entering abortion clinics."
LIE'sS DOMINION, supra note 1, at 176. Although it is easy to imagine anti-abortion violence
against physicians and clinic staff-and there is no doubt that this has occurred-any implication that anti-abortionists would use violence against pregnant women would seem
bizarre because it could induce miscarriage. Furthermore, Flip Benham, Operation Rescue National Director, stated recently: "In rescue events across the nation, for several years
now, in which nearly 80,000 of our people have been arrested, not one has been convicted
of a violent offense." John G. Gill, Summer ofJustice Rescue Rocks Little Rock, LIFE ADVOC.,
Aug. 1994, at 18, 19. Bill Dedman quotes the required Operation Rescue pledge: "I commit to be peaceful, prayerful, and nonviolent in both word and deed." Bill Dedman, Both
Sides from the Inside, 18 MOTHER JONES 28, 31 (1993). He indicates that during an entire

week of protests, he saw only one angry anti-abortion face. See id. at 32. Overall, the prolifers looked "prayerful, peaceful, committed." Id. at 68. Dworkin offers no counterevidence whatsoever regarding Operation Rescue.
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as when the life of the mother is itself threatened or when the pregnancy is due to rape) or even punished at all.7 3 The reasons for
nonpunishment could be that the abortions in question are justified
by an individualistic morality of self-preference, that they are excused
by human frailty, or simply that they are unwise to prohibit if the prohibition is likely to be ineffective.7 4
Even if Dworkin were correct that there is no way consistently to
hold both to fetal equality and to nonpunishment for some abortions,
he would by no means have proven that people do not in fact hold
both of these views. Even reasonable people are quite capable of applying a general principle (here the equal right to life of all human
beings, born or unborn) inconsistently in a particular situation (in the
case of rape, for example) without ceasing to hold that principle. At
best, we could say of such people that we do not know what their
"real" position is, if by this we mean the position they would choose if
they were convinced by Dworkin that they had to choose one or the
other. Perhaps we should even assume they would abandon the exception rather than give up the principle. Dworkin himself, in matters ranging from constitutional interpretation to understanding a
mother's moral desires," maintains that respecting the opinions of
others means assuming that they would not knowingly wish to depart
from their principles, that they would wish those principles to trump

73. On the pro-choice side, see the classic articles arguing that even if the fetus is a
person, abortion should sometimes be viewed merely as a nonculpable failure to be a Good
Samaritan. See Donald Regan, RewritingRoe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979);Judith
Jarvis Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. Arr. 47 (1971). Both articles are cited
by Dworkin. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 110-11, 249 n.4. Most recently, in a response to Life's Dominion, Frances Kamm has made the same sort of argument. See Kamm,
supra note 11, at 191 ("Need alone does not confer a right to have aid begin, nor a duty to
give it."). Dworkin himself makes the astonishing positivist claim that believing an act to be
the killing of a person may be "no reason" to prohibit it. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at
22. He says that we could consistently "believe philosophically that pigs are persons but
that human beings have no reason to treat them as we treat one another." Id.
On the pro-life side, Gerard Bradley suggests that people might wish not to condemn
all abortions as culpable homicides even if the fetus were recognized as a constitutional
person with rights equal to those of the rest of us. See Bradley, supra note 11, at 345. He
cites common notions ofjustification and excuse in the face of danger to one's own life, as
well as the flexibility granted to state penal law in the implementation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 344-46. Concerns about enforceability and the need for political
compromise could lead even someone who believed in equal rights for the unborn to
acquiesce in noncriminalization of some abortions. See id. at 344-47, 380-85.
74. The German Constitutional Court decisions, see supra note 9 and infra notes 372,
382 and accompanying text, open the further possibility that the nonpunishment of abortion could actually be helpful in providing greaterprotection for unborn life.
75. LiFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 133-42.
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inconsistent exceptions.7 6 If Dworkin applied his own maxims to his
interpretation of pro-life opinion, he would find much (though not
all) of that opinion strongly anchored in a sincere belief in the equal
right to life of unborn children.
Dworkin offers a second argument to the effect that unborn fetuses do not have an equal right to life.77 This argument is stronger
and more substantive. Dworkin contends that nothing can have a
right that does not have interests, 78 and nothing can have an interest
that does not have consciousness. 79 Therefore, he concludes, because
fetuses (at least in the early stages of pregnancy) do not have consciousness, they can possess neither interests nor rights.8 0
Once again, however, it is not clear why Dworkin thinks he is universally convincing here, nor why he thinks he has to be." As to the
question of whether there can be rights without interests, Dworkin's
view would seem to mean that the ascetic traditions of many religions
are destructive of human rights. Those traditions, of course, attempt
to purge the self of all interest in its own life or well-being. One of my
favorite stories, perhaps apocryphal, is that of the Tibetan monk confronted by a Chinese captain of an invading army squad. The Chinese
captain is reported to have said to him, "Do you realize that I am
someone who can have you shot without blinking an eye?" The monk
is reported to have responded, "Do you realize that I am someone
who can be shot without blinking an eye?" According to Dworkin,
would the monk's relative lack of interest in remaining alive mean
that he had less right to live than more self-interested people would
have? What about others who, because of sickness or bad luck, profess
indifference to continued existence? Would they have weaker rights?
Even more problematic is Dworkin's claim that an entity cannot
have interests, and thus cannot have rights, if that entity does not have
consciousness.8 2 Do people's rights become attenuated as they tire
and fall asleep each night? On an intuitive level, it seems insufficient
for Dworkin simply to assert that "it is not against the interests of a
baby carrot that it be picked early and brought to the table as a deli76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 16-20.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 15-20.
Id. at 15-17.
Judith Jarvis Thomson, for example, remains unconvinced by Dworkin on this

point-saying that the idea that a fertilized human ovum has a right to life makes "perfectly good sense" to her-and yet she still comes out squarely in favor of elective abortion.

Judith Jarvis Thomson, Abortion: Whose Right?, BOSTON Rv., Summer 1995, at 13.
82. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 15-20.
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cacy."8 3 He is also not obviously correct when he makes the claim that
a caterpillar has no interest in becoming a butterfly. s4 Could not
these examples be used equally well to demonstrate that interests without consciousness are indeed quite possible? Would it not be wrong
wantonly to kill plants or insects, despite their alleged lack of
consciousness?
Perhaps we hesitate to agree with Dworkin because we suspect
that carrots and caterpillars may in fact possess a primitive form of
consciousness. Dworkin seems to subscribe to a form of dualism in his
sharp division of living entities between those that have consciousness
and those that do not, rather than recognizing a gradual shading
from human awareness to the deafness of stones. Carrots and caterpillars do respond to their environments.8 5 How can we say that this is
not, to use Dworkin's words, "some form of consciousness"? 6
Dworkin may mean to suggest that se/fconsciousness is what is
required as a foundation for interests, although that could mean postponing rights to some time substantially after birth, if Dworkin also
insists on an elaborate sort of "self." If by self-consciousness we mean,
however, only reflexivity-an awareness of one's own being as well as
of one's environment-then a kind of self-consciousness is present
wherever life is present. In any organism there are processes of homeostasis and homeorrhesis occurring, in which the organism monitors
its own well-being and development. This is feedback, con-science,
with-knowledge. In Dworkin's language, the developing carrot and
the metamorphosizing caterpillar do take an "interest" in themselves;
if internal or external forces harm their development, corrective
mechanisms are applied to heal the injury and reestablish proper
growth. Life must be conscious of itself in order to govern itself, in
order to exist as a unified being. The zygote and embryo, like the
carrot and caterpillar, have "some form of' consciousness and even of
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id.
85. SeeJosEF PIEPER, The PhilosophicalAct, in LEISURE: THE BASIS OF CULTURE 83-84 (Alexander Dru trans., 1963).
Every living thing lives in a world, in "its" world, and "has" a world in which it
lives.... [T] he relation between a plant and the nturiment [sic] it draws through
its roots out of the ground ...is a real relation in the primary sense of the word,
in the active reflexive sense of "relating itself": the nourishment in the ground
and in the air is absorbed and assimilated into the sphere of the plant's life by the
dynamic centre of the plant, and its power of establishing relations. All that constitutes the plant's range of relations makes its world. A plant, in fact, has a world,
and a stone has not.
Id.
86. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 16.
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self-consciousness, and thus would seem to have the foundation Dworkin requires for the ascription of a right to life.
Still, I must agree with Dworkin that it seems odd to talk about
fetuses having interests or about us needing to be fair to those interests.8 7 I think, however, the language of interests and rights equally
odd in speaking of newborn infants or of others who are not as fully
conscious or as fully self-centered as are we. The calculation of interests is most at home in mercantile contract talk. Rights and fairness
are the language of bargaining among self-interested adults. It is
strange to speak of newborn infants or caterpillars having interests, or
getting their fair share, for such entities do not bargain at arm's
length with the rest of us. Their consciousnesses have not yet risen
(or fallen, depending on one's viewpoint) to the point where they
regard others as competitors. It is very difficult to squeeze the unborn
into the image of a set of calculating adults, bargaining out a social
contract of basic rights."8 Yet why should we regard social contract
thinking, with its trappings of interests, reciprocity, and consent, as
the only or highest form of normative political and legal discourse?
The language of rights seems to be itself a product of modern
individualism. As suggested above, the ancient religious and secular
worlds had no clear concept of a right in our modern sense of a power
possessed by an individual.8 9 To them, right meant what was appropriate or lawful, or it meant simply the law itself. The notion that one
could possess a right would have made as little grammatical sense as to
say today that one can possess the law. In a sense, when we talk today
of people having natural or positive rights, we distribute the law like a
commodity. We apportion it among ourselves. We reduce the law
from a public authority to be obeyed to a set of private security guards
87. Id. at 18, 22.
88. John Rawls solved this problem by treating all those potentially able to bargain as
though they were actual bargaining partners, thus including infants explicitly and fetuses
by implication:
[T]he minimal requirements defining moral personality refer to a capacity and
not to the realization of it. A being that has this capacity, whether or not it is yet
developed, is to receive the fidl protection of the principles ofjustice. Since infants and
children are thought to have basic rights (normally exercised on their behalf by
parents and guardians), this interpretation . . . seems necessary to match our
considered judgments. Moreover, regarding the potentiality as sufficient accords
...
with the idea that as far as possible the choice of principles should not be
influenced by arbitrary contingencies.
JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY oFJusTicE 509 (1971) (emphasis added). For further discussion of
the role of potentiality in discussions of abortion, see infra notes 109-135 and accompanying text. Without explanation, Rawls nevertheless, in a recent footnote, declared his support for elective abortion. SeeJOHN RAwLs, PoLTricAL LIBERALISM 243 n.32 (1993).
89. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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to be commanded. Whereas ancient law was an object of common
loyalty, modem rights divide up the human community into a set of
petty fiefdoms, each governed by a sovereign who has sway over all
90
who enter her domain.
If we are to preserve a sense of solidarity, the language of rights
and interests described above is not the best way to conceive the
human community.9 ' To this extent, I agree with Dworkin that it is
better not to think of fetuses as having rights.9 2 A fetus with rights is a
competitor, or even a potential enemy. Why must we think of unborn
children this way? Could we not see the fetus instead as a being who
elicits in many people a sense at least of inviolability, if not of care and
concern?9" Would that we could move away from rights talk, not only
with regard to abortion, but with regard to many other problems we
94
face in the human community.
Moreover, the language of rights and of rights-holders, whom we
call persons, may be particularly unsuitable to a resolution of debates
90. See Richard Stith, Generosity: A Duty Without a Righ 25J. VALUE INQUIRY 203, 210
(1991). The Latin term jus" originally meant "law" and was closely related to "justice."
Only much later did it also come to mean a "right" possessible by individuals.
91. The literature contains further critiques of rights along these lines. See, e.g., THEODORE M. BENDrrr, RIGHTS (1982) (exploring rights and rights theories); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALC THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITCAL DISCOURSE 47-108 (1991) (arguing

an overreliance on rights in the American consciousness); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE (1982) (providing an overview of the relationship ofjustice and
morality to individualism and claims of community); P.S. Elder, Legal Rightsfor Nature-The
Wrong Answr to the Right(s) Question, 22 OsGOODE HALL LJ. 285-86 (1984) (surveying the
possible range of legal rights for nature from shallow to deep ecology); Karl Marx, On the
Jewish Question, in EARLY WRITINGS 211, 230-31 (Rodney Livingston & Gregor Benton trans.,
1975) (discussing security obtained through political association as a means of preserving
rights and property);Jan G. Narveson, Commentary, 4J. VALUE INQUIRY 258 (1970) (critiquing the failure of Feinberg's theory of rights to address the principle of utility); Joseph
Raz, Rights-Based Moralities,in UTILrr AND RIGHTS 42-59 (R.G. Frey ed., 1984) (arguing that
morality should not be viewed as right-based); Charles Taylor, Atomism, in PowERs POSSESSIONS AND FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF C.B. MACPHERSON 39-61 (Alkis Kontos ed.,
1979) (defining political atomism and providing historical overview of its evolution).
92. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 9-10.
93. If you and I recognize someone's rights, we are not bound by love to him or her,
nor do we feel between ourselves a bond of fellowship. By contrast, if we jointly commit
ourselves to caring for another, the basis is laid both for affection for the object of our
concern and for community among ourselves. This attitude is much closer to the actual
feelings of parents for very young children than are the official rights-based positions of
pro-lifers or pro-choicers in the United States. Parents feel infants neither to be their private property nor to be individuals negotiating their rights at arm's length. Instead, and
for many years, a baby is the shared source of a common life.
94. Useful attempts have been made to rescue the concept of rights from self-centered
individualism. See FINNIS, supra note 70, at 198-226; ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN

92-112 (1993);
36-42 (1986).

MORAL
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like that over abortion. Rights split the world into subjects and objects, persons and property, consumers and consumed. All entities
other than persons dissolve into an amorphous stockpile9 5 of resources, to be divided fairly among the rights-holders.96 Trees,
whales, and fetuses must either become legally recognized persons or
else lose all principled protection. Such an all-or-nothing stance cannot but hobble debate on abortion, driving both sides to extremes
because only the extremes can be conceptualized in our law. Whether
or not Dworkin proves ultimately correct, his turn away from rights is
clearly a step toward renewed dialogue and community.
Finally, there is an important methodological reason to bracket
the idea of rights, to refuse (at least initially) to answer the question of
whether fetuses have rights: Dworkin invites us honestly to examine
our deepest and simplest intuitions regarding human dignity before
and after birth. An adequate response must discard not only all political and moral agendas, but also the conceptual structures developed
by political and moral theory. In seeking to be as purely descriptive as
possible, we must eschew the complex and controverted notion of a
right. Whatever merit that concept may have, it is not a root perception but a theoretical construct. Because this Article will attempt a
phenomenological description of the world we share,9 7 it should not
begin with a search for rights.
Thus, any quarrel I might have with Dworkin here would not be
over his failure to acknowledge rights in fetuses. It would be, rather,
over his insistence on emphasizing individual rights for the rest of us,
and over any claim that those with rights must dominate other beings
who have only what he calls inviolability. The fact that the unborn,
along with infants and other human and nonhuman entities, cannot

95. This notion of stockpile is an attempt to translate Heidegger's idea of Bestand See
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, DIE TECHNIK UND DIE KEHRE

16 (1962). See also Pieper's suggestion

that theory as such disappears once the world becomes "raw material for human activity."
PIEPER, supra note 85, at 81. I have argued that rights thinking tends to reduce the world to
the status of an aspirin tablet. An aspirin tablet is of interest to me not because it is good,
but only because it makes me feel good. Our world becomes a great stockpile of actual or
potential tablets, capable eventually (we hope) of producing every enjoyable experience
we might ever wish. What else could we do with such a world except exploit it See Richard
Stith, Thinking About Ecology: Resource Management, Recognition of Rights, and Phenomenological
Truth, THE CRESSET, Nov. 1981, at 7-8; see also Richard Stith, The World As Reality, As Resource,
and As Pretense, 20 AM. J. JuRis. 141 (1975) (discussing man's view of the world as resource
as arising from self-interest).
96. See Stith, Critiqueof Fairness,supra note 21, at 471-72.
97. See HERBERT SPIEGELBERG, II THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT 655, 690 (1960).
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bargain and reciprocate need not mean that they have less intrinsic
dignity than those who can."8
To sum up: Even though Dworkin is mistaken in thinking that
almost all pro-lifers regard the fetus only as an inviolable thing, rather
than as a part of the human community,9" he is correct in pointing
out that many of them ought to be able to speak comfortably of the
fetus without using the language of rights.'
A solution to the abortion question based on the inviolability of life, rather than on rights, is
thus potentially viable, at least as a compromise. Although Dworkin is
wrong in holding that the fetus does not have consciousness sufficient
to legitimate speaking of its interests,' he may be right politically in
his suggestion that we avoid the language of rights when it comes to
the unborn. 1' Speaking of rights creates a sense of conflict, or at
least of competition, in an already highly polarized political dispute.
By talking instead about inviolability and the common good, we may
more easily find a way to restore peace in the abortion war.
Having established to his satisfaction that most people on both
sides of the abortion dispute recognize an intrinsic value, an inviolability, in human life prior to birth, but that this inviolability is not and
cannot be equivalent to a right to life, Dworkin proceeds to ask what
else it could be. l ' In setting out the problem here, Dworkin is at his
strongest. He points out that the intrinsic value of human life cannot
be the same kind of intrinsic value we usually find elsewhere in the
world. 10 4 Ordinarily, when we think something of intrinsic value, we
want to have as much of it as possible, or at least its value in potentia
correlates with its actualized value. The intrinsic value of knowledge,
for example, means that we want to have more of it, not just to preserve what we have. 10 5 It would be odd for someone highly to value
the diamonds in her possession, but at the same time not to care in
the slightest about, or even to be opposed to, acquiring more
98. On a metatheoretical level, it seems odd for Dworkin to ascribe the highest value to

entities with the most extensive consciousness. After all, Dworkin opposes the subjectivity
of value. LiFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 67. Why then does he treat as obvious the
prime value of subjectivity? Id. at 73. There is at least a tension, if not a contradiction,
between Dworkin's commitment to the objectivity of value and his exaltation of
subjectivity.

99. Id. at 15-21, 91-97.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

16-19.
9-11.
68-81.
73.
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diamonds. 11 6 This strange stance, however, is just what we often take
with regard to human life. Few of us think of human life as so valuable that we ought individually or collectively to have an indefinite
number of children. Yet most of us agree, according to Dworkin, that
once human life exists, and even before it acquires rights, it is to some
degree wrong to destroy it.1" 7 It would not be uncommon or strange
for a parent to be strongly opposed to having more children, for financial or other reasons, and yet to value a child quite highly before
and after birth if conception were accidentally to occur. Without reverting to rights discourse-in which the distinction is obvious-how
can we make sense of this strange stance? How can something have
inviolable value once it exists, without its possibility having a correlatively high value?
Dworkin helps our reflections by pointing out other areas in
which we seem to take the same sort of bifurcated stance of wanting to
respect and protect things once they exist, and yet of being indifferent
or even hostile to their coming into existence in the first place. He
suggests that we feel a kind of reverence for art:
We attach great value to works of art once they exist, even
though we care less about whether more of them are produced....

I do not myself wish that there were more paint-

ings by Tintoretto than there are. But I would nevertheless
be appalled by the deliberate destruction of even one of
those he did paint."0 '
Similarly, Dworkin argues that the same people who want to protect at
least the major species of life that have developed over the eons may
have hardly any interest in bringing new species into existence.10 9 We
revere or respect, treat as inviolable, the species that have developed
up till now, providing legal protection for them at significant cost to
human enjoyment, yet we do not encourage science to spend its time
developing other, perhaps even more curious, forms of life.
In all three cases-new human life, art, and nonhuman speciesour attitude is that of respecting and protecting those entities that
already exist, considering them to have great value, without wishing at
the same time to bring other such highly valued entities into existence. What quality could they possess that could account for our unusual attitude toward them? This is the great puzzle that Dworkin seeks
106. This example is not used by Dworkin.
107. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 68-69.

108. Id. at 74.
109. Id. at 75.
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to solve. He has stated it well, but unfortunately his solution is
defective.
II.

DWORKIN'S INVESTMENT-BASED THEORY OF INVIOLABILITY

Dworkin's explanation of our seeming split personality is both
simple and elegant. A possible entity can have little or no value while
that same entity once actualized can have great value if the source of
the latter's value is something added as it is created and developed. 1
With regard to abortion (and, as we shall see, euthanasia), Dworkin
defends what he calls "a particular understanding of the sanctity of
life: that once a human life has begun, it is a waste . . . when the

investment in that life is wasted."1 ' We think abortion a shame because we regret the waste of the natural and human investment' 1 2 that
has been made in the fetus." 3 Yet we are not saddened when no new
fetuses are conceived, when couples use abstinence or contraception,
because in this case no investment in life is wasted.
Although Dworkin claims to be explaining the "intrinsic" value1 14
of human life, it is clear that his solution to our puzzle relies on an
extrinsic value, the value of the creative "effort"" 5 invested in the fetus. Dworkin's explanation of the paradox that we desire to protect
works of art and animal species more than we desire to produce them
is similar: "[T] he nerve of the sacred lies in the value we attach to a
process or enterprise or project rather than to its results ....,,16 If we

do not wish that process or effort to be wasted, we will want both to
protect it once it has been invested and not to invest it unwisely in the
first place. Dworkin's theory shows how we can be opposed to casual
abortion for the very same reason that we can be opposed to casual
conception-because we do not wish creative effort to go to waste.
Dworkin uses this investment theory to explain our feelings toward human life after as well as before birth." 7 The longer a child
has been alive, the more effort invested in her, the more regrettable it
is if she dies prematurely. On the other hand, if the investment in
someone's life has largely paid off (as with the elderly') or is des110. Id. at 74-75.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 213.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 73, 213.
Id. at 60, 69.
Id. at 79, 81-84.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 82-85, 213-14.
Id. at 85.
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tined to be frustrated in any event (as with the severely disabled1 1 ),
then death is not so tragic."' Human life, for Dworkin, is normally
most inviolable from early adolescence to early middle age-because
people within this range embody great investment and also, if healthy,
21
great promise. 1
As an example of how abortion can actually manifest respect for
life's inherent value, Dworkin mentions the pregnant teenager who
may find a greater investment in her own life wasted if she does not,
by abortion, waste a lesser investment she and others may have made
in her unborn child. 122 Paradoxically, the inviolability of life may well
require the destruction of life, according to Dworkin.
Nothing thus far in Dworkin's arguments is based upon religion.
Indeed, Dworkin emphasizes that one of his "main claims throughout
this book... [is] that there is a secular... interpretation of the idea
that human life is sacred."1 2 Dworkin points out that art and animal
species may likewise be perceived to be sacred in a secular sense, and
so the state may quite properly protect the "intrinsic value" found in
them:
Neither cultural achievements nor animal species nor future
human beings are creatures with rights or interests. But no
one doubts that government may treat art and culture as having intrinsic value, or that government may act to protect the
environment, endangered animal species, and the quality of
life of future generations. Government may properly levy
taxes that will be used to support museums, for example; it
can forbid people to destroy their own buildings if it deems
these to be of historical architectural value; it can prohibit
manufacturing practices that threaten endangered species or
injure future generations. Why should government not have
the power to enforce a much more passionate convictionthat abortion is a desecration of the inherent value that at24
taches to every human life?'
Having labored to convince us that "sanctity" and the "sacred"
can have purely secular meanings, Dworkin insists that beliefs regarding one subset of the sacred-human life-must nevertheless be denominated "religious," even when held by nontheists, because these
119. Id. at 98.
120. Id. at 85, 98-99.

121. Id. at 87; see aLso id. at 84-101 (discussing liberal and conservative variations on the
"frustration" that accompanies a wasted life).
122. Id. at 99.
123. Id. at 195.
124. Id. at 149.
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beliefs are "more fundamental" to our moral personalities. 125 Given
that these "religious" beliefs will conflict (according to the different
values attached to divine, natural, and human investment), governments may not gravely damage some people by forcing them to conform to a version of life's sanctity that they do not share. 12 6 Although
we may agree that prenatal life, like art and animal species, has some
inherent value because of the creative investment it embodies,
[a] state may not curtail liberty, in order to protect an intrinsic value, when the effect on one group of citizens would be
special and grave, when the community is seriously divided
about what respect for that value requires, and when people's opinions about the nature of that value reflect essentially religious7 convictions that are fundamental to moral
12
personality.
125. Id. at 154-56.
126. Id. at 154-55.
127. Id. at 157. Dworkin thinks these criteria preserve the right of the state to protect
art and animal species. Id. at 154. He concedes, however, that protecting endangered
animal species could be unconstitutional if it were as damaging to particular people as he
claims childbirth "may" be to women. Id. Dworkin argues that an anti-abortion law's harm
to some makes it unconstitutional even as to those who are not harmed. Id. at 153. We can
easily imagine that a ban on whaling, for example, could endanger the way of life of an
Eskimo tribe, or a prohibition of a dam could entail grave hardship for certain farmers.
Less physically, but perhaps more profoundly, strong protection for nonhuman species
could offend many people's sense of their unique human dignity, and thus take away much
of their own self-respect. If many are thus harmed, is species protection unconstitutional,
as with abortion?
We are likewise seriously divided about what the value of nonhuman life means.
Dworkin's pro-species approach, see generally id. at 75-81, is merely one of a number of
contemporary versions of respect for animal life. Dworkin may wish rules to protect the
existence of species, while animal rights activists want to protect each individual animal.
That these two views may come into conflict is obvious with regard to practices such as the
culling of deer populations by permitting hunting during a certain season of the year.
Such weeding out could be beneficial to a species (deer or other) and yet be incompatible
with the notion of individual rights possessed by the deer that are killed. Thus, some may
hold the intrinsic value of animal life to require hunting while others hold it to forbid
hunting. In addition to these two views-the sanctity of species and the sanctity of each
animal-there are other perspectives that would be even less particularistic than that of
Dworkin. Those who wish to preserve the wilderness are concerned neither with protecting the lives of individual animals nor with preserving individual species but, rather, with
preventing human disruption of nature. If a species were en route to disappearance
through the natural progression of an ecosystem, this third point of view would find no
fault, while the first might urge human intervention to defend the waning species and the
second might demand intervention to protect endangered individuals. In other words, the
inviolability of nonhuman life not only includes whatever ambiguities Dworkin may find in
the idea of the inviolability of the individual human, id. at 71-84, but also includes additional, radically different value perspectives. Protection of the nonhuman environment is
thus potentially far more controversial and divisive than protection of individual humans.
Is it, therefore, also unconstitutional?
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Dworkin leaves largely unexplained why the state may not punish
at least those abortions performed for trivial reasons-because by definition these abortions involve little hardship and Dworkin thinks
there exists a near-universal consensus that they are wrong. Yet he
goes further. Not only may government not prohibit any abortions,
but contrary to the current position of the United States Supreme
Court,

28

it may not even support "one side of an argument about an

essentially religious issue"1 29 by denying funding for elective abortion
while paying for childbirth,"' for this "is tantamount to establishing
one interpretation of the sanctity of life as the official creed of the
community. " "' For the same sort of reasons, the government should
"not impose some uniform, general view" with regard to protecting
the lives of the aged and disabled.1 12 All the state may do in supporting the inviolability of human life-as opposed to enforcing legal and
constitutional rights-is to promote reflective decisionmaking. Governments may "encourage their citizens to treat the question of abortion seriously,""' but may not seek to teach a right answer.
It is also unclear that views regarding abortion are more religious than views regarding
animal species. Dworkin indicates that the view that the human race should survive "is not
a matter of justice at all but of our instinctive sense that ... human survival is of sacred
importance." Id. at 78. Likewise, notions that the earth should survive or that life in general should survive are matters of intrinsic value that count as religious beliefs, according
to the tests Dworkin advocates above. Must the state, therefore, remain neutral with regard

to such values?
Finally, concern about other species may be at least as fundamental to moral personality as are views regarding abortion. Protection for nonhuman life may require a more
ascetic lifestyle, from not swatting rare flies to not wasting paper and other products of
trees. More deeply, concern for nonhuman life may involve a rejection of growth and
progress as fundamental direction-giving, meaning-giving values in favor of a way of life
built on stasis. The language used in the 1992 Planned Parenthoodv. Casey decision, which
Dworkin quotes with approval, id. at 171 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 853 (1992) (plurality opinion)), is at least as appropriate here as with regard to abortion. The Casey plurality spoke of "reverence for the wonder of creation," not just for
individual human entities. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853. That decision also spoke of the heart of
liberty being "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Id. at 851. For centuries, creation and the universe have been thought of as subject to man's dominion, or at least to his stewardship.
According other species equal dignity (or even inferior but substantial dignity) will radically change the way we live and the way we conceive our place in the world. Thus, it is
difficult to see how someone who adopts Dworkin's view as to why elective abortion is

constitutionally protected can avoid agreeing that those whose behavior is destructive of
animal species may also merit constitutional protection.
128. See supra note 32 (discussing Supreme Court cases regarding abortion issues).
129. LiFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 162.
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Dworkin begins with the pro-life thesis that abortion destroys an
inviolable human life, but he ends with a pro-choice position even
13 5
34
stronger than that of Roe v. Wade' and its progeny.
III.

UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES OF VALUING INVESTMENT

Dworkin's most legally significant contention is that life's inviolability itself can require killing innocent human beings. Inviolability
can mean violation, according to Dworkin.13 6 Before we turn to its
deep errors, let us examine some reasons why we ought to hope this
contention is mistaken. Before discussing its falsity, I want to show
that its results are quite unfortunate. First, Dworkin's thesis is harmful
to us as a political community. It confuses public discourse and undermines social solidarity. Second, the idea that the inviolability of
life, the sanctity of life, may require killing is a notion that may endanger others besides fetuses, about whom we care and whom we may
wish to protect from violence.
With regard to the first sort of consequence: Before Dworkin, the
arguments for and against abortion were fairly clearly divided."3 7 At
least the claims were clear, even if we could not see a way to reconcile
them. On the one hand stood the value of liberty, and its defenders
were called pro-choice. On the other hand stood the value of life, and
its defenders were called pro-life. Dworkin would have both sides
called pro-life. Each side would be defending its own version of the
inviolability of human life. Politically speaking, how will it help public
debate to have Roe's supporters shouting that life must be protected,
and proclaiming that the anti-abortionists must be defeated in order
to preserve the sanctity of life?
Dworkin's argument reminds one of George Orwell's famous
claim in 1984138 that "war is peace." 139 Of course, Orwell's totalitarian
dictatorship used that formula purposely to paralyze public debate,
and I am not alleging that Dworkin has any such nefarious purpose
behind his theory, but the doctrine that violating life respects life's
inviolability may have the same silencing effect. Furthermore, the lan134. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 153; see also supra note 32 (discussing cases following the Roe decision).
136. Id. at 84-101, 196, 215.
137. But see Richard A. McCormick, The Gospel of Life, AMERICA, Apr. 29, 1995, at 10.
McCormick claims that many have long believed that taking human life can on occasion be
"life-saving and life-serving." Id. at 16.
138. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).

139. Id. at 7.
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guage in 1984, claiming that war is peace, 140 not only inhibited propeace efforts, it also mocked and debased those opposed to the war.
They were told that their anti-war sentiments could not be articulated
rationally. Similarly, to tell the pro-life community that its opponents
are really equally (or more) pro-life, and that abortion respects life,
seems to mock as well as to silence. Dworkin's contention seems purposely or accidentally to dumbify the anti-abortion view of the world
and thus to make dialogue concerning abortion still more difficult.
Remember that Dworkin also scolds pro-lifers for claiming inconsistently to advocate a "right" to life for the unborn child. The pro-life
community must share with the other side its argument regarding inviolability and must refrain from making its argument about rights. It
is hard to see how the mutual self-respect that Dworkin promised 4 1
can result from his proposal. Recall that Dworkin will use the power
of the state to require people opposed to abortion to finance it.14 2
These people will be forced to acquiesce and participate in what they
consider to be the killing of helpless children, without being able easily or fully to articulate their reasons for opposing this practice. It is
hard to imagine a greater degree of political alienation on the part of
pro-life people if Dworkin's views should become legally and socially
dominant in America. Would their convictions wither away, or would
they find expression in apolitical and violent forms?
In Life's Dominion, Dworkin does not seem to care much for notions of social solidarity and the building of community. 14' He believes that a society based simply on respect for rights should be our
central aim, both in America and elsewhere. 4 4 Still, one must wonder if the kind of extreme anomie that his theory could engender
would not be an uncomfortable world even for him. Dworkin admits
that his theory requires the human community to eschew protection
for its most basic values.1 4 5 Abortion is not some peripheral concern.
Dworkin points out that our "convictions about how and why human
life has intrinsic importance, from which we draw our views about
140. Id.
141. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 10-11, 101.
142. Id. at 174-76.
143. Dworkin indicates as much, id. at 61-62, in criticizing the communitarian analysis of
Mary Ann Glendon, an analysis that had been called "perceptive" by Catherine MacKinnon. See MacKinnon, supra note 40, at 1316 n.153 (citing GLENDON, supra note 28). Freedorm's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution is a more sensitive and open
response by Dworkin to communitarian arguments unrelated to abortion. FREEDOM'S LAW,
supra note 4, at 19-31.
144. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 61-62.
145. Id. at 154-55, 167.
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abortion, are much more fundamental to our overall moral personalities than our convictions about culture or about endangered species,
even though these too, concern intrinsic values." 4 6 Furthermore,
Dworkin does not consider these fundamental values to be merely private. He contends that we ought not to be indifferent to others' abortions. 4 7 Those abortions may affect one's own moral environment
and that of one's children, and of course, they may matter to us because we are concerned about the value of life itself, which we may
think harmed by each abortion. Dworkin could also have added that
the abortions that take place in our community may matter to us because of our concern not just for the value of life, but for the value of
the mother-child relationship. After all, if one believes the fetus to be
a human being, then it is not just any human being. It is a mother's
own child.1 4 That maternal relationship is surely in our culture and
in most or all cultures an archetype of moral concern and care. Seeming to authorize and subsidize mothers to kill their children could be
seen to remove a cornerstone of human community, with possibly disastrous consequences. There are many who believe, with Mother Teresa of Calcutta:
The so-called right to abortion has pitted mothers against
their children, and women against men. It has sown violence
and discord at the heart of the most intimate human relationships. It has aggravated the derogation of the father's
role in an increasingly fatherless society. It has portrayed the
greatest of gifts-a child-as a competitor, an intrusion, and
an inconvenience. It has nominally accorded mothers unfettered dominion over the independent lives of their physically
dependent sons and daughters. And, in granting this unconscionable power, it has exposed many women to unjust and
selfish demands
from their husbands or other sexual
4 9
partners.

Dworkin's contention that the inviolability of life may require killing"' is also unfortunate in a second and much more direct sense: It
146. Id. at 154-55.
147. Id. at 167.
148. Stanley Hauerwas has pointed out that a fetus could be considered a child (as in
the expression "unborn child," I would suppose) even without being considered a full
rights-bearing person. See Stanley Hauerwas, Must a Patient Be a Person to Be a Patient? Or,
My Uncle CharlieIs Not Much of a Person but He Is Still My Uncle Charlie, in TRUTHFULNESS AND
TRAGEDY-. FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 127, 128 (1977).

149. Mother Teresa, Recalling America, FIRST THINGS, May 1994, at 9, 9-10. She goes on
to quote from the 1993 German abortion decision. See id. at 10.
150. LiFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 84-101, 215.
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endangers the lives of human beings who may matter to us more than
fetuses do-infants and those whose lives are frustrated by disability,
age, or even chronic economic hardship.
This danger is not a matter of empirical speculation but of logical
entailment. Dworkin's reduction of our sense of life's inviolability to a
desire not to waste investment requires that some lives be regarded as
less inviolable than others and that killing be thought less bad when
necessary to prevent net waste.
Let us look at this logic in greater detail. In a section of his book
entitled "The Metric of Disrespect," Dworkin offers a "comparative
tragedy" calculus for how much life's inviolability has been contravened by a particular act of killing or any other kind of premature
death:
[H]ow bad this is ... depends on the stage of life in which it
occurs, because the frustration is greater if it takes place after
rather than before the person has made a significant personal investment in his own life, and less if it occurs after any
investment has been substantially
fulfilled, or as substantially
1 51
fulfilled as is anyway likely.
In short, Dworkin believes that the measure of a life's inviolability is
the amount of investment that would be wasted if that life were cut
short.
Note that Dworkin is no longer limiting his waste-avoidance theory to fetuses and abortion. His use of the word "person" above
clearly shows that he is speaking of postnatal deaths as well. Note, too,
the profoundly inegalitarian thrust of his remarks. Even though he
may continue to adhere to equal rights,152 Dworkin clearly considers
some people's lives much less inviolable than others.
Infants, for Dworkin, are scarcely more inviolable than fetuses,
for little has been invested in "mere biological development-conception, fetal development and infancy." 153 To really count, one's life
must have been "determined not just by biological formation but by
social and individual training and choice." 5 4 Thus, the "death of an
adolescent girl is worse than the death of an infant girl because the
adolescent's death frustrates the investments she and others have al55
ready made in her life."
151. Id. at 88.
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 88.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 87. To be sharply distinguished is the obvious fact that the more we invest
our time and effort in a child or in any other project, the more we care about it, and the

318

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 56:289

Some might disagree with Dworkin here, feeling that early death
is more tragic, at least for the person who dies. The deceased adolescent at least enjoyed some time in the world; the dead infant had almost none. What is dangerous, however, is not Dworkin's right or
wrong theory of tragedy but his making the measure of tragedy also
the measure of inviolability, so that infants' lives can be violated with
less compunction if their deaths are in some sense less tragic.
Failure to kill an infant may even be the greater tragedy, under
Dworkin's schema,1 5 so that the inviolability of life comes not only to
permit but to require infanticide. Remember that the calculus of inviolability, as opposed to that of rights, makes no distinction in kind
between human beings before and after birth, and that Dworkin is
quite willing to engage in the comparative analysis of waste between
mother and fetus. He says that "respect for the intrinsic value of
human life" itself may require abortion because "the waste of life... is
very much greater when a teenage single mother's life is wrecked than
when an early-stage fetus, in whose life human investment has thus far
been negligible, ceases to live."15 7 What about the young woman who
discovers only after birth that caring for a child will mean, in Dworkin's words, that her life "is wrecked"?1 5 Could not the balance of
waste favor infanticide? True, according to Dworkin, there has been
more investment now than in early pregnancy, but it is still largely of
the "mere biological" sort.15 9 Moreover, giving the child up for adoption-a choice Dworkin already found unacceptable as an alternative
to wasting a fetus" 6°-would now be far more onerous for the mother.
Dworkin must admit in principle that his concept of the inviolability
of the mother's life could mean that she should kill her newborn
child.
We might expect a candid Dworkin to concede this claim-that
his idea of inviolability considered alone could indeed favor infanticide-but to point out that, unlike the fetus, the newborn has moral
and legal rights, and that these will suffice to preclude killing infants.
Such a response would, however, not fully allay our fears. If inviolability requires killing and rights oppose it, we know only that there is
more disappointed we are if it fails. This psychological truth, however, gives only a subjective importance to investment, felt mainly by the investor. What Dworkin claims is that
someone else's investment grounds an objective, intrinsic value that all must acknowledge.
156. Id. at 84-101.
157. Id. at 99.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 88.
160. Id. at 103 (discussing the great emotional pain that may result from giving a child
up for adoption).
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a conflict, not which side will win. Morally speaking, could it not be
sometimes better to violate a right than to wreck a woman's life? Furthermore, it is unclear that rights will remain legally firm once their
moral underpinning weakens. Indeed, Dworkin himself seems to argue later in his book that the current life of a person with Alzheimer's
may be such a waste that the right to live it disappears.1 61
Worse yet, Dworkin never attempts such a response. That is, he
never argues that infants have an inherent right to life that protects
them despite their relative lack of "intrinsic value." 6 2 Although he
seems to concede that infants (along with late-term fetuses) have interests,1 63 Dworkin makes having interests only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for having rights. He leaves explicitly open the
question of whether newborn infants count as persons in more than a
legalistic sense, writing: "[W]e might argue .. . that newborn infants
are constitutional persons without deciding whether or not they satisfy
whatever standards for consciousness we might think necessary for
personhood in the philosophical sense." '64 Dworkin then cites a famous essay by Michael Tooley that argues for the moral permissibility
of infanticide.1 6 5 This, together with his earlier linkage of fetuses and

161. Id. at 219-33. Similarly, the American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs recently reiterated its 1994 opinion that it is "ethically permissible" to harvest vital organs from anencephalic infants while they are still alive, in part because those
organs might deteriorate by or after death. Council on Ethical andJudicial Affairs, American Medical Association, The Use of Anencephalic Neonates As Organ Donors,JAMA, May 24,
1995, at 1614, 1617-18. Avoiding possible organ waste overrides the right to life in these
cases. The accompanying comments of the Council indicate that an exception to "current
law, which requires persons to be dead before their life-sustaining organs may be removed"
is "consistent with the majority view among experts in medicine and ethics." Id. at 1614.
Reminiscent of Dworkin's strictures against fetal rights, the Council argues that although
anencephalic infants "may be able to breathe, suck, [and] respond to noxious stimuli with
crying or avoidance maneuvers, [they nevertheless] are totally unaware of their existence
and the environment in which they live." Id. at 1615. Bad cf supranote 85 and accompanying text (noting that even caterpillars and carrots are in a way aware of their environments). Under great political pressure, this American Medical Association ethics
committee has now reversed itself. See Diane M. Gianelli, Ethics Council Reverses Stand on
Anencepha/ic Organ Donors, Am. MED. NEws, Dec. 25, 1995, at 3. The Council grounded its
reversal on doubts that all infants diagnosed as anencephalic in fact lack consciousness,
rather than rejecting the idea that those who truly lack higher brain function can be used
as organ donors. See id. Thus, according to ethicist Alexander M. Capron, "The reversal
fails to address the troubling implication that any patients near death could be suitable as
live organ donors if they were perceived as lacking higher brain function." Id.
162. IFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 73, 88.
163. Id. at 17.
164. Id. at 23.
165. Id. at 245 n.31 (citing Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
37 (1972)).
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infants as examples of "mere biological development,"1 6 6 makes it
seem unlikely that Dworkin would claim that killing infants violates
anything more than the letter of the law. Where child care would
waste a mother's life, would this legal technicality be sufficient to stop
infanticide?
"Personhood" and "rights" in Life's Dominion have a wholly positivistic cast. There is no logical entailment in either direction between
what Dworkin calls the "philosophical" question of whether an entity
has personhood and the "practical" one of whether it should be
treated as we treat each other. 167 This disjunction would seem to endanger even older children and adults, who Dworkin says "undeniably" have moral rights. 168 Why continue to grant all such entities a
practical right to life when that right runs counter to our strong desire
to avoid waste?
That Dworkin's approval of abortion should lead him sometimes
to approve of infanticide is not surprising. It is not a conclusion he
could avoid by more careful drafting, nor is it even just a necessary
consequence of his own idiosyncratic theory of comparative investment and waste. The late Paul Ramsey issued a challenge to all those
who favor abortion rights that still stands: Construct an argument for
the moral permissibility of abortion that is not also an argument for
the permissibility of infanticide. 6 ' Like others who have gone before
him,17 Dworkin has failed to meet this challenge. Better to wait for a
new contender than to adopt Dworkin's theory, if we wish to hold to a
17 1
strong postnatal right to life.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 88.
at 22-23.
at 23.
Paul Ramsey, Reference Points in Deciding About Abortion, in THE MORALITY OF
ABORTION 60, 79, 86 (John T. Noonan, Jr. ed., 1970).
170. Ronald Green, for example, denies any inherent dignity in the infant in order to
support a strong right to abortion. Seeking to meet Ramsey's challenge, the best Green
could do was to urge continuation of the ban on infanticide as a malum prohibitum, because
of the negative side effects that killing infants might have on others. See Ronald M. Green,
Conferred Rights and the Fetus, 2 J. REaGIOUS ETHiCS 55, 65-66 (1974). Jonathan Glover,
however, would disagree with Green. Glover argues that in the absence of an inherent
infantile right to life, the side effects of infanticide need not lead us to prohibit it altogether. SeeJoNATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 137-69 (1977). Linking
abortion and infanticide, Glover favors both. See id.
171. There may be more philosophical debate (as opposed to public debate) about infanticide than about abortion. Support for a fetal right to life is rooted fundamentally in
the intuition that newborn infants possess a human dignity worthy of respect; anti-abortionists then argue that whatever dignity the infant possesses the fetus also possesses. See,
for example, the German and other arguments found infra note 326 and accompanying
text. The many academics who wish to deflect the force of this anti-abortion claim are thus
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To summarize once again: Dworkin understands human life to
be inviolable only to the extent that killing would result in a net waste
of investment; 172 where it produces a net investment gain, killing can
be required by our sense of life's inviolability. Fetuses and infants,
because they have less invested in them, are less inviolable than older
1 74
human beings. 173 Their lives thus can be outweighed by others.
It might seem that Dworkin would concede a very high, or even
absolute, degree of inviolability once a certain age had been reached,
for at that point the level of investment would be so high that it could
only rarely, if ever, be outweighed. It turns out, however, that age is
only a very rough indicator of the amount of investment in a person's
life. For example, although one ordinarily invests a great deal of creative energy in one's own development, Dworkin says this may not be
so in "pathological cases."175 Thus, people with disabilities severe
enough to make "creative choices" 176 unlikely end up less inviolable.
Though Dworkin does not say so explicitly, his theory would seem
likewise to entail that children whose parents are able to be more creative or caring end up representing a greater investment and thus possess a greater inviolability. The child that has received "quality time"
is more inviolable than one that has been neglected, one that has attended a Montessori school more inviolable than one that has lived
on the streets.
Worse still, even those who have a large amount invested in them
are not necessarily very inviolable, under Dworkin's theory. Their
deaths surely cannot count as waste if their lives were already
"wrecked" by an unwanted child 177 or, more generally, to the degree
they were "frustrated by other forms of failure-by handicaps or poverty ur misconceived projects or irredeemable mistakes or lack of
training or even brute bad luck."17 8 Death is less bad when "it occurs
after any investment has been... as substantially fulfilled as is anyway
likely."

17 9

It is less tragic, then, when persons die who did not have much of
a future anyway. Their lives are less inviolable than those of healthy,
tempted to embrace the permissibility, at least in theory, of infanticide. See GLOVER, supra
note 170, at 137-69.
172. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
175. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 83.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 99.
178. Id. at 89.
179. Id. at 88.
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wealthy, and lucky people. Dworkin even suggests that some might be
better off dead: "Is premature death always, inevitably, a more serious
frustration of life than any of these other forms of failure?" 8 ° At first,
it might be hard for us to see how any sort of frustration could be
worse than the absolute frustration brought about by death. Dworkin's investment idea might seem to say only that individuals with
handicaps are less inviolable than others, meaning that they ought to
die if necessary to fulfill someone else's greater potential, not that
their lives, considered in themselves, are a net waste.
Such a conclusion, however, would be short-sighted. Dworkin explains that handicapped life could actually be more wasteful than premature death, even without interpersonal comparisons, if ongoing life
would mean "further, heartbreaking waste of personal emotional investments made in that life by others but principally by the [person
with grave disabilities] himself." 1 ' In other words, someone's life always requires continued investment-by the person himself and by
others. If that anticipated future investment is going to be "irremediably frustrated," 182 it is actually less wasteful to cut one's losses by terminating life immediately.
Dworkin makes us feel a bit better when he says that poverty, even
very great poverty, will only "rarely" make a child better off dead.' 3
Nevertheless, when he later suggests that the life of Tolstoy's Ivan
Ilych was a net waste because of his failure to advance his true interests, l1 4 we cannot but see just how open-ended is Dworkin's category
of people who really ought to die prematurely.
If these people do not in fact die early-preferably before birth if
future frustration can be predicted that soon-they may become people who anomalously should not exist, because their overall life is a
waste, but who should not now die, apparently because the marginal
amounts of investment they still need may yield a positive return.
In "the worst of such cases it would have been better had the life
in question never begun." 8 5 Such an existence can be "intrinsically a
bad thing.... [I] t is regrettable that such a deprived and difficult life
must be lived."1 8 6 Yet this is not a "Nazi" sentiment, Dworkin explains,18 7 for once a great investment has been made in such people,
180. Id. at 90.
181. Id.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

98.
203.
99.
98.
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the "liberal position insists that these investments in life should be
realized as fully as possible," out of a "horror at the investment being
wasted."18 Of course, if the burden of caring for such persons were
sufficiently frustrating for their caretakers, 8 9 continued life could result in a further net loss of total interpersonal investment, and the
same "horror at the investment being wasted"19 ° would favor death.
Dworkin reminds us, however, that the rights of such people
(once beyond infancy, at least) might stand in the way of killing them:
[T] he general question of the relative intrinsic tragedy of different events is very different from any question about the
rights of people now living or about how they should be
treated. The former is a question about the intrinsic goodness or evil of events, the latter about rights and fairness.' 9 '
If, however, the death of a severely impoverished or handicapped
person is adjudged not very bad, or even intrinsically good, does this
not weaken our sense of her right to life? Moreover, if infants may
have rights only in a "practical" sense, because they lack sufficient consciousness to count philosophically as persons-as Dworkin is willing
to suppose92 -might not persons with severe disabilities fall into the
same category? Persons with mental disabilities may be even more liable than infants to having their rights ignored or taken away, for unlike healthy infants, they may lack even the possibility of higher forms
of consciousness.
Even if Dworkin's ideas do not directly undermine legal rights, at
the very least they deprive many vulnerable people of secondary moral
protection from the traditional idea of the sanctity or inviolability of
life. Prior to Dworkin, there were two reasons not to kill someone
with Down's syndrome: because she had a right to life and because
her life was sacred or inviolable. After Dworkin, only the first reason
not to kill her is left. Indeed, the same inviolability that once motivated nonviolence may now, for Dworkin, actually favor her death.
Perhaps the greatest tragedy that could befall persons with frustrated lives would be for Dworkin's theory to gain widespread acceptance. By reducing the intrinsic dignity of life to the avoidance of
waste, Dworkin would have us look upon each other in a stingy, begrudging fashion. At least before birth, and quite possibly after as
188. Id. at 99.
189. Dworkin points out it is "expensive, tedious, and difficult" to continue to care for
seriously demented persons. Id. at 234.
190. Id. at 99.
191. Id. at 98.
192, Id. at 23.
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well, Dworkin would have us kill in the name of the inviolability of life,
but really out of a desire to hoard our resources rather than have
them used for unfulfilled projects. As our expectations for fulfillment
rise, more and more lives will come to seem unfulfilling. Our dreams
of the good life will be nightmares for those who cannot achieve it,
who should die or have died young.
We have seen so far that Dworkin's investment theory of inviolability tends to permit or favor killing the very young (because not
much investment is thus wasted) and those with frustrating handicaps
(because any investment in them is already largely wasted). It might
seem, however, that Dworkin's inviolability would require protection
from death at least for those people who lead fulfilling lives.
This supposition would be true only up to a point, the point at
which an older person has more or less realized her life goals. Death
is "less [tragic] if it occurs after any investment has been substantially
fulfilled."19 3 For people past their prime, "the conviction that human
life is sacred may turn out to provide a crucial argument for rather
than against euthanasia." ' 94
The concepts that Dworkin has already given us make this conclusion plausible. If an investment has already paid back almost everything that can reasonably be expected, its sudden end is not a tragedy.
Even if a mine were once highly profitable, a destructive earthquake
after its ore were nearly exhausted would no longer be considered a
financial disaster. Similarly, if the marginal return on further investment were low enough (the investment would be "frustrated," in
Dworkin's words),195 then the avoidance of waste could dictate purposely closing down the once-profitable mine-all the more so if
keeping it open deprived a second, more promising mine of scarce
investment funds. A past successful life does not make being killed a
tragedy.
Dworkin argues more. Not only is prior fulfillment a reason to
permit euthanasia, it may be a factor in favor of killing the old.19 6 This
is so because of an additional ethical demand to which Dworkin appeals: that our lives be good stories. Dworkin suggests judging a
human life "as we judge a literary work . . . whose bad ending mars
193. Id. at 88.
194. Id. at 196.
195. Id. at 87.
196. People who think human investment in life important will "insist that sometimes
euthanasia supports" the sanctity of life in those "riddled with disease or no longer conscious." Id. at 215.
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what went before." 9 7 It is not "zoe," 198 physical life, that has inviolability, but rather "biography."' 9 9 When a successful person becomes
incompetent, we "worry about the effect of his life's last stage on the
character of his life as a whole, as we might worry about the effect of a
20 0
play's last scene or a poem's last stanza on the entire creative work."
An anticlimax may be worse than death in that it may leave a person
"a narrative wreck. . . a life worse than one that ends when its activity
ends."

20 1

The inviolability of biography may even require going against the
explicit desires of the aged, to favor their "critical interests" 20 2 over
their immediate "experiential interests."
Suppose a demented patient insists on remaining at home,
though this would impose very great burdens on his family,
and that we all agree that people lead critically better lives
when they are not a serious burden to others. Is it really in
his best interests, overall, to allow him to become such a
03
burden? 2
Dworkin does not ignore the value of autonomy, but neither does
he give it absolute priority over biography. Moreover, the idea of biography becomes part of the meaning of autonomy for Dworkin, so
197. Id. at 27.
198. Dworkin explains that the Greeks used the term "zoe" to refer to physical or biological life. Id. at 82.
199. Id. at 82-83.
200. Id. at 199.
201. Id. at 211. Without mentioning him by name, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit comes extremely close to Dworkin's theory. In Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cet. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 37 (1996), the court writes:
A competent terminally ill adult, having lived nearly the full measure of his life,
has a strong liberty interest in choosing a dignified and humane death rather
than being reduced at the end of his existence to a childlike state of helplessness,
diapered, sedated, incontinent. How a person dies not only determines the nature of the final period of his existence, but in many cases, the enduring memories held by those who love him.
Id. at 814. For further discussion of this case, see supra note 5.
202. There may be a tension between Dworkin's position here and his earlier rejection
of "critical paternalism." See Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in 11 THE
TANNER LECrURES ON HUMAN VALuEs 1, 47 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990) (acknowledging
the problems and obscurities of the idea of critical interests); Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 484-86 (1989) (challenging the argument of critical paternalism that is often used to attack liberal tolerance). For other critiques of moral paternalism,
referring to the work of John Rawls and of Neil MacCormick as well as of Dworkin, see
Stith, Critique of Fairness,supra note 21; Richard Stith, On the Preservationof Morality, 20 VAL.
U. L. RE,.. 71 (1985); and Richard Stith, Will There Be a Science of Law in the Twenty-First
Centuy?, 22 REVUE GtNPRALE DE DROIT 373 (1991).

203. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 221.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 56:289

that only those decisions one makes with one's critical interests in view
20 4
really count.
"Dignity," says Dworkin, "is a central aspect of the value we have
been examining throughout this book: the intrinsic importance of
human life."2 0 5 Thus, "[w]e are distressed by, even disapprove of,
someone . . . who neglects or sacrifices the independence we think
dignity requires." 20 6 In fact, the indignity of dependence seems
"worse when the indignity is not recognized by its victim." 20 7 "Someone who compromises his own dignity denies ... a sense of himself as
someone with critical interests, the value of whose life is important for
its own sake." 2 8 "[N]o one treats his life as having any intrinsic, objective importance unless he insists on leading that life himself, not
being ushered along it by others, no matter how much he loves or
respects or fears them."20 9 Could we even be doing such people a
favor by killing them before (or after) they make the undignified
choice to become dependent? Not surprisingly, Dworkin quotes
Nietzsche with approval: "'In a certain state it is indecent to live
longer. To go on vegetating in cowardly dependence on physicians
and machinations, after the meaning of life, the right to life, has been
lost, that ought to prompt a profound contempt in society."' 2 10 Note
204. Id. at 235-36.
205. Id. at 236.
206. Id. at 235.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 237.
209. Id. at 239. Once again, watch out for Dworkin, you monks! Dworkin clearly opposes voluntarily imitating Christ, "taking the form of a slave," Phil. 2:7, humbly "obedient
even unto ... the death [without dignity] of the cross," Phil. 2:8.
210. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 212 (quoting Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilight of
the Idols, in 16 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE 1, 88 (Anthony M. Ludovici
trans., Oscar Levy ed., 1964)). Nietzsche has elsewhere elaborated:
If the degenerate and sick... [are] to be accorded the same value as the healthy
...
then unnaturalness becomes lawThis universal [Christian] love of men is in practice the preferencefor the suffering, underprivileged, degenerate: it has in fact lowered and weakened the
strength, the responsibility, the lofty duty to sacrifice men. All that remains, according to the Christian scheme of values, is to sacrifice oneself: but this residue
of human sacrifice that Christianity concedes and even advises has, from the
standpoint of general breeding, no meaning at all. The prosperity of the species
is unaffected by the self-sacrifice of this or that individual (-whether it be in the
monkish and ascetic manner or, with the aid of crosses, pyres, and scaffolds, as
.martyrs" of error). The species requires that the ill-constituted, weak, degenerate, perish: but it was precisely to them that Christianity turned as a conserving
force ....
If one does not feel such a disposition as an extreme immorality, as a crime
against life, one belongs with the company of the sick and possesses its instincts
oneself-
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that such cowardly and contemptible vegetables lose the right to life
along with its meaning. Dworkin's concern for autonomy leads him
to abandon those who choose to reject it.2 1 1 He suggests that actively
killing dependent, demented people might sometimes be called for,
even if they are happy and asking to live, in order to tell the story that is
best for them.2 12
Is this notion of "life as biography" entailed by Dworkin's basic
theory of inviolability? If so, then he might have to favor wiping out
endangered species, because their glory days seem to be over and they
have no constitutional rights. What a sad story it would be for the
California condor to eke out life in various zoos. And if the Sistine
Chapel could not be brightened up again, well, it might be better just
to whitewash it over.
Clearly, Dworkin would reject these suggestions. For our analytic
purposes, this means that it is neither sufficient nor necessary to deal
fully with Dworkin's idea of what makes a good story in order to critique his core concept of inviolability as not wasting investments.

Nothing would be more useful or more to be encouraged than a thoroughgoing practical nihilism...

Problem: with what means could one attain to a severe form of really contagious nihilism: such as teaches and practices voluntary death with scientific conscientiousness (-and not a feeble, vegetable existence in expectation of a false
afterlife-)?
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 142-43 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale

trans., Walter Kaufmann ed., 1967).
.problem"?

Has Dworkin found the solution to Nietzsche's

211. What Mary Ann Glendon writes with regard to American law in general applies
with special force to Dworkin: "By making a radical version of individual autonomy normative, we inevitably imply that dependency is something to be avoided in oneself and disdained in others." GLENDON, supra note 91, at 73.
212. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 221-33. Although Dworkin argues especially
strongly for this conclusion when a prior, competent death wish has been expressed, he
suggests that killing may be correct even without that earlier authorization by the patient,
out of a beneficent desire to further the patient's own critical interests. Id. at 232-33. The
Ninth Circuit has shown an openness to similar nonvoluntary killing:
[T] here is, in short, a constitutionally recognized "right to die." Our conclusion
is strongly influenced by, but not limited to, the plight of mentally competent,
terminally ill adults. We are influenced as well by the plight of others, such as
those whose existence is reduced to a vegetative state or a permanent and irreversible state of unconsciousness.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert.
granted sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996). The court again indicates
where it is impatiently heading when it writes "forpresent purposes we view the critical line in
right-to-die cases as the one between the voluntary and involuntary termination of an individual's life," id. at 832 (emphasis added), but adds just a sentence later, "we should make
it clear that a decision of a duly appointed surrogate decision maker is for all legal purposes the decision of the patient himself." Id. at 832 n.120.
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Even if he were wrong about biography, he might still be right about
his investment theory. On the other hand, if he is wrong about wasting investments, then he must be wrong both about how inviolability
in its simpler form applies to the young and the handicapped, and
about how inviolability in its more complex form, where it joins the
idea of biography, applies to the aged. Therefore, we shall not delve
deeply into Dworkin's notion of what constitutes a critically good life,
although it occupies a significant portion both of Life's Dominion and
of his prior work. 1 3 By showing that Dworkin has made fundamental
errors in interpreting the inviolability of life as only a "horror at the
investment being wasted,"2 14 we undercut at once his every argument
for death.
IV.

DWORKIN'S MISTAKE: IGNORING THE INDMDUAL

The previous section of this Article brought out consequences of
Dworkin's theory of inviolability that many might regard as unfortunate: its harm to public discourse and to the lives of certain vulnerable people. Such results do not, however, invalidate his theory. At
most, they give us a reason to reexamine his analysis with greater care.
If reexamination discovers no error, however, we may just have to
learn to live, or die, with the disagreeable truths Dworkin has
unearthed.
The words "error" and "truth" have a special meaning here. We
need not look only for obvious misreporting of facts or for false logical entailments. Dworkin has made primarily a coherence claim. He
has begun with certain data concerning our attitudes toward pre- and
postnatal life and has suggested that the most coherent interpretation
of these data is found in the desire not to waste investment. 21 5 To
show him in error can mean just showing that his theory has interpreted these and other data less coherently than would a different
theory. Such a showing would give us an out, would mean that we
need not accept his recommendations for death after all.
As we have seen, Dworkin begins by noting that both liberals and
conservatives acknowledge an "intrinsic value," notjust an "instrumental value," in the fetus, 2 16 though they may disagree on the degree of
that intrinsic value. That is, they consider that prenatal life has value
for its own sake, not only for the good it may do for others.
213. Chapters 7 and 8 of Life's Dominion are devoted to this topic, as are Dworkin's articles cited supra note 202.
214. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 99.
215. Id. at 84-89.
216. Id. at 72.
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Dworkin rightly adds:

[T]he claim that human life even in its most undeveloped
form has intrinsic value ...

raises unique puzzles. Why does

it not follow, for example, that there should be as much
human life as possible? Most of us certainly do not believe
that. On the contrary, it would be better, at least in many
parts of the world, if there were less human life rather than
more. Then how can it be intrinsically important that
human life, once begun, continue? Those are important
questions, and in answering them we will discover a crucial
distinction between two categories of intrinsically valuable
things: those that are incrementally valuable-the more of
them we have the better-and those that are not but are valuable in a very different way. I shall call the latter sacred or
inviolablevalues.2 17
Human life is different from most things we consider to have intrinsic value. We usually wish not only to protect intrinsically valued
objects, but also to have more of them. We wish not only to preserve
and transmit knowledge, for example, but also to increase it. It has
"incremental" intrinsic value.2"' Dworkin might have added that
there is a fairly rational correlation between the intrinsic value of an
object in actuality and its discounted but always positive value in potentiality. Yet in the case of human beings, as in the parallel cases of
art and animal species, we often consider them to have intrinsic value
only after they have come into existence. Individually or collectively,
we may well care little about, or even be averse to, having more children, and yet at the same time consider every fetus or infant to be of
intrinsic worth. Dworkin calls this odd subset of intrinsically valued
objects "sacred." 1 9 "The hallmark of the sacred as distinct from the
incrementally valuable is that the sacred is intrinsically valuable because-and therefore only once-it exists."22
I have no quarrel with Dworkin's report that most of us perceive
human beings, even before birth, to possess what he calls "inviolability" and that the nature of this inviolability is puzzling. His fundamental errors lie in his solution to this puzzle.
Faced with the fact that it makes no sense to care greatly about an
existing, intrinsically valued entity, and yet to care possibly not at all
for the same entity in potentia, Dworkin suggests that what is valued
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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73.
70.
73-74.
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must be that which is added as the entity comes into existence.2
The
strange notion of inviolability thus has been explained. Analogously,
we might surmise that insofar as churches are felt sacred-inviolable
once they exist but not something we necessarily want more of-this
feeling could be because what we really value are bricks. Perhaps the
reason we would not wish to smash a church is that we would not wish
to waste bricks, assuming them not recoverable. We could still consistently refuse to contribute to the construction of additional places of
worship. What we really valued in an inviolable entity would be not
the result but the investment. This investment or "effort" 222 would
have the ordinary, rationally understandable kind of incremental intrinsic value: Dworkin treats past and future investments equally and
finds "waste" of actual or potential investments to be of similar intrinsic disvalue.

223

Though he continues to use the word "intrinsic" to describe the
value of life,2 2 4 Dworkin cannot mean what he says, or perhaps he
means "intrinsic" only as opposed to "instrumental." He does not reduce human beings to instruments to be used by others, but he values
human lives for what has gone into them rather than for what they
are: "[T] he nerve of the sacred lies in the value we attach to a process
or enterprise or project rather than to its results ....
25
Dworkin's first fundamental error is simply his denial that human
beings themselves matter, not just the creative effort going into
them. 2 26 There is another, better way to explain the puzzles of inviolability. Instead of giving up the fuller notion of "intrinsic," Dworkin
should have abandoned the idea of "valuing" in favor of "respect" or
"reverence." Sticking with the idea of value is his second, and still
more fundamental, error. In other words, Dworkin is wrong both
about the object and about the attitude involved in the sense of inviolability. That object is the inviolable being itself, not what goes into it.
That sense or attitude is one not of evaluation but of deference.
Each of Dworkin's two errors obscures an aspect of the human
individual. His notion of investment ignores the individual in the etymologically central sense of an undividable whole, focusing instead on
that of which (or from which) she is made. 227 The attitude of valuing
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

78-79.
79.
84-101.
99.
78.
84.
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ignores the nonfungible particularity of each individual, caring only
about the kind of being of which she is an instance. Let us examine
these two errors one at a time. 22
A.

Investment Ignores Individuality

To test the hypothesis that we care about bricks rather than
churches, we would look to whether we cared equally about other
forms of brick construction. If we found that smashing brick houses
and patios were a matter of little concern to us, we would have to
reject the love of bricks as an explanation for the inviolability of
churches.
When we apply this same test to Dworkin's theory, however, it
fails. By his own admission, we are "selective" in finding inviolability
where there has been human or natural investment,2 2 9 and Dworkin
can adduce no pattern in our selectivity:
We do not treat everything that human beings create as sacred. We treat art as inviolable, but not wealth or
automobiles or commercial advertising, even though people
also create these. We do not treat everything produced by a
long natural process-coal or petroleum deposits, for example-as inviolable either .... 230
We are equally selective about divine investment: "Only God can
make a tree," but we still cut them down rather freely. Because investment does not necessarily produce inviolability, there must be a better
way to understand the demands of human life, art, and animal
species.
Could it be that Dworkin has it exactly reversed, that the perception of making, or of investment, actually d%anctifies a result? He
himself admits that "we do not think... artificially produced species
are intrinsically valuable in the way that naturally produced species
are." 231 Yet even nature-the original creation of life and its subsequent evolution-might no longer produce a sense of the inviolable
228. Virtually no reviewers of Dworkin's book have tried to challenge him on his erroneous explanation of the no-production-yet-no-destruction paradox. See supra note 11.
Kamm's piece does suggest that the subjective effect of death on the entity that dies is a
disvalue that can arise only for entities that already exist. See Kamm, supra note 11, at 179.

Her approach, however, would help explain the paradox only with regard to entities that
have rights or at least interests, a status that Dworkin denies to many fetuses that he says
possess a measure of inviolability.
229. LIFE'S

DOMINION,

230. Id.
231. Id. at 78-79.

supra note 1, at 80.
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in us if it could be reduced to a series of discrete and comprehensible
steps.
Making demystifies; investing desacralizes-and not merely because knowledge of process minimizes or eliminates any role for a deity. To the degree that secular, human art comes to seem artificial, to
seem the result of a learnable process of production, of technique, it
also loses much of its inviolability.
Why is this so? Fundamentally, because a made thing has already
been violated; from the beginning of its being it has been composed
of separate parts. Better put: There is nothing in it to violate. If it is
only the sum of what went into its making, then nothing is destroyed
when it is broken apart again. Only something individual-that is,
undividable-can be inviolable. Only as we forget a product's origins
and components do we come to see it as a formal unity and thus possibly as inviolable. (Thus genetic explanation is often degrading.)
Dworkin's reductionism obscures whatever inviolability we might
otherwise sense. Indeed, investing is still more reductionistic than
making, for it does not even produce something with parts. "Investment" connotes a reserve with no shape at all, like Dworkin's "coal or
petroleum deposits."2" 2 It results only in a collection or stockpile, not
in an entity.

233

With regard to human life in particular, Dworkin does have it
backwards. Consistent with his theory, he suggests that a planned
pregnancy is more inviolable than an accidental one, not from considerations of fairness to the fetus, but "because a deliberate decision of
parents to have and bear a child is of course a creative one, 23 4 thus
involving greater human investment. If Dworkin were right, then testtube embryos, products of surrogacy, and the like ought to induce in
us the greatest sense of the sacred, in that they add much more
human effort to that of nature. Yet in fact, one of the chief objections
to biological engineering is that it actually lessens our sense of life's
sanctity.
Another way to test Dworkin's theory (that the inviolability of life
is directly related to the waste of investment caused by its destruction) 23 5 would be to look carefully at deaths in which waste is minimal-analogous to looking at churches made with very few bricks. If
232. Id. at 80.
233. For further discussion of the idea of a stockpile, see supra note 95 and accompany-

ing text.
234. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 83.
235. Id. at 84.
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we find a sense of inviolability even there, then Dworkin's investment
idea again does not work.
It is surely common for the sick and aged, and for their caretakers, to wish for death and, if they are religious, even to pray for it. In
Dworkin's terms, their deaths would not be tragic because any investments have been already as fulfilled as possible. 3 6 Why are most of us
nevertheless reluctant to cause death intentionally? Do we not hold
back out of a sense of life's sanctity or inviolability, despite the fact
that death would be welcome?
Admittedly, some people no longer have a strong sense of the
inviolability of life in such situations, and Dworkin's theory indicates
that we ought to get over our qualms. The point here, however, is
empirical, not moral. It is quite common for a person to hold
strongly, consciously, and at the very same moment, both to a sense
that death would not be tragic and to a sense that life may not be
destroyed. Therefore, Dworkin's calculus of tragedy cannot be an adequate metric for inviolability. Indeed, the very fact that he has to
work so hard to change our feelings with regard to euthanasia shows
that his theory is not accurately founded on those feelings.
Consider also mass murder: According to Dworkin's theory, we
ought to feel worse about Nazis gassing young to middle-aged adults
than we do about the Nazis' destruction of little children, the seriously
disabled, and the very aged because, although all had their rights
equally violated, only the deaths of the former caused great waste of
investment.237 In fact, we are more aghast at the wanton killing of the
absolutely helpless and defenseless. It is precisely in the most vulnerable and least capable, those furthest from the usual standards of
human excellence, that the sanctity or inviolability of life stands out
with greatest clarity. The Nazi slaughter of infants seems a direct, flagrant, arrogant, and inexcusable attack on the dignity of life. To
shoot a crippled child is more horrifying, even if in some way less
tragic, than to do the same to a healthy adult. When pro-lifers call
abortion "the killing of a defenseless baby," they are arguing that it is
actually worse than the usual sort of homicide.
Even where Dworkin's theory seems to work, where there is a
rough correlation between investment and inviolability, a careful phenomenology will reveal that it is the human being that we care about,
not what went into making that being. For example, Dworkin claims
repeatedly that almost everyone thinks late abortion worse than early
236. Id. at 88.
237. Id. at 87.
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abortion. 23 8 As discussed previously, this too is a universal claim, 239
but even where it accurately reflects people's views, it does not validate
Dworkin's theory. Dworkin argues in effect that the unborn child is
being constructed (rather than developing itself) in the womb, 24 ° and
that people gradually care more about a fetus as it gets older because
it then has more invested in it.24 1 Yet many such people acknowledge
fetal dignity, not in the effort expended, but in the results achieved,
and not so much as a gradual matter of degree as a sudden threshold
of recognition. Once the fetus is recognizable as a child, many become at once reluctant to abort her. Dworkin acknowledges this, writing: "[T]he more like a child the aborted fetus has already becomethe worse it is." 24 2 He ignores this fact for theoretical purposes, however, because, he claims, "increasing resemblance alone has no moral
2
significance. "243 One could disagree with this contention of his, "
but even if it were true, we are not yet at the point of moral theory.
We are first seeking accurately to discern and report what it is that we
perceive to be sacred or inviolable. Dworkin says it is investment, but
in truth it is the individual human image.
If Dworkin were ever to seek to console a parent who had lost a
child through miscarriage or stillbirth, he would do well to avoid
speaking of a tragic "waste of human investment" 24 5 and concentrate
instead on the loss of that child herself. It is not the bricks but the
building that matters, not the human input (nor the natural or divine
input) but the human being that has dignity and inviolability.
Dworkin makes a similar mistake at the other end of the human
lifespan, arguing that it is life's output, its biography, that matters, not
the aged human body itself.246 He does notice that even demented or
"vegetating" persons have human dignity and a right to be treated correspondingly. 24 7 Indeed, one should emphasize that this human dignity is what makes their present condition tragic. There is nothing
regrettable about the existence of real tomatoes or other vegetables.
238. See, e.g., id. at 86-87.
239. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
240. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 82-83 (discussing that each human being is the
product of natural and human creation and investment).
241. Id. at 89 ("[Als fetal growth continues, the natural investment that would be wasted
in an abortion grows steadily larger and more significant.").
242. Id. at 86-87.
243. Id. at 89.
244. SeeJames Q. Wilson, On Abortion, COMMENTARY,Jan. 1994, at 21, 24, and the discussion of the significance of the human image infra at text accompanying notes 300-317.
245. LiFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 92.
246. See, e.g., id. at 199.
247. Id. at 233-34.
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Dworkin also rightly sees that the contrast between how a person once
appeared and how she now appears may be tragic.2 41 He is wrong,
however, to find the full explanation of our sense of tragedy in the
notion of biography, the idea that her present condition makes a poor
ending and, therefore, that the supposedly vegetating individual may
249
be "better off dead."
If a great athlete, an Olympic champion, is crippled by some accident, she retains her dignity because of her humanity and because of
her past achievements. She may be only a remnant of what she once
was, but that remnant is honored because it is still recognizable as an
imperfect image of something greater. It is not merely some anticlimactic and eliminable appendage of what would otherwise be a good
story. To say she ought to die, or ought to have died in the accident,
is to attack her present dignity, not to acknowledge it. For she is her
body, not her biography.
Dworkin's error is to confuse life itself with the input (investment) into life and the output (biography) from life. Life is not
something added to or produced by human or animal organisms, it is
those organisms themselves. To say that someone's physical life has
no further worth is to say that person has no further worth. Richard
Neuhaus, in a sentence quoted by Dworkin, has it almost right:
"[T]he question [of] whether life is good [for] the person gets things
backward ....
[L]ife is a good of the person ... "250 Hamlet said it
even better: "To be or not to be, that is the question ....
Physical
life is the person; if Hamlet kills himself, he no longer exists. To be
biologically alive is the only way we can exist in the present world; to
die is to cease to be entirely-not to live on as biography or as anything else. We may well wish it were not so. We may wish that we
ourselves and those we love were not condemned to wither away. Nevertheless, that is just the way it is, and to imagine that the human
person is hiding somewhere (maybe in a story) other than in that
shriveled body on the bed is dangerous romanticism.
25 2
Dworkin's admitted reluctance to degrade even the comatose
demonstrates that that body, all that is left of the person, has dignity
because of the human design it once manifested and still possesses.
Our human dignity, and our right to be treated with dignity, can
"251

248. Id. at 199.
249. Id. at 193.
250. Id. at 214 (quoting Richard John Neuhaus, The Return of Eugenics, COMMENTARY,
Apr. 1988, at 15, 22).
251. WILLAM SHiA, rtsPEutF, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2, line 64 (Washington Square Press 1976).
252. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 233-34.
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never leave our body, as long as we live. Even ifI will otherwise, even
if I write down a wish for euthanasia in a "living will," I cannot destroy
respect for my incarnate personhood, any more than I can sell myself
into slavery or waive my right not to be maimed or tortured.253 A
good theory of inviolability must explain, not explain away, how the
humanum, merely being a living human individual, continues thus to
matter.
That theory need not be committed a priori, however, to the
moral conclusion that the sanctity of life is absolute. Dworkin did not
create the value of investment or of biography out of thin air. Nietzsche and many others may well feel that how they are remembered is
more important to them than the humble and dependent being they
will someday become if death does not first intervene.25 4 Nothing I
have written up to this point proves that such a preference ought not
to count.2 55 I have insisted only that we recognize, as Dworkin does
not, that the inviolability of human existence works always against
rather than for the desire intentionally to cause death.
When I made a similar argument once before to Dworkin, he responded that the inviolability of life cannot simply mean that "it is
wrong to kill people."2 5 6 The significance of sanctity, he wrote, cannot be found 'just in the idea that the existence of life is valuable in
itself, because it would follow . . . that it is desirable to produce as
much life as we can." 25 7 In other words, Dworkin defends shifting
from valuing individual life to valuing investment because he sees no
other way to explain the actuality-possibility discrepancy we have noticed before in our attitudes toward human beings. There is in fact
another alternative-rejection of the idea of valuing altogether. Life
could be inviolable not because it or investment is valued by us, but
because it lays a claim of respect upon us.

253. These are limits on my autonomy with which Dworkin agrees. Id. at 259 n.23.
254. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
255. See

REPORT OF THE NEw

YORK

STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND

THE LAW, WHEN

(1994) (providing a good summary of theoretical and practical arguments against assisted suicide and euthanasia).
256. Ronald Dworkin, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Mar. 28, 1991, at 73 [hereinafter N.Y. REv.
BooKS].
257. Id. at 73. Dworkin was responding to my letter criticizing his article entitled The
Right to Death, which had been published in the same journal on January 31, 1991, and was
later substantially incorporated into Life's Dominion.
DEATH Is SOUGHT
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Valuing Ignores Particularity

Dworkin's second fundamental error is to remain fixed to the attitude of valuing25 rather than rejecting it in favor of the stance we
shall soon describe and call "respect" or "reverence." Only this latter
stance can discern particular individuals within the mass of humanity.
Before proceeding, however, let us review and amplify the data we
seek to understand.
Without abandoning concern for human individuals as suchwithout turning to investment or something else as our object of concern-we need to make sense of the fact that we often try both not to
destroy existing humans and not to produce more of them. There is
also a related basic datum that Dworkin overlooked: As the word itself
implies, inviolability is much more offended by the willful violation of
life (or art or anything else felt inviolable) than by its chance
nonpreservation.
Consider the recent massacres in Rwanda, an example of intended genocide. 5 9 No one would have difficulty seeing them as a
monstrous violation of the sanctity of life. Especially the clubbing to
death of the very young and very old, as with parallel Nazi killing, 6 '
fills us with horror. The assailants seem to have been oblivious to the
basic sanctity or inviolability of life, transgressing it wholesale. Yet few
if any of us would react similarly to an equally lethal earthquake in
India. The tragedy of wasted investment is, by hypothesis, the same,
but we would not describe the earthquake as an injury to life's sanctity. The inviolability of life is just not at issue in natural events, even
violent ones, although the same loss of investment may be there. It
would seem silly and irrelevant to say of someone, "Her life (or the
sanctity of her life) was violated by that big boulder that fell on her."
The inviolability of life is a claim or demand on human agency, not on
natural forces.
Similarly, we do not now think that the inviolability of life is at
stake in the AIDS epidemic, but we surely would think so if the government decided to combat AIDS by killing its human carriers. Our
sense of life's inviolability also does not require us to spend taxes to
maximize the human lifespan, or even to cure AIDS or cancer, in the
258. See infra notes 263-275 and accompanying text.
259. See generally AIAIN DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

(Alison Marschner trans., 1995) (placing Rwandan genocide in historical context and calling for political action).
260. See generally ANATOMY OF THE AuSCHWITZ DEATH CAMP (israel Gutman & Michael
Berenbaum eds., 1994) (collecting essays describing the operation of the Auschwitz death

camp).
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way it requires us to refrain from murder. More concretely, it is common for people who would never think of killing themselves or others,
because of the inviolability of life, to decide to do little or nothing
extraordinary to preserve it in the face of overwhelming and incurable
illness.
In Life's Dominion, Dworkin wholly ignores these active-passive
and intentional-accidental contrasts, 6 1 claiming that the inviolability
of life weighs equally against all wastes of investment, whether by intentional killing or by not preserving. Indeed, he is so far from the
world in which we really live that he actually claims that the inviolability of life may require us actively and intentionally to increase the
number of deaths, wherever not doing so would let poor lives continue.2 6 2 He thinks the sanctity of its own life could demand the abortion of a severely disabled fetus, for example,2 6 3 later adding: "[I]n
some state a majority.., might come to think it shows disrespectfor the
sanctity of life to continue a pregnancy ... in cases of fetal deformity." " Anything ispossible, but such talk would seem gibberish almost everywhere today, even among those who favor prenatal
euthanasia. To let life alone does not violate it.
The properly sharp disjunction between intentional destruction
and unintentional nonpreservation is even clearer in the case of art,
perhaps because our relation to art is not so complicated by duties
that arise from sources other than sanctity. An art history teacher
once told me of a sale of a large piece of land in which buyer and
seller quarreled over who should pay the enormous costs of removing
certain unsalable monumental sculptures that neither party wanted or
valued. Clearly, the simplest and cheapest solution would have been
to destroy the sculptures and cart away the pieces. "The sanctity of
art" made this impossible. At the same time, the low value of the
works of artjustified doing little or nothing to preserve them from gradual destruction by the weather. To take another example: Official or
private vandalism of a work of art involves clear disrespect for the artwork's sanctity, but no violation of the sanctity of art occurs when an
artist gives up a project in frustration, nor when the government refuses to subsidize its completion or its preservation.
261. Curiously, the amicus brief Dworkin later coauthored gives great importance to the
latter contrast. See Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: The Philosopher'sBrief supra note 5,at 42.
262. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1,at 90.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 159. Dworkin seems to oppose forcing women to abort in such cases, but why
a mother should have a right to impose an exceedingly frustrating life on her child remains unclear under his theory.
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Sanctity thus draws a sharp line between intentional destruction,
which it forbids, and unintentional nonpreservation, which it permits.
Any adequate theory of sanctity must account for this dramatic difference. Dworkin's theory just ignores it. Gerard Bradley has rightly
taken him to task for being virtually unconcerned with the role of
intention in matters of life and death. 65 Dworkin likewise considers
the distinction between action and inaction "apparently irrational."2 6 6
That is saying that the sense of sanctity or inviolability is itself irrational, which is a way of admitting that one has no good theory of it.
Once we move away from the pure cases of intentional action and
unintentional omission, to cases of unintentional action and intentional omission, the demands of inviolability become less clear. For
example, Catholic medical ethics does not consider the foreseeable
death of a patient by a potent dose of morphine to be a violation of
the norm against intentional killing, provided that there is no other
way to relieve the patient's extreme pain and that the consequent
death, while predicted with certainty, is not intended as the object of
the injection.2 6 7 Many laypeople might still have qualms and might
need quite a bit of pastoral convincing, however, before they would
feel comfortable knowingly (though unintentionally) causing someone's death. Even homicide as a result of a wholly unavoidable vehicular accident-running over a child who darts from some bushes after
a ball, for example-makes one a killer, in the sense of being someone who has caused another's death, albeit one we think legally and
morally excused. The driver of that vehicle is going to feel an anguish
that will be spared a passenger or an onlooker. Horror at being a
cause of death, even an unintentional one, was once actually dominant in the law. In the European Middle Ages, every agent of deathconscious or unconscious, man, beast, or inanimate thing-was polluted by the desecration of life and had to purge itself by atonement
or redemption.2 6 8
265. See Bradley, supra note 11, at 387.
266. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 184.
267. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 549 (1994) ("The use of painkillers to
alleviate the sufferings of the dying, even at the risk of shortening their days, can be morally in conformity with human dignity if death is not willed as either an end or a means, but
only foreseen and tolerated as inevitable.").
268. See FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
470-73 (2d ed. 1905); Walter Woodbum Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals
and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modern Times, 64 U. PA. L. REv.696 (1916); see also
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 343-357 (1978) (discussing extensively the
still-extant practice of "tainting" individuals solely because their acts result in the death of
another human being). Consonant with the theory of this Article, Fletcher points out that
even today, the "law of homicide is built on the premise that everyone has a duty not to
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Likewise, intentional but passive permitting of death is something
about which the demands of sanctity may be unclear. Although I previously mentioned that some people wish or pray for the deaths of
those caught in irremediable suffering, I doubt that all of us would
feel comfortable with wishing death upon someone. Here we are just
talking about wishing; a wish is not really an intent unless it is connected to an efficacious choice. Many more people would feel uncomfortable with intentionally bringing about death, not just wishing
for it, even by wholly passive means. Could it not violate the sanctity
of life purposely to withhold aid from India's earthquake victims in
order to decrease world population? The active-passive distinction,
considered apart from the question of intent, can bear still less moral
weight in the case of those who are wholly dependent on us-infants,
those with serious disabilities, and the very aged. To fail to preserve a
dependent person is just as directly lethal as actively to kill an independent individual. To say, "I didn't kill her; I just turned off her
oxygen so that she would die on her own" seems a sophistic quibble.
(Although even here life is not as unequivocally violated as it would be
if the oxygen in her tent were deliberately replaced with carbon
monoxide.)
We need not in this Article resolve our ambivalence in the above
cases of eithercausing death or intending death, but not both intending
and causing it,"' and we certainly need not ask and answer the question of what inviolability in conjunction with all other moral and legal
norms would require or permit. Our task is rather the premoral and
prelegal one of reporting accurately and making theoretical sense of
the feeling that we may not deliberately cause death but need not
produce or preserve life.
We should, in passing, call attention, however, to the fact that
there are other considerations besides sanctity that must be taken into
account in judging right action. When I earlier made the claim to
Dworkin that sanctity required not killing but did not require preserving life, and mentioned the above example of the monumental sculptures left to deteriorate, he criticized my view for "allowing [people]
to decay and suffer."2 7 0 Of course I expressed no such view. I simply
cause death.... Yet there is no universal duty to prevent death from occurring...." Id. at
371. The sanctity or inviolability of life requires that we not kill but does not, without
more, require life's preservation.
269. For my own attempt at a resolution (focusing finally on intention rather than on
causation), see Richard Stith, Toward Freedomfrom Value, 38 Ju~rsT 48 (1978), reprinted in
ON MORAL MEDICINE 127 (Stephen E. Lammers & Allen Verhey eds., 1987). Much of this
and the next section of this Article is a reworking of portions of that prior essay.
270. N.Y. REv. BooKs, supra note 256, at 73.
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said that it was no violation of the sanctity of art not to cover it up, nor
of the sanctity of life not to provide painkillers. Justice or compassion
may well impose such requirements, however, as to fellow humans.
Dworkin seems to want to squeeze nearly the whole moral universethe demand to help as well as the demand not to harm-into the
single idea of inviolability. Perhaps this is one reason his theory ends

up so misleading.
There is clearly no way to understand the above data regarding
the phenomenon of inviolability merely in terms of the intrinsic value
of life. To this extent, Dworkin is right. If the value of life were set
low enough to explain why we often do not want more of it and do

not wish to spend extraordinary efforts preserving it, then our reluctance to kill intentionally would come to seem an irrational hang-up
that should be overcome.

71

On the other hand, if the value of life

were set high enough to explain why we shrink from killing, then it
would demand that we maximize the production and preservation of
271. Indeed, Dworkin's rhetorical strategy, in effect if not in intent, is precisely to conflate our two intuitions in order to argue from the nonabsolute character of the duty of
preservation to the nonabsolute character of the duty of nonviolation. Other advocates of
occasional killing do the same. See McCormick, supra note 137, at 16-17. Both the Second
Circuit, see Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729-30 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996),
and the Ninth Circuit, see Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 821-24 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996), treat the actomission distinction as unimportant in this context, arguing from the seeming lack of state
interest in stopping lethal withdrawal of care to a similar lack of state interest in preventing
active assistance in suicide.
Of course, permission to withdraw even low-cost care need not indicate that the state
does not highly value a patient's life. Both law and morality frequently permit omissions
that result in a regrettable net loss to society, out of deference to self-centered human
nature. See Larry Alexander, Affirmative Duties and the Limits of Self-Sacrifice, 15 L. & PHIL.
65, 65-66 (1996); infra note 385. Consistency does not require that the law permit affirmative action that results in equally regrettable net harm, because human nature can more
easily accept not acting against others than it can accept sacrificing for others.
Furthermore, the omission of even life-saving care can be motivated by respect for a
patient's privacy, her right to be let alone, while actively killing her obviously cannot.
Therefore, the law's permission to withhold intrusive life-saving care need not imply a low
valuing of the life of the person who fails to receive that care. See Judge Beezer's discussions of the "right to be free from unwanted medical treatment," citing Professor Yale
Kamisar. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 840, 856 (Beezer, J., dissenting) (citing Yale
Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735,
757 (1995)).
Even if legal permission to withdraw care did imply that the law regarded a patient's
life to be of little value, this would in no way prove that the life did not retain sanctity or
inviolability. Acknowledging value and acknowledging sanctity are two entirely separate
stances, as shown in the next section of this Article. We shall also see there that sanctity,
unlike value, demands nonviolation (nonaction) far more than it demands preservation
(nonomission of care). Both Dworkin and the above courts have failed to appreciate the
act-omission distinction because they have not properly conceptualized the sanctity or inviolability of human life.
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human beings. Similarly, no amount of tinkering with the intrinsic
value of art could explain the strange way buyer and seller treated the
monumental sculptures mentioned above.
A point of still greater analytic importance: Even the belief that
life or art has an absolute or infinite intrinsic value could not generate
the intuitive aversion to destruction found in our sense of sanctity or
inviolability, because the attitude of valuing can have no objection to
destruction accompanied by the substitution of more of the infinitely
valued type. In other words, valuing is inherently indifferent as between particular instances of that which is valued. Thus, no amount
of valuing life or art can make individual persons or paintings
inviolable.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that human life has infinite value. By this I mean that a human being is so valuable, of such
great worth, that no other kind of entity (thing, relationship, or
whatever) or combination of entities, can ever be preferable to such a
being. In other words, insofar as we choose rationally that which is
most valuable, we would never choose something else instead of a living human being. Consequently, we would never choose to destroy
such a being, no matter what other kinds of benefits we might realize.
Nevertheless, we might well destroy such a being for the sake of
the same kinds of benefits-human life. Indeed, if we felt that human
life were of infinite value, we might well feel morally compelled to kill
whenever killing would save more lives than those lost.2 72 For example, when faced with mutual starvation in a lifeboat, we would begin to
kill and eat each other.2 73 We also would kill a healthy person if his
vital organs were absolutely needed to save a number of ailing siblings.
We might also kill for reasons other than saving life. If life were
really of infinite value, but our resources were limited, would we not
favor those who were most fertile or lived longest at least cost? Would
272. Note that I am assuming only that life has an infinite exchange value-that we would
exchange an infinite amount of anything else for one life. If one life were taken to provide
infinite satisfaction, then we would be indifferent as between preserving one life or many.
This infinite satisfaction value, however, would be even less able to prevent killing than
would infinite exchange value, for although it would refute the claim that we ought to kill
one person to save two or fifty (by affirming that one person has as much value as fifty), it
would also be indifferent to killing fifty to save one-it would affirm that no value would
thus be lost.
273. See, e.g., Queen v. Dudley & Stephans, 14 Q.B. 273 (1884) (convicting two men of
murder, but commuting the sentence to six months imprisonment, for killing and eating a
fellow passenger while stranded in an open life boat for three weeks without food); cf.
United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383) (convicting defendant of unlawful homicide, but giving light sentence of six months and twenty dollars,
for throwing several passengers overboard on overladen longboat).
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we not, like some kind of prize-animal breeder, put to sleep the fat
and the sick and the sterile in order to permit more people to replace
them? If every single life had tremendous value, we would want as
many as we could afford for as long as possible even if this meant
destroying those requiring greater net care, resources, or space.
Similarly, we would not avoid comparing the lives we valued and
perhaps killing as a result. Even if all lives had infinite value, we
would have no rational objection to killing whenever an equal substitute were available. Even if I valued Mexican gold coins infinitely, I
would not have any objection to returning one to the mint in exchange for an exact duplicate. So, too, I would not object to killing a
newborn if she could be quickly replaced and any extra inconvenience could be compensated. Moreover, I would actually prefer to destroy and replace if the quality of what I had could be in any way
improved. Even if I valued those coins infinitely (in that I would give
anything else to have even one), I no doubt would return a scratched
one in exchange for one without a blemish. Similarly, even though I
valued every baby infinitely, relative to everything else, I would prefer
to have one of maximum quality, as long as it were easy to have "defective" ones sent back to their maker and new ones substituted. No
value of human life, no matter how high, can preclude killing simply
to improve life's quality.
These last examples begin to reveal the reason why no amount of
valuing of human life, not even infinite valuing, can be in harmony
with our intuitive regard for life: We think that the particularindividual matters, whereas for something we merely valued, we would accept
a relevantly identical substitute. In other words, all valuing (in common with many other attitudes) is and must be for types (or essences),
rather than for particular examples of these types. No matter how
highly I value gold coins, there is no possible reason why I would prefer one to another if both partook equally of value-conferring characteristics. If we only valued human life, we would likewise treat people
as substitutable; because we do not so treat them, we must do more
than value them.
We also cannot make do with value by saying that we value the
particular examples of the type, rather than the type itself. Such a
clarification is no doubt true; we do not value some kind of disincarnate type called "human life" any more than I value the abstract
form of gold coins. My point, however, is that as long as individuals
are described as valuable only because they are human beings- examples of this type-they become substitutable. That is, insofar as I
simply value the set called "individual human beings," I cannot object
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to the substitution or maximization of the members of this set, even if
it involves killing.
Someone might object here that I have misunderstood the way
we value human beings, saying that we do not value them merely as
examples of the human species, but for their qualities as "unique" persons. Concededly, there may be a uniqueness in each human being
that adds to her sanctity, just as the singularity of each painting may
contribute to the sanctity of art. Uniqueness, however, cannot be the
whole story. There are many unique entities in the world, and they
are not all inviolable. Furthermore, even if people are all unique, it
seems impossible that we could value them infinitely for their unique
characteristics, primarily because their differences are just not so important. I do not care about a stranger in her uniqueness (her neverto-be-repeated fingerprints or her possibly unusual facial appearance
or odd sense of humor), but in her humanity. It is only her humanity,
in fact, that I know with any degree of certainty. This knowledge suffices to make me reluctant to kill her. Moreover, even if each person
is unique, we can hypothetically imagine the existence of absolutely
identical siblings. Would our reluctance to kill one to save the others
be in any degree lessened by their lack of uniqueness? I think not.
They would be identical without being fungible. Obviously, something other than valuing their uniqueness must be at the root of our
reticence. We must somehow explain how the particular individual
thus matters to us (and notjust to her) in the sense that we are reluctant to kill her even when she is exactly identical to her sisters.
Dworkin's turn to investment fails to explain the inviolability of
life not only because he ignores the human individual as a whole, caring only about the investment in each person, 274 but also because investment itself is only valued by him. Dworkin cannot care about
particular human individuals because he thinks in terms only of value.
His first error ignores that we are individuals (more than the sum of
our parts) while his second error ignores that we are particularindividuals (distinguishable even from identical brethren). As a result, Dworkin can have little hesitation about wasting one investment, no matter
how highly he may value it, as long as that loss is more than counterbalanced by present or anticipated gain in other investments. Every
investment is fungible. Someone who simply values bricks cares
neither about individual churches nor even about particular bricks.
Another, quite different, way to demonstrate the arrogance of valuing toward particularity is to contrast it with the concern often found
274. See supra Part IV_
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in love. There is, of course, a loose sense of the word "love" that applies to many valued objects. I might say that I love steak, horses, or
diamonds, and mean little more than that I value them. Yet love in
the full sense, in which we say we love God, or a spouse, or a friend, is
not normally used for things, no matter how highly we value them. We
cannot translate all value into love. More surprising the converse is
also true: We cannot translate our feelings for those we love into
value terminology. "I love my wife" has a very different feel to it from
"I value my wife." The latter seems at first objectionable because of its
instrumentalist connotation; one suspects that I care about my wife
only because I have some use for her. The antagonism between love
and value goes deeper, however. If anything, it sounds more inappropriate to eschew instrumentalism and to say, "I consider my wife to
have intrinsic value."
No doubt I can speak of valuing our marriage, but to speak of my
wife herself having value seems to demean her, not because of a connotation of instrumental value, but because the very idea of valuing
her seems to reduce her to a good or commodity to be prized and
even priced. Such an attitude is at least different from, if not incompatible with, love. I appear in some way to have set myself above her
and to be evaluating and preferring her, rather than unselfconsciously
delighting in her in the way of eros and giving myself to her in the way
of agape. Indeed, to speak of a beloved solely in value terms seems so
misguided as to be nearly absurd.
Love is radically different from valuing. Moreover, at least some
lovers care about the beloved as a particularindividual, whereas valuing regards only types. Valuing is willing to exchange, to accept substitutes of at least equal value. This willingness is quite appropriate for
value because valuing proceeds from a value judgment, an evaluation,
and it would be silly not to value two entities equally if both were
judged to have the same valued characteristics-to be the same valued
type. Love, by contrast, is often not willing to accept substitutes, even
identical ones. Even if God were to promise me that he would immediately substitute an identical person (or more than one) for my wife
if I would let him take her away, I would refuse. I do not want someone like her; I want her.
The fact that one cannot give sufficient reasons for one's love is
directly related to the fact that one cares about the beloved as an individual and not as a type. Perhaps this is what we mean when we say
love is an affair of the heart rather than of the mind. If one were to
claim that any characteristics of the beloved could fully account for
one's love, then one would be saying that anyone else of the same type
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would be equally loved. Yet many lovers would not say this. Love,
unlike valuing, can be for particular individuals instead of for types.
A particular entity is distinguished not by what it is, but by the fact
that it is. I can think abstractly of a table, but I cannot think, for example, of the third identical table I am about to build unless I mentally
insert it into space-time and imagine it existing sequentially with the
first two. Only if they have different space-time coordinates can two
entities of the same type be distinguished. Only if they exist in the
physical world, consequently, can they be thought of as particular individuals; the mind otherwise knows only quantity and quality, not
particulars.
Put another way, one might say that "existence" is part of the essence of an individual. In searching for a way of thinking that can
respect the individuality of people, we are thus looking for a mode of
thought that can take existence seriously.
Could love be the alternative to valuing for which we are searching? Could it be that we are reluctant to kill because we love other
people, even strangers? Without even beginning to discuss the complex question of whether love tends to preclude killing but allow not
preserving life, which the attitude for which we are looking must do,
we must reject love. For although love may indeed care for individuals, in a way that valuing does not, individual love cannot be extended
to all human beings. This is so, not only because love is too intimate
and too scarce a commodity, but because to universalize love is to destroy its particularity. That is, if we were to love all people simply as
people rather than as "John" and "Mary," we would be treating the
object of love as a type-"people." Yet it is the very nontype caring of
love that makes the individual matter. Therefore, we can never fully
love individuals simply because they are people. Someone who says
he loves people cannot mean love in our sense here and may mean
rather in the sense of liking a type.2 75 Such "people-liking" may well
be no more incompatible with killing individuals than is the peoplevaluing discussed at length above.
Love, therefore, will not work as an alternative explanation of inviolability, but it has shown us at least this much: We are looking for
an attitude that finds significance in individuals, but not only in indi275. The religious person may mean that she loves God, that God loves all persons individually, and that she thus indirectly loves all those loved by her Beloved as individuals.
This alternative to valuing is not insignificant, but it simply casts the conceptual problem
on God. How could God love every individual as an individual simply because each is of
the human type? Moreover, if God were so highly enamored of humans as such, would he
not wish us to produce as many as possible?
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viduals, because it must be an attitude that can be for all human beings simply because they are such. We must somehow find a way to
respond to the form or type we call "human being" in a way that nevertheless cares about particular examples of this type.
In sum, we might say that our and Dworkin's problem with sanctity is, at bottom, a metaphysical one. Inviolability attaches to particular individuals, to existing instances of the types called "humanity" or
"art" or "churches." We have to find a way to make existence matter,
without exchanging the true object of our concern for some other
type, call it "investment," "bricks," or whatever.
V. A

RESPECT-BASED THEORY OF INVIOLABILITY

To accomplish our task requires a degree of metaphysical courage. In particular, it requires that we give up our comfortable categorization of the lived world into the two boxes called "fact" and "value."
Is our reticence about killing due to some empirical fact of life? If
not, conventional thought takes it to be a "value judgment" about life.
For such a mind-set, our proof that life cannot be consistently valued
sufficiently to prevent killing could be evidence only that our reluctance to kill is irrational and arbitrary. Yet we need not think this way.
As Karl Mannheim has remarked:
[T]he fact that we speak about social and cultural life in
terms of values is itself an attitude peculiar to our time. The
notion of "value" arose and was diffused from economics,
where the conscious choice between values was the startingpoint of theory. This idea of value was later transferred to
the ethical, aesthetic, and religious spheres, which brought
about a distortion in the description of the real behaviour of
the human being in these spheres. Nothing could be more
wrong than to describe the real attitude of the individual
when enjoying a work of art quite unreflectively, or when acting according to ethical patterns inculcated in him since
childhood, in terms of conscious choice between values. 76
Against such economistic narrowness, this Article asserts that valuelanguage is a trap and prison of the mind and that the moral world
has a multitude of curious creatures in it, many of whom are at least as
fascinating as those two beasts of burden called "fact" and "value."
Love is only one of them.
Let us look, then, beyond value and love, to two more attitudes
often associated with sanctity and inviolability, respect and rever276.

KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 82

(1936).
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ence 2 7 7 and see if they match up better than valuing or loving with
the data we have so far gathered.
We ought first to notice that the feeling of respect, like that of
love, cannot easily be translated into value-talk.2 78 I might tell ajudge
of my respect for her court, but I would be unlikely to tell her how I
valued it. Valuing again seems connected to using, or at least implies
congruence with one's desires, and the judge is normally not interested in how desirable I find her court's judgments. Just as valuing
seemed unloving in regard to a spouse, so here it seems disrespectful
in regard to a court. Its evaluative boldness seems to obscure a court's
particular kind of dignity, no matter how highly I finally rank the
court in my scale of values.
Note, too, that we cannot respect just anything we value. I can
value diamonds, but do I make sense if I say, "I respect diamonds"?
The answer is obvious. The important point is not that I am silly or
overly materialistic, but that the sentence does not make sense. It
would perhaps be wrong of me, but certainly not senseless, to say, "I
value diamonds more than anything else in the world." Nor is it important here that diamonds are rarely valued as ends in themselves, or
that they are merely desired but not obligatory ends. I certainly can
say, "I think diamonds ought to exist for their own sake," or "Everyone
has an obligation to produce a maximum number of diamonds." Yet
it sounds like gibberish to say, "I respect diamonds." We would be
dumbfounded by such a statement during a conversation.
Similarly, we cannot sensibly say, "I respect happiness," though
certainly many value it. Happiness and diamonds just do not seem to
be the proper kinds of objects for respect. Whether or not eudaemonism or hedonism have been refuted is irrelevant. It certainly is possible to think of happiness as having great value, yet it is not possible
even to imagine it as an object of respect.
277. Dworkin uses both "respect," LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 28, and "reverence,"
id.at 76, in this context. The 1993 German abortion decision links respect (Achtung) and
inviolability (Unverletzlichkeit). See 88 BVerfGE 203, 257 (1993), 1993 EuGRZ 229, 244.
278. It is odd that in Life's
Dominion, Dworkin slides erroneously back and forth between
respect and value, given the importance that "equal concern and respect" has had for his
theories of the priority of individual rights over valued collective goals. LIFE'S DOMINION,
supra note 1, at 71-81. Nowhere in his prior work, however, does he seem to have carefully
examined and explained the idea of respect. His book, Taking Rights Seriously, is about as
close as he comes. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272 (1977). There he
points out that to treat people with respect means treating them "as human beings who are
capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be
lived." Id. I would consider this to be a correctly described instance of the object of respect, which, in its most generalized phenomenological form, is "directed power." See infra
note 322 and accompanying text.
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If someone were to ask us why we cannot feel respect for goods of
such obviously high value, we might well respond, "But they don't do
anything! How can I say I respect them?" Agency, the ability to act or
to participate in action, seems necessary (though not sufficient) for
respect. So we can respect intelligence but not good looks, and courage but not praise. We respect not goods or goals, but virtues-not
only moral virtues but all that might be called "directed powers."
Moreover, even if the object of valuing appears to be the same as
the object of respecting, our stance toward it is quite different. "I
value intelligence" has a different feel from "I respect intelligence."
The former puts intelligence into my sphere of action and speaks of
the preference it has; the latter steps back and accords the virtue of
intelligence its own proper sphere of action. The first is a holding,
and the second a releasing.
Undoubtedly, to respect people means something importantly
other than to value them. Respect discerns, in a sense, the personhood of human beings as creatures able to persevere powerfully
and creatively in their aims. Although this agency is often discovered
in people one at a time, all human beings seem designed for at least
some kinds of "virtue"-moral virtue, for example. This design itself
may be enough to evoke respect. Michael Polanyi writes:
[H]owever greatly we may love an animal, there is an emotion which no animal can evoke and which is commonly directed toward our fellow men. I have said that at the highest
level of personhood we meet man's moral sense, guided by
the firmament of his standards. Even when this appears absent, its79 mere possibility is sufficient to demand our
2
respect.

If potential virtue is sufficient for respect-worthiness, then perhaps respect is the individual and universal attitude to human life that we are
seeking, or again, if the human species generates respect in us, perhaps
this feeling can be appropriate even for individual instances of that
species who are in themselves unworthy of respect.
Respect is shown, above all, by acknowledgement and deference.
It cannot operate, therefore, except upon an individual instance of a
respected type. Primarily a matter of pausing and drawing back, it
279. MICHAEL POLANVI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 51 (1966). Kant, too, makes the capacity
for moral action a basis for respect for humanity, although he sometimes appears to be
thinking of a feeling more akin to what is below called reverence, rather than to what is
here called respect. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 99-101
(Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956) (1788) (discussing the transcendental
freedom of humankind as a necessary prerequisite for moral law and accountability).
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does not immediately commit us to production or preservation of that
type. Therefore, respect may be the best way to describe our sense of
the inviolability of human life.
Yet the word "reverence" competes with "respect" as the best expression of our sense of inviolability. Valuing feels demeaning in contrast to revering, just as it did in contrast to loving and respecting.
The sentence "I value God" seems rather presumptuous and can
hardly mean that I revere him. To talk of valuing art or law, again, is
to give them less importance than to speak of reverence for them.
Reverence acknowledges a nobility in its object that valuing does not,
a quality we may well call sanctity or inviolability.
The nature of reverence, and its distinction from valuing, can be
shown in still another way: As with respect, reverence for many objects of value would be nonsensical. Happiness and praise can no
more be revered than they can be respected. They are just not the
proper kinds of objects for reverence. We do not and cannot revere
goods or goals as such. Therefore, we cannot revere those entities that
can never present themselves to us except as desired goods or goals,
and we can revere other entities that we value, such as life, only by
seeing them differently than we do when valuing them.
Value is not necessary for reverence, any more than it is sufficient. One may well not like going to church, and yet behave reverently once inside. One might even resent an ugly church while
feeling reverence each Sunday. Reverence, after all, harkens back to
its linguistic root of vereri-"to fear." There is no necessary correlation between that which we fear and that which we like or value. Consequently, we may well not seek to produce or preserve many objects
that evoke reverence in us-ugly churches, for example.
Curiously, the revered does not have to have the virtues of the
respected. I can feel reverence for churches, even if at the same time
I do not have a feeling of respect for them (because I regard them as
inert objects). Only if I attribute some dynamic qualities to churches
can I also feel respect for them. That which we revere does not have
to have actional virtues, as did that which we respect.
Like respect, reverence need not fasten only upon the individual
in order to make her matter. Reverence can be for types-churches
or people, for example. Instead of making and having its types (as
does valuing), however, reverence lets them be. Reverence is reticent
and hesitant before that which has sanctity. It seeks to leave room for
its object. Above all, it seeks not to violate the object of its concern.
Not to violate that which we revere, however, means necessarily not to
violate any individual examples of the revered. Because valuing seeks
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actively to further a type, it cannot be bothered with individuals. It
seeks to use them in promoting their common type. Because reverence is a largely passive withdrawing, a "letting be" of its type, it must
move back from every individual instance of that type.
Does the term "respect" or the term "reverence" better express
our attitude toward human life? Each has its advantages, but their
usage overlaps to such a degree that I think we need not choose between them. Because respect seems slightly broader-it includes reverence more than reverence includes it-I will ordinarily use only the
word "respect" in this Article. When I use it, however, I mean to refer
to the idea called reverence as well as to the idea called respect. If I
mean only the latter, I shall usually specify "respect in the narrow
sense."
In sum, all valuing seeks to dominate the world. Individual entities as they exist have no significance; what matters is the production
and preservation of various valued types. People, facts, matter-the
stuff of being-become mere resources to be used in the maximization of values. All that exists is expendable, because only the abstractions we have here called types count. Even if these types are
considered to have intrinsic or infinite value, rather than only an instrumental value, the individual examples of these types (including
human investments and human beings) are reduced to the status of
desired goods and can be destroyed and exchanged at will. No wonder, then, that valuing feels bold and arrogant in contrast to the other
attitudes we have examined; a world we only value is a world entirely
subject to our evaluation and control.
Respect, by contrast, eschews domination. It steps back before
the type of thing cared about, and thus necessarily before every individual example of that type. A limit is given to us and to our schemes
of domination. We can no longer destroy and rebuild as we wish, but
must accept and accommodate being, even the being of individuals.
If I respect human life, if I say it is inviolable, then rather than making
and controlling it, I acknowledge and defer to it; I let it be. That
which is respected is beyond the scope of our rightful judgment; even
to evaluate it seems presumptuous and wrong. True, I may sometimes
(but not necessarily or always) have a kind of attraction to the object
of respect, but even here, my feeling is not the achieving and holding
stance that accompanies valuing; it is rather an appreciative awe or
delight.
Note what this means for bioethics: The much-maligned and belittled active-passive distinction turns out to be integral to the discernment of individuality. It is because valuing cannot see any difference
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between actively killing and passively not preserving that it cannot discern particularity. It is because respect can see this difference that it
can discern the particular.
Both universal and particular, both not violative and not necessarily productive or preservative, respect remedies the deficiencies of
valuing and provides an adequate concept descriptive of our feelings
and behavior toward human life and in particular of our reluctance to
kill. Certainly, it does a far better job than Dworkin's idea of
investment.
VI.

FORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES OF RESPECTING LIFE

Is the moral significance of the inviolability of life exhausted by a
rule forbidding killing? Does respect for life demand only that we not
kill? It would seem not. Rather, the inviolability of life is a foundation, perhaps the only foundation, for all ethical principles that make
individual people a matter of moral significance.
All moral attitudes that, like valuing, demand something must be
indifferent as between individual examples of that which they seek.
Only an attitude such as respect, which seeks to respond to something,
necessarily has regard for every individual example of the object of its
concern. Only by responding can individuals even have "reality," in
the full sense of that which must be accepted and taken into account
in planning how to use the things of the world.
The word given to human beings who have this reality, who have
a final and fundamental moral significance, is "persons." Respect
raises in the soft clay of value the hard rocks of persons. We can recognize persons; we can distinguish and make each one matter, not only
in spite of the fact that they are all identical qua human, but because
of this fact. Because we respect people, we cannot care only about
their quantity or quality; we are suddenly aware of them as individuals
who cannot be thoughtlessly sacrificed to the whole.
Respect may thus have a fundamental secular function that
Dworkin has overlooked. All interpersonal morality and all human
rights may be derivable from the deference shown to individual
human existence, for that which has inviolability must always be seen
as also an end in itself. When we defer to it, we are prevented from
using it in any destructive way. Metaphorically, we are forced to leave
a "space" around persons, not unlike the empty and unused space in
churches on a weekday, within which they can manifest themselves.
Dworkin made a terrible mistake. Inviolability is not hostile to
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"waste"28 ° but requires it. The individual human is not to be fully utilized in our (or her own) investment schemes. Indeed, the sacred
requires sacrifice, not investment; we must not expect a return on
what we give to our children, on what passes into their inviolable
space. "Rights" are simply a modem way to demarcate this "wasted"
space, to delineate the details of the particulate individuality discovered through respect. In other words, the reason that Dworkin finds
the inviolability of life "detached" from rights rather than being "derived" from them' is that respect is a basis for rights. Respect is primordial; rights are derivative.28 2 The necessary supports for personal
integrity, such as health, acquire a derivative sanctity that likewise demands their nonviolation. Thus, respect is not indifferent to personal
flourishing, but in service and in delight waits for human fulfillment.
One clarification: My argument is that respect for human beings
allows them to become individually important and thus to be called
"persons." I am not suggesting that respect for works of art, for example, transforms them into persons. Respect makes us pause and contemplate particularity; it permits its object to be seen as a person. Only
if that object also possesses an inner design for those virtues we associate with humanity does the word "person" become appropriate. Put
another way, those particular entities that merit respect may reveal
themselves to be persons if we permit them to do so, if we give them
enough time and space.
Even if respect is not sufficient in itself to generate an entire
moral or legal system, it is clearly necessary. Justice, in particular, requires as its necessary starting point the identification of those to whom
one must be just. It needs both to know the type on which it is to
operate-human life-and to separate this type into persons. It
needs to operate on individuals, but in a world of pure value, individuals cannot easily matter. Respect for human life lets justice know
where to start, lets it know for whom to ready its tools of equal regard.
Respect is thus not only more faithful than investment to the
seemingly contradictory data with which we began, it also has consequences quite different from Dworkin's idea. Whereas Dworkin ignores the individual in theory and permits or requires her destruction
LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 79.
281. Id. at 11.
282. Although I contend above that respect provides a basis for rights, I continue to
regard the idea of rights as an imperfect construction on this foundation. The shift from
the point of view of the duty-owing person to that of the benefit-receiving person undermines the sense of community. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. For further
discussion see also infra notes 286-292 and accompanying text.
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in practice, 283 respect insists on keeping her present before us. Thus
respect provides a basis for justice or utility and any other ethical or
legal theories that must begin by assuming some set of subjects.
Respect can do this for us because it is one of possibly many attitudes in which we discern calls or claims in the world. That is,
whereas valuing tells us what should be out there in our world, respecting tells us what we must do. It discerns not values, but sources
of value; not things that ought to be, but things that tell us what ought
to be. When we respond appropriately, our acts may appear to be a
"waste" because they are not part of a project of production or preservation, but they are better viewed as required "sacrifices."
The idea that the world contains entities to which we must respond, rather than which we must value, is not unfamiliar in everyday
life. It is only strange to a modern theoretical consciousness dominated by the fact-value split. For example, when a police officer holds
up her palm before us, we know that the appropriate response is to
stop. We do not, however, necessarily value traffic police; we may regard them only as an annoyance. Similarly, we may feel that we
should salute every time we see a flag being raised, without wishing to
make or preserve flags or flagpoles. A stray cat that wanders into my
home may present me with a compelling claim to food and shelter
even if I do not especially like cats and even if I proceed to close my
window to guard against further invasions.
As in these last two examples, it is quite possible for the calls we
hear to be positive, to ask for action rather than only deference on
our part. Nevertheless, those claims on us must also include the requirement of nonviolation or they cannot secure particularity in theory or in practice. If I can easily destroy flags or cats, I need not take
them into account for long. I do not need to watch out for each one
in particular. If we must respond fairly to the interests of everyone
existing, but need not let them remain existing, we effectively undercut all demands of justice. If we must relieve the oppressed unless we
kill them, then we will probably choose the latter and easier way. The
idea ofjustice to the weak might never even occur to us if we could get
rid of others, instead of having to deal with them when they get in our
way. That justice must be founded on the inviolability of the individual is so obvious that it would not be worth stating were it not sometimes overlooked in the way we treat those with disabilities. On the
one hand, we have today a great awareness of our responsibility for
their just treatment. On the other hand, at least until recently, it has
283. See supra notes 150-275 and accompanying text.
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been "common practice" to do away with newborns with severe disabilities.2 8 4 We seem to take a schizophrenic attitude toward these dependent people: we insist that we must treat them justly if they are
around, but that we may make sure they die when they first arrive.
The latter allowance must in the long run either destroy the rights
even of older people with disabilities or else convert these very rights
into a pressure to kill them while they are young.
Similarly, a utilitarian demand for a universally high "quality of
life" masks a monstrous choice unless it is accompanied by the recognition of life's sanctity. There are two ways to ensure that everyone
living has a high quality of life: raise the quality of all lives or eliminate those of low quality. Without the sanctity of life to exclude the
less arduous second alternative, any increase in the urgency or degree
of the quality of life demanded may lead to mass killing. Achieving
top-quality life may be felt too expensive, drawn out, and problematic
a process, and death may be found preferable. This may already be
the plight of some newborns and other "defective" persons, but unless
at some point the quality-of-life ethic is supplemented by the sanctity
of life, no one with any quality deficiency can be secure. Without
sanctity, we are all likely to be aided only when and to the extent that
aid is cheaper than poison. Whether our "defects" are physical or
mental, economic or educational, only sanctity can ensure that others
28 5
see these lacks as reasons to help us rather than to destroy us.
On the most abstract level, the inviolability of life ensures that
people are seen as subjects rather than as objects, as definers of
problems rather than as problems themselves. That there be such entities is a logical as well as a moral requirement. How can we ever
know what is needed unless we first know what can have needs? If we
admit the possibility that we might need to eliminate some of the
needy, we undercut our every conclusion. We may not kill others
even in a good cause because it is only the givenness of others that lets
us discern which causes are good.

284. SeeJohn A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasiaof Defetive Newborns: A LegalAnalysis,
27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 214 (1975). Robertson speaks primarily of passive (or "negative")

euthanasia. See id. The adoption of federal legislation in 1984 appears to have reduced the
practice of infanticide somewhat. See Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98457, § 121, 98 Stat. 1752; UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIL RIGHTS, MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN wrrH DISABLrrS 2 (1989).
285. As Dworkin has pointed out in response to my argument, he does not advocate this

kind of crass utilitarianism, which does away with inviolability entirely. See N.Y. REV. BooKS,
supra note 256, at 73. His investment version of inviolability would only partially mitigate
these consequences, however, as discussed supra notes 155-212 and accompanying text.
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In practice, too, far more than life itself is preserved by the rule
against intentional killing. Permission to practice cannibalism in extremis would undercut social equality and cooperation on a lifeboat
long before provisions ran out. The possibility of euthanasia, even
wholly voluntary euthanasia, undercuts the relation between the dependent and their caretakers, even if that option is never exercised. If
grandmother refuses optional euthanasia, she ends her life not as a
respectworthy heroine battling in solidarity with her children against
an implacable fate, but as a selfish old woman who burdens others
and decreases her own dignity for no good reason at all. The possibility of infanticide converts children with disabilities from sources of
meaning into burdens, even if they are allowed to live. We do not
resent that which we accept as a given. Unless we fantasize about becoming birds, it never occurs to us to regret being earthbound. The
inviolability of life preserves dignity in those with disabilities by insisting that they are and have always been a given, not an option, so that
we do not call into question their existence.
Put another way: Options invite inegalitarian judgments of comparative value. To allow killing leads us to evaluate and so to devaluate those whom we might kill, even if we do not do so, thereby
reducing them from the given individuals discerned by respect to
pawns expendable in our quest to maximize value.
Dworkin might respond that the right to life is sufficient in itself
to anchor individuality and stop us from treating each other merely as
utilitarian resources. Although he seeks to sever the connection between inviolability and rights, proclaiming the sense of sanctity "detached" from moral and legal rights and indicating that that sanctity
may permit and even demand killing in some cases, he also insists that
postnatal rights remain as a life-protective shield.2 86 Can the right to
life, alone, secure equality and prevent Nietzschean contempt for dependent life? The very point of the last two chapters of Dworkin's
book is that the once nearly absolute prohibition on killing the dependent should yield to other rights and interests when it is no longer
supported by his special sense of inviolability. 8 7 This undercutting is
not surprising. Why should human equality matter if investment
rather than humanness matters? Only if a person's bodily human
life-her real existence in space and time-is felt to be inviolable are
her equal dignity as well as her rights well founded.

286. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 98.
287. Id. at 179-241 (discussing euthanasia as it relates to the patient, the family, and the
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The German Constitutional Court seemed to reason in a similar
manner in its 1993 and 1975 abortion decisions. Where there is individual human existence, there is human dignity. Where there is
human dignity, there is the right to life. 8 8 To weaken the inviolability
of life would be a step back along the path traveled by National Socialism, in which the individual lost all importance.2 89 Whether that
court is right to discern human life and dignity in the fetus is a question to which we return later. Here the point is more general. The
German high court holds that human dignity and human rights are
inherent simply in human being. 29 ° In our terms, it is respect for the
inviolability of being that safeguards individual equality and human
rights.
There is yet another, closely related reason why respect for life is
important. Even if it were secure, a framework of rights alone would
not be conducive to social solidarity. "Subjective rights," as the
Europeans like to call the rights and remedies possessed by individuals, demarcate petty fiefdoms, minor sovereignties, within which each
person can rule as a tyrant. The whole system of rights is often derived from an imaginary or real "social contract" among self-interested
individuals. Dworkin suggests, perhaps correctly:
The United States is a nation of continental size, covering
many very different and very large regions, and it is pluralist
in almost every possible aspect: racial, ethnic, and cultural.
In such a nation, individual rights, to the extent they are recognized and actually enforced, offer the only possibility of
genuine community ... .291
Still, we may well ask Dworkin, what does it take for individual rights
to form the basis of genuine community? Surely not just a tolerance
based on mutual willfulness and selfishness, an "I won't tread on you
so you won't tread on me." Would not genuine community rest better
on a shared perception of the inherent dignity of individuals, a dignity
transcending our choices and founding our rights?

288. 88 BVerfGE 203, 252 (1993), 1993 EuGRZ 229, 242. The German Basic Law begins
with the sentence: "Human dignity is inviolable [unantastbar." Grundgesetz [Basic Law]
[GG] art. 1 § 1. The African Charter proclaims more directly and simply: "Human beings
are inviolable." African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/
LEG/67/3 rev. 5, art. 4, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), quoted in Ivonne Prieto, Intemnational Child Health and Women's Reproductive Rights, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 143,
150 n.38 (1993).
289. 39 BVerfGE 1, 67 (1975).
290. 88 BVerfGE 203, 251-52 (1993), 1993 EuGRZ 229, 242.
291. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 61.
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Moreover, common commitment to respect for life, to the inviolability that undergirds all individuality, may at once be the only safe
source of solidarity. All other goals, be they equality, health, fulfillment, or anything else ever so good, are dangerous because they are
values, and values are indifferent to particulars. Unless accompanied
by respect, all valuing is incipiently fascist, incipiently indifferent to
the individual. By contrast, primarily because it is a retreat rather
than a charge, respect for physical human being can be shared without becoming totalizing or collectivizing. 9 ' We can find solidarity
more safely in a common reverence than in a common goal.
VII.

THE AMBIVALENCE OF ABORTION REvISITED

Dworkin's theory of investment arose originally from his attempt
to mediate and solve the abortion controversy.293 Reflecting upon
common pro-choice and pro-life attitudes toward abortion, he came
up with a theory that he thought could make sense to both sides.2 94
In response, this Article has argued that his theory is pernicious in
consequence and erroneous in concept. The idea of respect expresses much more closely, and more safely, how we feel about human
life. Can an understanding of respect do the political job Dworkin
originally undertook? Can it provide a language that can make sense
to both sides of the abortion debate? With appropriate diffidence, I
would contend that the answer is "yes."
Like Dworkin, we can discern hope for a solution in two important data: even among pro-choice people there is a reluctance to
abort, and even among pro-life people abortion is condemned less
severely than postnatal killing. We need not claim that all pro-choice
people have qualms about abortion, nor claim with Dworkin that virtually no pro-life people view abortion exactly like ordinary murder. 9 5
With regard to the majority of Americans, Dworkin's two observations
are surely correct. If we can make sense of them both, we will have
constructed a significant bridge across the chasm that presently divides our nation. If we can come to agree on reasons why abortion is
wrong and yet ought not to be punished as murder, we can hope for
eventual peace in the abortion war.
292. Life's Dominion can be seen as a betrayal of Dworkin's opus as a whole, in that the
latter emphasizes the importance of "equal concern and respect" as a bulwark against collectivization. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. His disrespect for an individual's
life undercuts his respect for that individual's person.
293. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 10-11.
294. Id.

295. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
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It seems to me obvious that people are reluctant to abort to the
degree to which they think the fetus is like a baby, given the overwhelming consensus that infanticide is wrong. Moreover, discussing
the nature of the newborn infant and of infanticide is about as close as
we can get to the abortion controversy without entering into it.
Therefore, an examination of our feeling of respect for newborn life
is an appropriate way to begin to discern a possible basis for agreement with regard to unborn life.
Dworkin himself says very little about the dignity or inviolability
of infant life.2 96 He does, however, address two major reasons traditionally given for why human life in general ought not to be violated:
another's life is her or God's property,2 9 7 and it is made in the image
of something noble or divine. 9
The property explanation has a certain resonance with our theory of respect. The fact that something belongs to another is a strong
reason not to harm it. Of course, the assumption of divine ownership
would make us quite a bit more reluctant. Yet few feel required to
contribute to God's property holdings by conceiving more of his children. The property idea, like the feeling of respect described in this
Article, requires primarily that we not violate that which is owned by
another, not that we produce, preserve, or otherwise value it.
A major problem for the property idea, however, particularly in
its theistic form, is that it is too strong an explanation. The whole
universe is made by God, just as much as are human beings, yet nonhuman creation does not share anywhere near the same degree of
inviolability. If it is argued that God delegated to humanity his authority over his nonhuman possessions, this raises the question of why
God would do so and amounts to an admission that the property notion cannot be a sufficient explanation for the special respect due to
human life.
Moreover, the feel of property rights is too cool and insufficiently
honorific to capture the sense of sanctity or inviolability. We just do
not experience anything near admiration or awe for another's property, nor do we think that the respect we owe another's property responds in any way to an intrinsic characteristic of that property. Being
wholly extrinsic to the thing owned, at least for our modern conscious-

296. See supra notes 155-171 and accompanying text.
297. IJFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 214.
298. Id. at 82.
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ness, 29 9 ownership cannot explain our sense of the intrinsic dignity of
the human individual.
Dworkin himself rightly lays much more emphasis on another explanation for the respectworthiness of human life: it is made in the
"image" of God or of man.3 00 He is correct that the "dominant Western religious traditions insist that God made humankind 'in His own
image,' that each individual human being is a representation and not
merely a product of a divine creator. "30 ' The Hebrew scriptures likewise give the fact that people are made in God's image as the reason
that murder must receive the most severe punishment.3 0 2 Dworkin is
also right in discerning a secular analogue: that a human individual
is
30 3
an instance, an image, of a uniquely noble form of being.
Dworkin fails, however, to understand the scriptural or psychological import of the idea of image and of representation. He thinks
it means only that each individual is "a creative masterpiece" valued
primarily for the talent and effort invested .3 °4 The ancient Jewish,
Hellenistic, and Christian worlds, however, linked prototype and image in a unity of being.3 0 5 The representation re-presented the original. For those traditions, to say someone is made in God's image is to
say that person is in some way divine. God's image is not just a divinely great masterpiece, as Dworkin thinks.3 0 6 It does not just represent divine beauty; it presents God himself to us. Reverence and
respect for our neighbors is obviously called for because the one God
is literally present in them. Christ can thus say: "Whatever you did to
the least of my brothers, that you did to me. "307
Pope John Paul II's recent encyclical entitled Evangelium Vitae
(The Gospel of LifeP'8 harkens back to this ancient way of thinking. In
answer to the question: "Why is life a good?," the Pope writes that
299. A system of entail could lead to a much greater identification of the person with
her property. With ownership based on blood, and sale impossible, property would be less
easily reduced to a commodity held at arm's length and convertible into money value. The
Queen of England is more attached to her realm than I am to my house.
300. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 82.
301. Id.
302. See Genesis 9:6.
303. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 82.
304. Id.
305. II

THEOLOGICAL DICrIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENr 389, 395

(Geoffrey W.

Bromiley trans., Gerhard Kittle ed., 1964).
306. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 82.
307. Matthew 25:40. For further reflections on the ancient ontology of imaging and its
continuing presence in modem legal consciousness, see Richard Stith, Images, Spirituality,
and Law, 10J.L. & RELIGION 33 (1993/94).
308. POPEJOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VrrAE para. 34, reprinted in 24 ORIGINS: CNS DocuMENTARY SERVICE, Apr. 6, 1995, at 689, 701-02 [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE].
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human life is "a manifestation of God in the world .... Man has been
given a sublime dignity based on the intimate bond which unites him
to his Creator: In man there shines forth a reflection of God himself.""0 9 The Pope writes of a bond of being between God and God's
image in each human being: "The life which God offers to man is a
gift by which God shares something of himself with his creature. "310
In what seems almost a direct reply to Dworkin's notion that being an
"image of God" means only that each human being is "a creative masterpiece," ' the Pope adds:
[M]an and his life appear to us not only as one of the greatest marvels of creation: For God has granted to man a dignity which is near to divine (Ps. 8:5-6). In every child which
is born and in every person who lives or dies we see the image of God's glory. We celebrate this glory in every human
3 12
being, a sign of the living God, an icon of Jesus Christ.

On the level of metaphysical theory, modern consciousness no
longer agrees with or even understands this quasi-Platonic unity of
image and prototype. We can, however, still feel that unity phenomenologically. If I guard or kiss the photo of my absent spouse or child,
this is not because I think it a masterpiece but because through and in
it that person is again present. St. John Chrysostom's warning against
the violation of images can still make sense to us:
Do you not know that if you insult the image of the emperor,
you transfer the insult to the prototype? Do you not know
that if you show contempt to his image, whether it is a
wooden carving or a copper statue, you will be judged not
for insulting lifeless matter, but for showing the emperor
contempt? Dishonor shown to the emperor's
image is dis3 13
honor shown to the emperor himself.
To kill someone made in God's image is thus at least to insult, if not to
injure, God himself.3 1 4 Whether or not we can accept the ancient
metaphysics of imaging, its contextual point should be clear: Human
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id.
Id. at 702.
LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 82.
EVANGELIUM VrrA, supra note 308, para. 84, at 718.

313. ST.JOHN OF DAMASCUS, ON THE DIVINE IMAGES 68 (David Anderson trans., St. Vladi-

mir's Seminary Press, 1980) (emphasis omitted) (quoting St. John Chrysostom).
314. Note further that according to section 2319 of the new Roman Catholic catechism,
"human life.., is sacred because the human person has been willed for its own sake in the
image and likeness of... God." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 558 (1994). This
"for its own sake" would presumably not be true of most other images. Human beings are
thus to be respected for their "own sake" in a way that other icons are not.
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being is sacred and inviolable because it is a reflection and extension
3 15
of divine being.
A nontheist will not, of course, agree that it is God who is imaged
and present in each human being. Can we discern equally powerful
nonreligious sources of individual dignity? Each of us is at the least an
image and presence of humanity. To the degree that our species elicits wonder and respect, each instance of it must do so.
There is also a yet deeper and stronger reason for our respect for
human form: recognition of self. We identify with others once they
appear to be essentially like us. If they share our self-image, they are
our "kind." As soon as another person is seen as "one of us," she becomes a cosubject, an alter ego, rather than only an object-a source
of value rather than a thing to be valued. She becomes, like our own
ego or self, a given and inviolable starting point for premoral and
moral reflection and action. Thus the Pope founds the dignity of
others also in a recognition of self: Adam knew Eve as a person because, unlike all prior creation, she was "flesh of his flesh and bone of
3 17
his bones." 16 An attack on Eve was thus an attack on Adam.
Recognition of self in the other does not in itself ground in her
an absolute inviolability, in that if suicide is possible, then the killing
of other selves must also be possible. The thought of suicide, however, must surely remain anomalous. One could not function in one's
everyday tasks if one's own being were felt merely a contingent thing
in the world. Ordinarily, the ego or self is an unquestioned given, so
that when others acquire a like status they, too, become nonoptional.
Seeing another as "one of us" must at the very least make us reluctant
to kill her, especially if suicide remains rare. Moreover, it can be questioned whether most suicides are as perspicacious as Hamlet's "[t]o
be, or not to be."" i ' Insofar as one frames the issue as, "Would it be
good for me to be dead?" or, "Would I be better off if I were dead?," a
wishful dualism creeps in to separate one's self from an alien body
315. Respect for art may partake of a somewhat related sanctity. Insofar as we do not
fully understand how to make art, insofar as art cannot be reduced to a series of investments or to the sum of its parts, we may consider it inviolable. See supra note 233 and
accompanying text. What is this mysterious unifying element? Some may find each work
of art to be a minor miracle. Sensing the presence of the more than human, they may feel
the destruction of art to be a sacrilege.
316. EVANGEUUM VrrAE, supra note 308, para. 35, at 702 (quoting Genesis 2:33).
317. Neither the theistic nor the nontheistic theories of human dignity are "speciesist"

in the sense of evincing an arbitrary preference for humanity over other species. The first
type of theory would respect the divine image not only in humans but wherever it might
occur-in angels, for example. The second would accord to every species capable of moral
acts the duty to give special recognition to its own kind.
318. SHAKtsP1RtE, supra note 251, at act 3, sc. 2, line 64.
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seen as the locus or agent of suffering. Because such a person fails to
see that she is destroying herself as a subject and because she continues to treat herself as an unquestionable given, she cannot consistently objectify her fellows. Thus, the possibility of suicide need not in
theory greatly weaken respect for the being of other selves. Whether a
right to suicide, or to assistance therein, in practice undercuts the recognition of an inviolable self in others remains to be seen.
At the same time, recognition of other selves need not imply any
sense of duty to produce them. Precisely because the world cannot be
conceived without the background presence of an already existing
self, any desire to produce oneself must be even more foreign than
any desire for self-destruction. Therefore, the acceptance of others as
cosubjects in no way implies that they are objects of which we would
like to have more. The reluctance to kill, even if absolute, has no
connection to a desire to procreate. In line with the theory of respect
articulated above, selves can be revered and respected without being
highly valued.
In what way could it be said that a newborn infant is an image of
God or of ourselves? What is that divine or human image or essence,
and how does it present itself in the infant? Mere body and facial
shape cannot be the whole answer, for then we would feel a similar
respect for the great apes and even for statues of humans, nor can the
reason be the infant's rudimentary sort of consciousness or ability to
feel pain, or endearing behavior, for these are shared not only by fetuses, at some stage of gestation, but by many beasts. Clearly, those
attributes that may serve to distinguish our species-and that some of
us would consider divine-do not arise until quite some time after
birth. Human intelligence, speech, rational choice, principled conscience, sacrificial love, such qualities do not yet manifest themselves
in the infant.
What the human infant does have, and other species seem not to
have, is the potentiality for these things, understood not as mere possibility but as self-actualizing design. 1 9 There is a human form or nature at work in every baby, latent but active. An infant's smile is more
than a bodily movement; it is a harbinger of communication and com319. In the remainder of this Article, I try to avoid the word "potentiality" because it can
be used ambiguously both for possibility and for design. We can say both, "Every infant is a
potential English speaker" and, "Every infant is a potential speaker." Yet there is nothing
in any child specifically designed for English, whereas every child is designed, from its
genes to its brain and tongue, for speech.
I should add that in preferring the word "design" I do not in any way seek to imply
that merely because there is a design, there must be a designer, divine or otherwise.
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munity. The image we respect and revere abides in what the child is
designed to do, not yet in what the child does.
Put another way, that image is part of the infant's being, though
not yet of its appearing. Appearing cannot be crucial, however. If we
were to say that the actual expression of speech or of some other specifically human quality were necessary for human dignity, then that
dignity would be only an epiphenomenon, an ephemeral divine
flicker emerging from otherwise profane matter. People would fade
out of personhood as they tired each evening, and we would entirely
lose respect for their lives once they were dreamlessly asleep. This we
do not do. We respect the human image even when it is not appearing, when it is subsisting merely as a capacity or, in the infant, as a selfdeveloping potentiality.
There is yet another, related way to understand the recognition
of self, the image of humanity, present in the newborn child. Pace
Dworkin, a child is begotten, not made. In every sense, modern as
well as ancient, that which parents beget is an extension of their own
being. Adam's son Seth, like all sons and daughters, was "in his own
likeness, after his image."2' Theological wars were once fought over
whether Christ was made or begotten by the Father, precisely because
it was thought that only begetting could found complete unity of image and thus of being."' The bond of origin assures the bond of
being. To question the humanity of a newborn infant would be to
suggest that a human being might be discontinuous, that humans
might engender offspring of another species that only later turn into
humans.
Moreover, the human image in an infant elicits from us more
than reverence. Unlike some divine presence in a church or painted
icon, the image of God or humanity in a child is dynamic rather than
static. As a "directed power," it can thus call forth respect as well as
3 22
reverence.

Because the child is alive, in other words, its latent human image
or nature strives to manifest itself. Of course, this is true of all life.
320. Genesis 5:30.
321. Certain followers of Arius taught thatJesus Christ was only God's first creation and
thus was not God himself. The First Council of Nicea in 325 A.D. condemned the Arians
and formulated the Nicene Creed. See XI THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 49 (Charles G.

Herbermann et al. eds., 1911). That Creed, as finally adopted at the Council of Constantinople in 381 A.D., is commonly recited by Christians even today. See id. It repeatedly
affirms Christ's divinity by pointing to his origin as "the only begotten Son of God, and
born of the Father before all ages. (God of God) light of light, true God of true God.
Begotten not made, consubstantial to the Father ...." Id.
322. See supra notes 278-279 and accompanying text.
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We distinguish individual living creatures (whether or not they are
human) from inanimate matter (and from nearby living creatures) by
each creature's separate systemic autonomy-its capacity to regulate
and direct its own equilibrium (homeostasis) rather than being entirely subject to external forces.
A pile of rocks does not reconstitute itself if it is kicked over. It
does not regulate and control itself, nor does it respond and adapt to
its environment. It is not an autonomous system. Any form it has is
purely the product of external forces, is passive rather than active. By
contrast, a living creature seeks to repair itself if it is disrupted by
some external attack, not only in each part, as crystals might do, but as
a whole. It monitors and governs itself, so to speak. This is what
makes it a unified being in the first place, rather than just a "collection of body parts," which is what Dworkin calls Frankenstein's preactivated monster.3 23 Of course, an external attack may overwhelm and
destroy a living creature, but it retains the status of a life as long as it
actively resists disintegration.
My dog is thus distinct from a pile of stones because it is a single
autonomous system, and the pile is not. It is distinct from other
dogs-is a separate life, a particulardog-because it and the others
have unconnected maintenance mechanisms and are not part of some
larger self-governing biological system. It and other dogs are related
simply in the way of rocks or in other ways that are far less perfectly
integrative than biological unity.
All living creatures thus possess individuality-in the sense of undividability, as discussed above 324 -- in a much stronger sense than
does, for example, even a uniquely great work of art. The unity of the
latter, after all, is primarily in our minds; a painting does not, in any
literal sense, pull itself together. In every living entity, however, there
is a unifying image, an immanent form, at work in its very substance.
Thus, living creatures can be much more inviolable than any artifact.
When we kill a living being, we really and objectively violate a unity.
When we destroy a work of art, it might be said that we only seem to
do so.
Most living systems also develop (homeorrhesis). They do not remain static, but grow. As they grow, the parts of each system may be
partially or totally replaced. The material in my cells now may be entirely different from that which I had as a child. Nevertheless, I am
323. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 19.

324. See supra notes 228-257 and accompanying text discussing how Dworkin's concept
of investment ignores individuality.
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the same living individual because I am the same system, and I am the
same system because I am still governed by the same image, the same
form, and the same nature. A being's historical continuity and identity is one of form, not matter.
Although we may thus feel respect for all life because of the inner
dynamic shaping it, human life is unique because the power at work in
it is unique. That power is designed and directed, even in the infant,
toward human and (according to some) divine communion. The
presence of the developing image of fulfilled humanity is what makes
the infant one of our kind and accounts for our sense of the special
inviolability of newborn human life over that of other species.
One source of our qualms about abortion is thus obvious and
independent of any religious faith. The fetus is designed to be what
the infant is designed to be. The human image is latent and active
from conception, making the conceptus our kind of being, begotten
by human parents and thus a member of our species. It, like the infant, is respectworthy as an individual human "life developing itself,"
in the words of the 1975 German abortion decision."2 5 Systemic continuity persists from conception to maturity and on to death.
Perhaps it would be helpful here to analogize fetal to photographic development. (The analogy is not perfect because photographs are usually valued rather than respected, and unlike new life,
they do not monitor their own development.) Suppose I am in the
process of developing a picture I know I will prize, and you come in
part way through the process and destroy it. By way of mitigation, you
argue, "Look, that negative was still pretty vague. So you didn't lose
much." This argument is like a claim that infanticide is not so bad as
killing an adult because infants are not fully developed. Similarly, to
claim that early feticide is not so bad as ordinary murder is like saying,
"That photo was still in the brown-smudge stage. You don't care
about brown smudges, do you?" Once it is realized that the basis for
human dignity in the newborn infant lies in its developing human
image, the idea that early stages of life do not count as much as later
stages seems outrageous, if not indeed mad.
In other words, the compelling reasons that explain the special
dignity of human infants over other species also apply to embryos and
fetuses. The bases of inherent dignity in the newborn also apply to

325. Jonas & Gorby, supra note 9, at 638. That decision spoke of the legal irrelevance of
distinctions among the various stages of "sich entwickelnden Lebens." Judgment of Feb. 25,
1975, 39 BVerfGE 1, 37 (First Senate 1975).
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the preborn, and this throughout gestation. The dignity of each
stands or falls with that of the other.3 2 6
It was essentially the above argument that led the German high
court in 1975 to conclude that no distinction may be drawn, with respect to the right to life, between the born and the unborn or between
any prenatal stages of human development.3 2 7 To draw such a distinction would be to hold that human nature, the latent but developing
human image, is insufficient for human dignity, and that some actualized human perfection is needed, thus undercutting the inherent inviolability of neonatal as well as prenatal human life. In the court's own
words:
The process of development . . . is a continuing process

which exhibits no sharp demarcation and does not allow a
precise division of the various steps of development of the
human life. The process does not end even with birth; the
phenomena of consciousness which are specific to the
human personality, for example, appear for the first time a
rather long time after birth. Therefore, the protection.., of
the Basic Law cannot be limited either to the "completed"
human being after birth or to the child about to be born
which is independently capable of living ....

[N] o distinc-

tion can be made here between various stages of the life developing
itself before birth, or between unborn and born
32 8
life.

326. Rakowski makes a similar point in criticizing Dworkin, arguing:
A newborn's cognitive abilities are little different from those of many nonhuman
animals. Yet many people think an infant deserves the same protection as older
people because of what it could become .... But what about killing a fetus? A
fetus' potential is the same as an infant's .... This fact motivates most moral
distress over abortion ....
Rakowski, supra note 11, at 2078. See also the related argument drawn from John Rawls,
supra note 88. There might, of course, be other theories of inviolability that could replace
this image-based theory, accord with our intuition of the inherent dignity of the newborn
infant, and yet not apply to those still located within the womb. To my knowledge, however, none has ever been articulated. See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text; see
also Don Marquis, Why Abortion Is Immoral 86J. PHIL. 183, 195-201 (1989) (surveying extant

pro-choice theories and showing that they all deny that there is anything prima facie wrong
with killing infants).

327. SeeJonas & Gorby, supra note 9, at 638.
328. Id. The 1993 case agreed, emphasizing that here:
[H]andelt es sich bei dem Ungeborenen um individuelles .. .Leben, das im
Proze3 des Wachsens und Sich-Entfaltens sich nicht erst zum Menschen, sondern
als Mensch entwickelt .... [E]s handelt sich ... urn unabdingbare Stufen der
Entwicklung eines individuellen Menschseins. Wo menschliches Leben existiert,
kommt ihm Menschenwfirde zu....

Diese Wtirde des Menschseins liegt auch ffir
das ungeborene Leben im
Dasein urn seiner selbst willen. Es zu achten und zu schfitzen bedingt, dapI die
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Could one push this argument back further, to argue that if embryos are inviolable, then sperm cells and ova must also be? The answer is "no." Neither sperm nor egg contains a latent complete
human image, nor does either grow. Dworkin writes: "[W] hen I was a
just-conceived fetus ....

,,

,s19

but he would be unintelligible if he

wrote, "When I was a sperm cell.. . ." He is in fact a grown-up fetus,
but he is not a grown-up sperm cell. Similarly, he could not say,
"When I was still a separate sperm and ovum ... ." because, prior to
conception, the sperm and ovum are far more like nearby rocks in a
collection than they are like a single organism, in that prior to conception there was no active immanent design directing those particular
cells to form young Ronald. He was not there in them. They came
together only through chance and external forces. 33 0
Put another way, latent potentiality in the sense of an immanent
design (image, form, essence, nature, kind, species) is radically distinct from mere possibility, as mentioned above. Either may exist
without the other. Prior to conception, a new individual life is possible,
but an active design has not yet come into being. Likewise, in a severely disabled person, there may no longer be any possibility of
Rechtsordnung die rechtlichen Voraussetzungen seiner Entfaltung im Sinne
eines eigenen Lebensrechts des Ungeborenen gewdhrleistet.... Dieses Lebensrecht, das... dem Ungeborenen schon aufgrund seiner Existenz zusteht, ist das
elementare und unverduperliche Recht, das von der Wfirde des Menschen ausgeht ....
88 BVerfGE 203, 251-52 (1993). The degree of protection owed to the fetus is independent of the stage of pregnancy. Id. at 254. The court adds that this conclusion is valid
independent of any particular religious beliefs, concerning which the legal order of a religion-and-worldview-neutral state can make no judgments. Id. at 252. The protection of
each individual unborn life is a precondition for ordered community. Id. at 282. Donald
Kommers notes that in Germany, unlike in America, "the most non-religious Social Democrat could agree with the most religious Christian Democrat" on the state's duty to protect
the life of the unborn human at all stages of pregnancy. Kommers, supra note 8, at 28.
329. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 18.
330. Jim Stone would add:
If the animal which becomes an adult human being existed before conception in
a divided form, then it would have existed if it had never been conceived, for if a
material thing exists at a time, it exists at that time no matter what happens at a
later time. Further, it follows that this animal would have existed if the egg and
sperm had found different partners. Given two sperms and two eggs we have four
human animals, only two of which can survive their initial stages. We are committed to the absurdity that the planet sustains billions of additional animals, each
existing in a divided form from beginning to end, its cells having nothing to do
with one another ever, and each cell part of countiess other animals of the same
kind. Plainly the human animal does not exist before conception: my body was
once a fetus but never a sperm or an egg.
Jim Stone, Why Potentiality Matters, 17 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 815, 817 (1987) (foomote
omitted).
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human expression, although the striving for human perfection has
not been lost. The paraplegic may never walk again. The comatose
person may never again speak. Yet the body of the first is still
designed for walking and that of the second still aims at speaking.
Their human nature or design remains unchanged, even though it
must remain unfulfilled. Insofar as the person with severe disabilities
remains anything, she remains a human being, one of our kind. Her
life remains therefore inviolable.
We use the idea of design in this way not only in regard to
humans, but in regard to all other living creatures. A dog that has lost
one leg in an accident is still called a dog, even though it is correct to
say that the nature of a dog is to have four legs, and even though an
otherwise dog-like animal belonging to some odd three-legged species
would probably not be called a dog by us. A living entity does notjoin
another species by being crippled. It is thus false as well as demeaning
to call a person with grave disabilities a "vegetable," as Dworkin repeatedly does.3 3 ' Indeed, it is only because she remains human that
her condition is tragic. We do not feel saddened every time we visit
someone's garden and observe all the tomatoes just vegetating there.
Recall that Dworkin was unable to explain why so many feel that
the fetus somehow acquires greater dignity and inviolability once it
comes to "resemble" an infant.33 2 In fact, this feeling is quite understandable, though ultimately incomplete, in light of the theory developed above. If it is self-developing human nature that elicits
reverence and respect in the newborn, it makes perfect sense that
many would have those same attitudes toward the unborn only after
the appearance of a human form, sometime around eight to ten
weeks after conception. 3 3 It is only thereafter that ordinary human
sensibility would say naturally, "There is a baby growing in the womb."
Prior to that time, it is natural to think that a baby is only being made,
rather than growing-that organs are being added one by one as the
embryo is gradually shaped into a human being.
Such indeed was the nearly universal premodern theory of
human generation. Knowing neither of the ovum nor of conception
in our modern sense, Job says to God, "Did you not pour me out like
milk and curdle me like cheese?" 3 4 Only after this "curdling" was a
331. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 180, 188, 212, 216.
332. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
333. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY 373 (1970).
334. Job 10:10; seeJoseph W. Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and
Law, 40 U. PITr. L. REv. 359, 403-04 (1979) (mentioning the nineteenth-century discovery
of the existence of the ovum).
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human form apparently present. Before that moment, Job sees God
as an external source of activity and design, giving human form to
semen. Dworkin argues that Aquinas thought that the human individual began only after the fetus received a human form and thus could
take charge of its own development, although Aquinas ascribed the
prior organizing design to its human father rather than directly to
35
God, as does Job.1
We should not be surprised if such theories find less inviolability
in very early life. Essentially, they imagine that the early embryo is
being constructed (by God or by another outside force) rather than developing. As previously argued, things that are merely made lack inviolability, at least until the point that they acquire form and thus unity;
an amorphous collection of stones or of body parts cannot be
violated.
In truth, however, waiting for the appearance of human form in
the fetus is radically mistaken. Mere bodily similarity to us cannot be
the reason for the importance of resemblance or we would likewise
find apes and statues inviolable. Rather, resemblance is taken by us to
mean identity of nature or kind, of the latent design for human community. This design, however, is in fact present from the first moments after conception, and not as some passive blueprint for some
builder to use, but as an active self-directing power. The embryo derives only food, not form, from its environment. Of course, that inherent form is not yet visible; at first it subsists only as a moving,
growing complex of DNA. Yet from the beginning, a human image
gives a human embryo a human nature and a continuity of being from
conception to full development. Even in the conceptus, one can see an
active human image with one's mind, though not yet with one's eyes.
It is irrational to object to the destruction of a photo only after it has
been partially developed but not while it is still in one's camera. Once
one knows that the prized image is present, its stage of development is
a triviality.
Still, both those who would date human dignity from human resemblance and those who would date it from the first presence of life
developing itself see being-in-the-human-image as the object of respect, as the source of the prenatal inviolability of life. The idea of
respect has led us to understand better than Dworkin why nearly all of
336
us, nonbelievers as well as believers, feel some reluctance to abort,

335.

LIFE'S DOMINION,

supra note 1, at 41-42.

336. See the survey cited by Dworkin supra in the text accompanying notes 59-61.
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especially after the fetus resembles an infant.13 7 Can the idea of respect also help us to account for our second crucial datum: most of us
think abortion less wrong than postnatal homicide? To this question
we now turn.
Recall first that the presence of God or of oneself in another demands nonviolation more than preservation. 3 ' This because that
other is both a cosubject and a co-object. As a cosubject, she is a
given, a near-absolute whose existence cannot be brought into question without undermining every form of public deliberation about
ends and means. We can never know what is needed without first
knowing who has needs. Yet as co-objects, one's own self and that of
the other enjoy no such near-absolute status. Our separate needs are
entitled to no more than equal consideration as we go about formulating joint human projects.
The above theoretical considerations are captured phenomenologically by our earlier descriptions of respect and reverence as discerning above all the inviolability of the individual.3 39 In responding
to the claims placed upon us by that which we respect or revere, we
feel a duty of nonviolation much more absolutely than we feel a duty
of preservation (and we may well feel no duty at all of production).
For fetuses and infants, for paintings and churches, our reluctance to
violate is far more palpable than our beneficent desires to support.
Ordinarily, we have no trouble keeping these two intuitions quite
separate. Most of us would never consider killing our neighbor even
to gain a million dollars, while few of us would give a million dollars to
save our neighbor's life. Problems come when our neighbor is already
physically and morally dependent on our care, when she is disabled by
infancy, age, or illness. If we omit a million-dollar operation for our
child because we do not wish to impoverish ourselves, have we intentionally brought about her death, or has our lack of heroism only
failed to preserve her life?
In abortion, these two intuitions-the duty not to violate and the
permission not to preserve at all costs-may become absolutely counterposed. Almost every form of abortion is a direct attack on the fetus.
Most involve violent dismemberment of an already partially formed
body with a beating heart.o Respect for life's inviolability cannot but
337. See supra notes 242-244 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 315.
339. See supra Part IV.A.
340. See Irwin H. Kaiser, updatingAlan F. Guttmacher, The Genesis of Liberalized Abortion in
New York: A PersonalInsight, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW, supranote 336, at 552,
557-63 (describing abortion techniques).

372

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 56:289

stand askance at abortion. Yet at the same time, not aborting necessarily involves a woman in great-sometimes even heroic-sacrifices
aimed at preserving that fetus before and often after birth.3 4 Even
less than for the dependent older person, there is no morally comfortable middle way neither causing harm nor requiring sacrifice for
one's unborn child. Respect for life forbids abortion, but respect also
contradictorily permits not making heroic sacrifices to continue a
pregnancy. Our ambivalence toward abortion is rooted in this antinomy of respect.
It could be countered that a permission is not yet a right. That
respect does not require preservation at all costs could mean simply
that some acts of preservation are beyond the call of this particular
duty. If so, one could hardly claim a right to do a moral wrongdirectly attack life-in order to avoid making an otherwise supererogatory sacrifice. Yet in the light of liberal political theory, we can understand how respect can come to seem actively pro-choice.
Few of us would think highly of parents who refused to spend a
million dollars to save the life of a child at the point of death. Nevertheless, most of us would think the state to be overreaching itself if it
operated upon the child and then seized the parents' million-dollar
savings. We think that there are limits to the sacrifices that the state
341. The 1993 German decision argues that, unlike the ordinary prohibition of murder,
forbidding abortion does more than require a pregnant woman not to violate the legal
sphere of another. 88 BVerfGE 203, 256-57 (1993). It also imposes an intensive duty of
concern and care lasting for many years. Id. It is not to be expected (unzumutbar) that
women will sacrifice their own life values beyond a certain normal degree. Id. at 256-57.
Curiously, the German court gives almost no emphasis to adoption as a nonlethal way to
avoid extreme self-sacrifice. Id. By contrast, Marvin Olasky recently set up the legal abortion dilemma in the same way as this Article and the German court do-that is, as one
involving a conflict between not killing another and not sacrificing oneself-but Olasky
then turns to adoption as the main way to resolve the apparent antinomy. See Marvin
Olasky, The Antiabortion Movement's Future, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1995, at A14, available in
1995 WL-WSJ 9911551. He writes:
[T]wo decades of pro-life teaching and intrauterine photography have taught
many Americans that creatures in the womb have beating hearts and look and
move like us....
[M]any Americans nonetheless view abortion asjustifiable homicide, self-defense against tiny intruders who will ruin the lives of young women unless they are
(with regrets) snuffed out. Unmarried pregnant women are seen to have the
choice of committing homicide or suffering the life imprisonment of single
parenthood. Most Americans are unwilling to force a young woman against her
will into a lifetime of parental service, generally in poverty-so abortion, despite
its brutality, continues to receive reluctant support....
Adoption needs to be displayed as a strong bridge that gives both unwed
mother and child access to a better future.
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may demand of us and that we are legally, even if not morally, justified
in refusing to make such sacrifices.
I am not arguing that we have no affirmative legal duties toward
others. Many nations recognize a duty to rescue even strangers, when
rescue is possible without significant risk to oneself.3 41 It is obviously
possible to discern duties of greater sacrifice on the part of parents
toward their children-in the biological bond itself or in the knowing
creation of need in another by the voluntary act of conception, for
example. Even the strong legal duties of parents must have some limits, however. The law never imposes affirmative duties that are "unreasonable" under all the circumstances.3 4 3 Is a mother bound to donate
a kidney to her needy child? Both kidneys, if two of her children
would otherwise die? Her heart and liver as well, if needed to save
their lives?
At a more generalized level, the matter may be expressed in this
way: Only a collectivist, wholly utilitarian regime can insist that the
common good be maximized at all costs. A liberal state must at some
point consider omissions of help that result in a net loss to be nevertheless legally justified. At some point a sacrifice becomes too much
for the state to demand of an individual, even if that sacrifice may be
required by morality and the common good because it would cause
less harm than it would prevent. In other words, parents and others
must be granted a legal right to refuse assistance that is too much for
the government to demand of them, even where such sacrifice, if
made, would involve less loss to the parents than gain to their child.
Before as well as after birth, parents have a legal right not to make
extremely great sacrifices even to preserve the still greater good of
their child's life. 34
The difficulty in certain dependency relationships such as pregnancy is that a sacrifice that would ordinarily be "beyond the call of
duty" may be demanded by the duty of respect. We end up with a
kind of duty to go beyond the call of duty, which accounts for the
curious fact that we are wont to call such sacrifices at once "required"
and "heroic. "M
34 German penal jurisprudence long ago developed a
342. See Dinah Shelton, The Duty to Assist Famine Victims, 70 IOwA L. REv. 1309, 1313
(1985).
343. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 73, at 1685-86 (discussing the possibility of forced organ
donation and concluding that no duty would be found).
344. See id. at 1588 (noting that it is unlikely a parent could be held criminally liable for
not rescuing a child from a burning building).
345. Even the Pope, in hisJune 29, 1995, A Letter to Women, could not help but take note
of this unusual duty to go beyond what is ordinarily the call of duty. Pope John Paul II, A
Letter to Women, TABLET, July 15, 1995, at 917, 918. He says abortion is always a "grave sin,"
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way to conceptualize failures to comply with a legal duty that turns out
to involve extraordinary sacrifice: Unzumutbarkeit-translatable as
"nondemandability" or "nonexpectability." 46 Even when otherwise
forbidden by law, an act or omission will not be penalized if it was the
only alternative to a sacrifice of one's own interests beyond that which
could reasonably be expected or demanded in the circumstances." 7
The point here is not only that a penal threat would be ineffective, but
that it would demand more than should be demanded of a person by
the criminal law.
The above explanation does not wholly "solve" the politico-legal
conflict over abortion. The duty not to harm and the permission not
to assist remain in tension if not in contradiction. Furthermore, there
will obviously be great disagreement over just how much sacrifice the
state may rightly require of a woman for her unborn child. Nevertheless, the idea of respect coupled with liberal politics allows us to understand, better than Dworkin's investment idea,3 48 the range of
opinion on abortion and begins to make possible dialogue and even
practical collaboration among principled opponents.
We can begin to account for the odd fact that the more religious
a person is, the more likely she is to feel guilt after an abortion, 49
even though few if any faiths claim a specific revelation regarding the
permissibility of abortion, and even though nontheistic respect for the
human image may well be as strong as theistic respect for the divine
image. Surely part of the reason that religious people are more prolife is that religion often calls for heroic levels of self-abnegation, and
promises divine assistance, so that the burdens of even a very difficult
and yet praises as "heroic" those women who give birth after rape. Id. Such ajuxtaposition
is not entirely unique to pregnancy. A soldier ordered to face near-certain death may be
punished if he refuses, yet he is paradoxically praised as a hero if he obeys. "Required
heroism" is rare, however, at least in a liberal, individualistic society.
346. One of the earliest uses of this concept in criminal law occurred in the famous 1897
Leinenfanger decision of the Reichsgericht. 30 RGS 25-28 (1897). There, the court went be-

yond the penal code to reason that although the omission in question "considering the
common good.., could be demanded of the actor," one must also ask whether it could be
demanded of the accused under the circumstances. Id. at 25-28.
347. See FLETCHER, supra note 268, § 10.4.3, at 833 (discussing the new German Code's
synthesis of duress and necessity); Albin Eser, Justification and Excuse, 24 Am. J. COMP. L.
621, 624 (1976) (discussing justification and excuse in German civil law in the context of
wrongfulness independent of blameworthiness). Section 35 of the German Penal Code
uses the concept of Unzumutbareit in the course of defining "Excusing Necessity."
Strafgesetzbuch [Penal Code] § 35 (F.R.G.).
348. LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 71-94 (discussing the value of life in terms of

natural and human investment).
349. See, e.g., The Abortion Dilemma: PsychologicalEffects,
(1979) (interview of Magda Denes).

TODAY'S STUDENT,
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pregnancy may come to seem bearable. Christianity, for example,
holds up a high standard of required self-sacrifice: the imitation of
Christ himself. Furthermore, the self-image of deeply religious people
is often less promiscuous than that of others, regardless of what the
behavioral reality may be, so that the nonavailability of easy abortion
can seem to require fewer lifestyle sacrifices in the area of sexuality.
For these reasons, religious people may be less likely to view anti-abortion legislation as posing unacceptable burdens.
At the other extreme, there are those who find even the ordinary
burdens of pregnancy too much to demand. These persons often
seem to ignore the normative consequences of the parental relationship and that the sacrifices of pregnancy can be avoided only by
means of a legal act, both of which factors significantly increase the
level of sacrifice that may be expected. Drawing and expanding on
the work of Judith Jarvis Thomson, 3 5° Donald Regan has argued that
the traditional American lack of a duty to rescue strangers can support
the result in Roe v. Wade 35 -fully elective abortion, at least prior to
viability-even assuming the legal personhood of the fetus.35 2 Of
course, many in America, especially on the political left, find that
traditional lack of duty somewhat shameful.3 5 3 Yet Regan argues, with
some cogency, that United States law ought then to begin imposing
greater duties of affirmative assistance on everyone, not just on pregnant women. 5 4 It is wrong to require women to provide life supports
for fetuses while asserting that a like level of support would be too
much to demand of others in equally urgent situations.3 55
350. See Thomson, supra note 73.
351. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
352. See Regan, supra note 73, at 1641.
353. See, e.g., Editorial, The Genovese Syndrome, PHOENIX GAZETTE, May 27, 1995, at B10,
available in 1995 WL 2797236 (discussing cases in which individuals observed crimes being
committed without intervening, including the highly publicized case of Catherine "Kitty"
Genovese, who was murdered in front of her apartment building in front of at least 37
witnesses); Sam Roberts, Routine Murders in a Hurried City Numb to Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1991, at BI (discussing a similar incident in which witnesses to a murder failed to come
forward or call the police). But see Phillip Burton, What's a Cop's Off-Duty Duty? The Chilling
Message of a Rockville Case: Don't Get Involved, WASH. PosT, Dec. 11, 1988, at C5, available in
1988 WL 2013058 (discussing a case in which a police officer is charged with assault for
intervening, while off duty, in what he mistakenly, although reasonably, thought was a

rape).
354. See Regan, supra note 73, at 1604-09.
355. See id. at 1571-1610 (arguing that the physical burdens involved in the duty of pregnancy and childbirth are much greater than other potential duties). Dworkin rightly finds

this "no excessive sacrifice" explanation insufficient fully to justify elective abortion, for
three reasons: because abortion is an act, notjust an omission; because parents have duties
to sacrifice themselves; and because active killing of infants in rare, like circumstances
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European abortion jurisprudence has emphasized the "too much
to demand" criterion in deciding which abortions should be legally
permitted.3 5 6 The 1975 German decision held that something more
than the burdens of "normal" pregnancy must be involved in order to
reach the level of Unzumutbarkeit.3 7 Agreeing, the court in 1993 said
that in order to be "not expectable," burdens must be both "so heavy
and [so] unusual that they exceed the expectable limits of sacrifice."35' 8 Only in such circumstances would it be wrong and futile to
punish abortion.3 59
Already in 1975, the court also realized that because not aborting
is always a decision to support as well as a decision not to violate, the
state cannot ever significantly diminish abortion except by strengthening the willingness of women to accept at least those "normal" burdens of pregnancy and motherhood.36 ° That willingness can be
encouraged in two radically different ways. Culpable abortion (abortion in which the pregnancy did not involve excessively heavy and abnormal burdens) can be punished, or birth can be encouraged.
According to the 1993 court, it is rational, and therefore permissible,
for the legislature to eschew the former in favor of the latter.3 6 1 Punishment has not been very effective in stopping abortion3 6 2 and is particularly ineffective in early pregnancy because often no one knows
about the fetus except its mother. The state has a problem protecting
life, the existence of which it is ignorant.36 3 In order for the child to
be protected, its mother must come forward . 3 1 Yet as long as abortion is punishable, women with crisis pregnancies will not come to any
would then also be legally permissible, which it is not. LiFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at
110-11.

356. Pro-choice scholar Luis Arroyo Zapatero argues that by focusing on nondemandability, European tribunals in general have been too begrudging in their permission
for abortion, especially abortion of defective fetuses. See Luis Arroyo Zapatero, La Indicacidn EugenEsica, in ESTUDIOS

DE DERECHO PENAL EN HOMENAJE AL PROFESSOR LUISJIMENEZ DE

1985).
357. 39 BVerfGE 1, 49 (1973).
358. 88 BVerfGE 203, 257, 283-84 (1993).
359. Id.
360. See Jonas & Gorby, supra note 9, at 644.
Regardless of how the state fulfills its obligation to protect, it should not be forgotten that developing life itself is entrusted by nature in the first place to the
protection of the mother. To reawaken and, if required, to strengthen the maternal duty to protect, where it is lost, should be the principal goal of the endeavors
of the state for the protection of life.
Id.
361. 88 BVerfGE 203, 265-66.
362. Id. at 265.
363. Id. at 263.
364. Id. at 266.
ASUA (REvISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE ed.,
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public or quasi-public agency for probirth assistance or advice.3 65 In
other words, in order to reach women considering abortion with help
that may convince them to give birth, it is necessary to promise them
immunity should they finally end up aborting. 366 Nothing must legally turn on the outcome of a counseling session if it is to be as effective as possible in protecting life. 67 At least in early pregnancy, it is
rational to conclude that the state may work only with rather than
against the mother.3 68 Furthermore, the court reasoned that most women who commit abortion would not wish to do so if they were fully
informed and empowered. 6 9 The mother-child bond, even in its earliest and weakest stages, can militate against abortion and in favor of
active support for the child.17 ' Even the major 1993 dissent conceded
that abortion is a "self-wounding" by the pregnant woman. 3 7 1 Therefore, it is a mistake to view distressed pregnant women as necessarily
hostile or indifferent to the life of the fetus, as enemies of the fetus
who must be restrained by force. More abortions may well be prevented by considering pregnant women to be potential allies of their
unborn children, women who would offer support but often lack the
means to do so. 3 72 For these reasons, the court approved the substitu-

365. Id. at 282.
366. Id. at 282-84.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 266, 282-83. Thus the German court justifies depenalization of first trimester
abortion without denying the equal dignity of the different stages of developing life, pace
Dworkin. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
371. 88 BVerfGE 203, 350.
372. According to the court, the counseling concept is built directly upon the idea that
the pregnant woman, who sees herself in a situation of need and conflict, is ready to make
a decision respecting the interests of her unborn child, especially once she is informed of
her child's right to life. Id. at 284. It has become common in the United States to encounter like arguments that abortion would not be chosen by women if they were truly free to
choose, in that abortion allegedly often harms women (physically or psychically), as well as
killing the fetus. See supra note 40 for the views of Catherine MacKinnon and others on
the political Left. Much relevant data can be found gathered in Cunningham & Forsythe,
supra note 336. See also FREDERICA MATHEWES-GREEN, REAL CHOICES 17-20 (1994) (showing
that women almost always choose abortion to accommodate the wishes of others who do
not welcome their children); Thomas W. Strahan, Induced Abortion As a Violation of Conscience of the Woman, NEWSLETTER (AssocIATON FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH IN VALUES
AND SOCIAL CHANGE), Sept./Oct. 1995, at 1 (claiming that most women feel some regret or

guilt after abortion).
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tion of counseling favoring life,"' 3 followed by a three-day waiting pe3 74
riod, instead of penal threats during early pregnancy.
In other words, rather than fight over just how many burdens
pregnant women can or should be made to bear, the Constitutional
Court in 1993 mandated a regime in which the state is required both
to encourage and to mitigate maternal self-sacrifice to the degree humanly possible. For the most part, abortion remains technically illegal
and unsupported by public or even private health insurance, in order
to teach its wrongfulness.3 7 5 The dignity of unborn life is to be taught
in other ways as well. For example, the Constitutional Court indicates
that the state has a duty to strengthen the public's will to protect unborn life in its school curricula and in all broadcast media, which are
legally bound to uphold human dignity.3 76 Furthermore, the state
must proactively reduce pressures to abort by insisting upon a "childfriendly" society.3

77

For example, it must ban the termination of

leases as the result of the addition of a newborn child. 8 It must guarantee that the task of raising children will not lead to discrimination at
the workplace.3 7 9 In addition, according to the court, the state should
shield the pregnant woman from pressure to abort coming from third
parties-husbands, parents, or employers, for example-by enacting
appropriate laws punishing such behavior, at least when it actually
ends up causing an abortion.38 ° Though the court does not use ideological language, by implication it condemns the sexism, pointed out
by Catherine MacKinnon and others, 8 1 that drives many women to
373. The court is oddly legalistic when it comes to directly strengthening the motherchild bond, relying primarily on letting the pregnant woman know of the child's own constitutional right to life. 88 BVerfGE 203, 283-85. No mention is made, for example, of
letting the mother hear her child's heartbeat in early pregnancy, nor of making available
ultrasound sonography later on, as a means of awakening a full appreciation of the child's
presence. In the United States, this latter technology may be having a significant effect on
public and personal attitudes toward the unborn. See Heidi Evans, Womb with a View: Unborn Babies Star in Fetal Film Fests, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1993 at Al, availablein 1993 WL-WSJ
673412.
374. 88 BVerfGE at 286 (citing 39 BVerfGE 1, 64 (1975)).
375. Id. at 319-20. Furthermore, for the state to take any part in abortion would implicate it in an "act of killing" (Tdtungshandlung), which is permissible only if the act is proven
to be lawful. Id. at 315-16.
376. Id. at 261.
377. Id. at 260.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 259-60.
380. Id. at 296-98, 308-09.
381. See MacKinnon, supra note 40; Tushnet, supra note 40. Responding to claims that
various counseling features themselves express a sexist distrust of women, Gerald Neumann argues that the court's decision likewise evinces distrust of men; husbands and boyfriends may be brought into the counseling and even prosecuted. See Neumann, supra

1997]

CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY OF INVIOLABIUTY

379

abortion, and it requires the state to go about eliminating such social
injustice.
In response to Dworkin's stock argument that the nonpunishment of abortion proves a lack of belief in a fetal right to life,38 2 the
court could respond that he has missed the point: nonpunishment is
permissible only insofar as it is arguably more effective than penal
sanctions in protecting life. Similarly, a regime depenalizing child
abuse in favor of mandatory counseling need not imply any sort of
second-class personhood for children, if counseling is thought more
effective than penalties in preventing abuse.
Only in the face of proven hardships so extreme that it is "too
much to expect" (unzumutbar) that a pregnant woman give birth, despite all social supports, can the state label abortion "legal" or "justified" 8 3 and permit it to be generally covered by health insurance.3 8 4
In other words, faced with respect's disjunction between the duty not
to harm and the permission not to aid, the court gives at least nominal
priority to the former, by calling abortion "illegal" and requiring pronote 8, at 292. Therefore, the counseling requirements need not be seen as showing any
more than a doubt about any human being's ability fairly to judge her own case, although
Neumann admits they could spring from a sexist belief in the lack of independence of
women. See id. A more radical response to this criticism of the court would be to acknowledge women's lack of independence as a brute fact in a sexist society, a condition that must
be countered by counseling and support in order to free women and children from forces
hostile to both. It might be noted that the only woman on the court, a Social Democrat,
sided with the majority. See Kommers, supra note 8, at 25 n.117.
382. See supra text accompanying note 63. Dworkin accuses the 1975 German decision,
in particular, of not really being based on a right in the unborn child. LIFE'S DOMINION,
supra note 1, at 64.
383. 88 BVerfGE at 256-57 (citing 39 BVerfGE 1, 48ff (1973)). The court continues, as
in 1975, to indicate that abortions for medical, criminological, and embryopathological
reasons are legal, as well as for other emergencies of similar gravity that cannot be otherwise avoided. Id. Here the court appears to be reiterating the categories of the law enacted by the Bundestag in compliance with its 1975 decision. Id. at 257. There, abortion
was permitted in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy to avoid danger to the mother's life or
grave injury to her physical or mental health. Id. Abortion after sexual assault, in the case
of grave harm to the health of the child, or in other similar emergencies was legally
deemed to satisfy this life-or-health criterion. Id. at 215.
384. Unlike the 1975 decision, however, the 1993 opinion does not permit abortion
insurance coverage in the last, open-ended category of "similar emergencies." Id. at 31220. Although it concedes that continuation of pregnancy may sometimes be nonexpectable in such unspecified situations, it argues that the vagueness of this category opens it to
abuse and would interfere with the counseling process by giving the mother an incentive to
prove to the counselor that her conflict was irresolvable. Id. at 273-76, 312-20. Public
funds may, however, be used to fund all abortions for the poor in order to provide a
necessary incentive for them to come in for counseling. Id. at 316-17. The court's principle is that abortion for other than clearly provable hardship must be treated as unlawful by
the entire legal order except when the counseling system could not function without acting as if the abortion were lawful. Id. at 279-80.
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life counseling and support, except when the sacrifice asked by the
38 5
state would be inevitably overwhelming.
385. Id. at 257, 283-84. In 1975, it appeared plausible that the Constitutional Court
considered such hardship abortions only to be excused. See New Constitutional and Penal
Theory, supra note 10, at 545-51. George Fletcher treats Unzumutbarkeit as an excuse. See
FLETCHER, supra note 268, § 10.4.3, at 833. Other German courts, however, later made
clear that such abortions were legally justified, and in 1993, the Constitutional Court
agreed to this label. 88 BVerfGE 325-26. Hardship abortions can be justified in the penal
law even though they violate the fundamental right to life of the child and even though the
state continues to have an affirmative duty to protect that life. Id. at 257. A right to at least
some hardship abortions might even be required by the Basic Law. The court left this issue
open in 1993. Id. at 255.
How could the 1993 court decision call hardship abortion "justified" rather than only
"excused"? How could the court suppress the duty not to harm in favor of the right not to
aid without giving up the principle of an equal human dignity and right to life before birth
and at all stages of pregnancy? Its opinion contains no clear answer. It certainly does not
try to claim that the fetus is some kind of aggressor or intruder against whom force might
be justified.
Perhaps, by analogy, the court would argue that a mountain climber who has a companion (voluntarily) tied to his leg and dangling over an abyss would be thought by us
"justified" in actively cutting the rope in order to prevent gangrene, even at the cost of
killing the companion. Would we mean "justified," however, in the sense of "required by
duty" or even "favored by law"? Would the law urge the climber to cut off his companion? I
think not. When we say that severing the rope is justified, we mean, rather, that it would be
unjustified for the state to demand the sacrifice of a leg to save a life. SeeWAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AuSTIN W. Scor, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 5.4, at 441-43 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the public

policy behind the justification of necessity). We would rather have him lose his leg than
have his companion lose his life, but it would nevertheless be wrong of us to impose a legal
duty to accept gangrene. We call his act justified not because we fully approve of it, but
because we wish to emphasize the limits of state power. See id.
In like manner, it may be that the court does not really mean to say that hardship
abortions are fully justified, despite the state's pragmatic material cooperation with them.
Although there is no doubt that the court repeatedly uses the German term for "justified,"
gerechtfertigt, with regard to these hardship abortions, the 1993 decision also insists that the
state seek to prevent these same justified abortions by counseling and other nonpenal
means mentioned above. 88 BVerfGE 257. The 1975 decision likewise required the state
to try to convince women of their "duty" (Pflicht) to continue pregnancy even if abortion
would be legally justified. SeeJonas & Gorby, supra note 9, at 654-55.
States often, of course, grant rights that they would prefer not to see exercised. Many
of us would be happier if others exercised less often their rights to drink or smoke, to
promote pornography or revolution, or to refuse to heroically rescue their neighbors. The
law sometimes permits a violent response to aggression even when retreat is possible, especially when retreat would involve slight risk.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 65(2) (a) (1981). In such circumstances, might we not say that the victim of the aggression has a right to resist, but that we wish she would retreat instead? It makes perfect sense
to say that although someone may have a legal right to walk past a baby drowning in a
puddle, the human community urges the passerby to stop and render assistance. We
might even say that she is legallyjustified, though not morally correct, in refusing to retreat
or to rescue. See id. § 314 cmt. c (noting that one is under no legal duty to render aid to
another, even if the danger is great, merely by realizing the other is in danger). If we
spoke this way we would not mean justified in a very strong sense, however, especially if we
insisted that nonrescuers listen to our plea for rescue before walking by. We would have
used the word "justified" only in the weak sense of "legally permitted," and not in the
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In broadest outline, the Constitutional Court claims to further a
solution to the abortion debate that is both pro-choice and pro-life,
not in some newly stipulated meaning but in the very sense intended
by the partisans of these two camps.38 6 German abortion jurisprudence can be seen to be pro-choice because it does not penalize informed choices for early abortion.""7 It can also be seen as pro-life in
that the court is using what are arguably the most effective means at its
disposal to encourage respect for life. In so doing, German abortion

law incorporates our deep ambivalence about abortion, both our feeling that the living human individual is inviolable and our sense that
the liberal state must not overreach itself by demanding under penalty
that women give birth regardless of the cost.
There may or may not be a way to achieve full theoretical coherence between our sense of respect and our sense of freedom. I am
not sure that the German opinions have done so. They do, however,
point the way toward practical measures that may lessen our sense of
contradiction. Even people who think abortion justified or excused,
and who thus oppose its penalization, might agree to measures
designed to encourage a choice for life. 38a Furthermore, many such
people might agree with Germany that birth is too much to expect of
a woman only insofar as it requires her to bear burdens that are both
"heavy" and "unusual."38 9 Aid to women in resisting sexist and other
pressures to abort could make childbearing less severely burdensome
and thus more expectable. Likewise, demanding greater levels of sacrifice by men and other nonpregnant people (for example, reintroduction of the draft or legally required blood or marrow donation
strong sense of "legally favored." Perhaps this is the sort of weak justification intended by
the Constitutional Court. Perhaps, although abortion in hardship cases is not condemned

by the legal order; it is only a "liberty," not something the law encourages or promotes.
My own judgment remains that the language of excuse would capture our sympathy
for hardship abortion better than that ofjustification. It is easy not to blame women who
have abortions in difficult circumstances, without giving up the principle of the inviolability of life. To adhere to that principle while calling an act of lethal violence-not just an
omission-justified seems much more difficult. Still, the court must be credited with a
solution that seeks to incorporate both liberal deference to self-interest and communitarian encouragement to self-sacrifice-by supporting those who refuse to be heroines even
while pleading for heroism. 88 BVerfGE 203 (1993).
386. Kommers indicates that the German judicial debate has built "bridges between
people of opposing views." Kommers, supra note 8, at 29.
387. 88 BVerfGE 203.
388. Both Kommers and Neumann have suggested that the United States Supreme
Court in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), may permit more or less the same
degree of fetal protection that the German court requires, namely, measures aimed at persuading (rather than coercing) women to give birth. See Kommers, supra note 8, at 32;
Neumann, supra note 8, at 292.
389. 88 BVerfGE, 203, 257, 283-84.
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by parents to children) would make pregnancy's level of burden less
unusual. 9 0° As these two processes advanced, abortion could come to
seem less justified or excused to many who now support it. 39 ' They

might still not think penalization the best route to prevention, but
they would support other forms of state action protective of unborn
life.
CONCLUSION

In Life's Dominion, Ronald Dworkin has tried to make sense of a
common sort of ambivalence concerning the fetus. Many people
seem to value the fetus as less than a human being with equal rights
but more than the sort of potentiality found in sperm and egg prior to
conception. In order to explain this significant but less-than-equal fetal value, Dworkin suggests that we must be valuing the investment
that goes into a human being as it is conceived and as it matures, first
before and then after birth. 9 2 Traditional terms such as the "sanctity"
and "inviolability" of human life express our concern that this investment not go to waste at any time during someone's life, according to
Dworkin. 9 3
This critique of Dworkin's theory of inviolability has argued that
his theory is dangerous, mistaken, and unnecessary: To reduce the
inviolability of life to a mercantilist notion of avoiding waste endangers various sorts of vulnerable people whose continued lives seem
wasteful to some. Moreover, Dworkin's turn to investment mistakenly
ignores the human individual who is the real focus of our moral intuitions. Most important, value-based reasoning, as used by Dworkin
and many others, 9 4 cannot discern the significance of particular entities; it unthinkingly undercuts not only the right to life but individual
dignity and equality as well. Finally, Dworkin's effort was unnecessary
because there are more plausible ways to resolve any ambivalence we
may have concerning abortion, without criminalizing it.
390. These other sacrifices might not have to be quite as burdensome as those of childbirth in order to make continuation of pregnancy "expectable." When the alternative is an
act of violence, we may well feel that more sacrifice can be expected than when the alternative is merely an omission of aid. Nevertheless, the sacrifices borne by pregnant women are
unlikely to be felt acceptable if they seem wholly out of line with the burdens carried by
others.
391. Such views from the political Left were noted at the beginning of this Article. See
supra note 40.
392. LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 68-101; see supra text accompanying notes 111-135
(discussing Dworkin's investment-based theory of inviolability).
393. LiFE's DOMINION, supra note 1, at 68-101.
394. See supra note 5.
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The central datum overlooked by Dworkin is the attitude called
respect. Respect cannot be converted into value. It is a separate and
significant stance toward human beings and other entities. The core
of this Article has been a description of the nature and effects of the
idea of respect.

